Unpublished Disposition, 919 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1990)

MEMORANDUM^** 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant Leo D. Feurt ("Feurt") instituted a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 for fraud, conspiracy, and deprivation of constitutional rights against three employees of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). The sole basis for the suit is Feurt's argument that taxation is unconstitutional and that the IRS realizes this. The district court dismissed appellant's claims on the ground that the lawsuit was frivolous and the court therefore lacked jurisdiction. Feurt appeals this determination as well as the district court's refusal to make additional findings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52. We affirm the district court's ruling and impose sanctions in the amount of $500 against appellant for filing a frivolous appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court dismissed this action as a pure question of law following motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6). This court reviews questions of law de novo. Fort Vancouver Plywood v. United States, 747 F.2d 547, 552 (9th Cir. 1984).

FACTS¹ 

The IRS, after audits, apparently determined deficencies against appellant Feurt for 1977, 1980, and 1981. In 1988, Feurt filed this class action lawsuit, in propria persona, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages, against Bob Mack ("Mack"), an IRS employee who allegedly helped in the preparation of Feurt's tax returns, Theron C. Polivka ("Polivka"), Director of the Fresno IRS Center, and Michael J. Quinn ("Quinn"), District Director of the Laguna Nigel Internal Revenue District--as well as "unknown named" IRS officers or agents. The complaint alleged fraud, conspiracy, and deprivation of constitutional rights. The sole basis for these allegations was Feurt's belief that the IRS is involved in a grand conspiracy to deprive Americans of their constitutional rights by taxing them. The foundation for these claims was Feurt's belief that the income tax is unconstitutional. All defendants moved to dismiss on a variety of grounds. Although properly served, Feurt did not file a written opposition to any of these motions.

After a hearing, the district court dismissed Feurt's claims as so frivolous that they conferred no jurisdiction. Feurt was present at the hearing and orally presented his grounds for opposition. Following the dismissal, Feurt asked for additional findings of fact pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 52.

Feurt now appeals, arguing that the district court's failure to hold a hearing and make these additional findings violated his due process rights.² 

ANALYSIS

Frivoulous claims can be dismissed for failure to confer jurisdiction. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946); Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984); Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342-46 (9th Cir. 1981). Appellant's claims have been uniformly rejected and are now considered per se frivolous. United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 1986); Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1985). The district court was therefore correct in dismissing appellant's claims on jurisdictional grounds.

Further, we hold that the district court did not err in refusing to grant additional findings of fact under Rule 52 since Rule 52 explicitly states:

Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41(b).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis added).

Finally, although appellant appeared in propria persona, his claims are so frivolous that they warrant the imposition of sanctions in the amount of $500. See Wilcox v. C.I.R., 848 F.2d 1007, 1008 (9th Cir. 1988).

AFFIRMED; SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $500 ARE IMPOSED AGAINST APPELLANT.