Perodeau v. Hartford (dissenting)
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****************************************************** The officially released date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the officially released date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the officially released date. All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. ****************************************************** PERODEAU v. HARTFORD SECOND CONCURRENCE NORCOTT, J., concurring and dissenting. I concur with parts I and II A of the majority opinion. I also join, in part, the Chief Justice s dissent with respect to part II B of the majority opinion. I agree with the dissent that the majority s distinction between claims involving termination and claims in an ongoing employment context is arbitrary. In my opinion, employers have a legal duty to avoid subjecting their employees to the negligent infliction of emotional distress whether the claim arises in the ongoing employment context or through a termination event. I write separately, however, because I am not prepared, at this point, to conclude that our decision in Montinieri v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 175 Conn. 337, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978), was, as the Chief Justice writes, misguided. As the majority opinion notes, we do not address Montinieri because neither party asked for our opinion on the issue in that case. While I would be willing, in a proper case, to revisit the question of whether a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress requires proof of an ensuing physical injury or risk of harm from physical impact, I believe it is premature to offer my opinion on that issue without the full exploration of it in another case. Our decision in Montinieri may or may not have been misguided. Whichever comes to be the case, I reserve my opinion on that issue for a future appeal before this court.
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