United States of America v. Woltmann, No. 10-413 (2d Cir. 2010)

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10-413 United States v. Woltmann 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT August Term, 2009 (Argued: June 9, 2010 Decided: July 6, 2010) Docket No. 10-413 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, - v.GARY WOLTMANN, Defendant-Appellant. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Before: JACOBS, Chief Judge, WINTER and WALKER, JR., Circuit Judges. Defendant-appellant Gary Woltmann pled guilty in the 30 United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 31 York (Platt, J.) to one count of tax fraud. 32 a notice of appeal challenging the sentence, and the 33 government countered with a motion to dismiss on the basis 34 of the appeal waiver provision in the plea agreement. 35 conclude that the waiver is unenforceable, and we vacate and 36 remand to a different district judge for re-sentencing. Woltmann filed We 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 RICHARD M. LANGONE, Langone & Associates, Levittown, New York, for Appellant. CHARLES P. KELLY, for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney s Office for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, New York, for Appellee. DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge: Defendant-appellant Gary Woltmann pled guilty in the 16 United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 17 York (Platt, J.) to one count of tax fraud. 18 a notice of appeal challenging the sentence, and the 19 government countered with a motion to dismiss, citing 20 Woltmann s waiver of appeal in the plea agreement ( the 21 Agreement ). 22 and we vacate and remand to a different district judge for 23 re-sentencing. Woltmann filed We conclude that the waiver is unenforceable, 24 25 I 26 Pursuant to the Agreement, Woltmann pled guilty in 27 September 2007. After signing the Agreement but before 28 sentencing, Woltmann provided substantial assistance to the 29 government in its (ultimately successful) prosecution of 2 1 another criminal tax fraud case. 2 cooperation, the government submitted a letter to the 3 district court pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 urg[ing] the 4 Court to consider formulating a sentence below the advisory 5 guidelines range of 18 to 24 months imprisonment.1 6 In exchange for this At a December 11, 2009 hearing ( December 11 Hearing ), 7 defense counsel and the government urged the district court 8 to consider the 5K1.1 letter and the factors enumerated in 9 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when imposing sentence. Notwithstanding 10 these prompts, the district court deemed the 5K1.1 letter an 11 improper effort by the parties to repudiate, modify, or 12 amend the Agreement, and ruled that the Agreement 13 constituted Woltmann s consent to any sentence at or below 14 27 months (the upper limit of the appeal waiver provision). 15 Accordingly, the judge discounted the 5K1.1 letter and the 16 other factors enumerated in § 3553(a). 17 At a hearing on January 22, 2010 ( January 22 18 Hearing ), the district court sentenced Woltmann principally 19 to 18 months imprisonment (the low end of the Guidelines 1 Section 5K1.1 provides that [u]pon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines. 3 1 range). 2 appeal in this Court; the government moved to dismiss on the 3 basis of the appeal waiver provision in the Agreement; and 4 Woltmann moved for bail pending appeal. 5 In short succession, Woltmann filed a notice of On April 7, 2010, we granted Woltmann s bail motion. 6 See United States v. Woltmann, 10-0413-cr (Apr. 7, 2010) 7 (order). 8 submitted to this panel. 9 considerations that bear upon the motion likewise control The government s motion to dismiss was then Because the facts, rules, and 10 the merits of the underlying appeal, we heard oral argument 11 on the merits, and we resolve the merits together with the 12 motion: 13 sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded to a 14 different district court judge for re-sentencing. The government s motion is denied, Woltmann s 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 II Three provisions of the Agreement have bearing on this appeal: ¢ Paragraph 2 states that the applicable Guidelines term of imprisonment is 18-24 months. ¢ Paragraph 2 acknowledges that the Guidelines are advisory and the court is required to consider any applicable Guidelines provisions as well as other factors enumerated in 18 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Provisions like these are common, and their inclusion in the 13 Agreement is unexceptional. 14 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to arrive at an appropriate sentence in this case. ¢ Paragraph 4 contains an appeal waiver provision: The defendant agrees not to . . . appeal . . . the conviction or sentence in the event that the Court imposes a term of imprisonment of 27 months or below. This waiver is binding without regard to the sentencing analysis used by the Court. At the December 11 Hearing, the government reiterated 15 its position, expressed in the 5K1.1 letter, that the court 16 should impose a below-Guidelines sentence due to Woltmann s 17 substantial assistance. 18 Hearing at 8. 19 Agreement as the governing or controlling instrument, 20 e.g., id. at 4-5, and reasoned that the government s 21 advocacy of a below-Guidelines sentence on the basis of the 22 5K1.1 letter was an impermissible attempt to repudiate, 23 modify, or amend the Agreement, e.g., id. at 5, 14. 24 district court felt free to ignore the 5K1.1 letter and the 25 § 3553 factors because Woltmann had ostensibly consented to 26 such and such a sentence by agreeing both to the Guidelines 27 calculation in Paragraph 2 and the appeal waiver in 28 Paragraph 4. See, e.g., Tr. of December 11 The district court refused. Id. at 6. It viewed the In effect, the district court 5 The 1 believed that because of the appeal waiver, any sentence at 2 or below 27 months was appropriate, regardless of whether or 3 how the 5K1.1 letter and the § 3553(a) factors--if 4 considered--would bear on the sentence. 5 At the January 22 sentencing hearing, the district 6 court stated that it had considered the [A]greement that 7 was made with the government and the provision that we just 8 read, paragraph four [i.e., the appeal waiver provision], 9 and the court feels that under the circumstances here and 10 the family circumstances that an 18 month sentence is an 11 appropriate one. 12 court also intimated, as it had done at the December 11 13 Hearing, that consideration of the 5K1.1 letter would 14 constitute an impermissible repudiation of the Agreement: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Tr. of January 22 Hearing at 12. The [Defense Counsel]: I would just like to point out to the court, judge, first, that all of the guideline calculations were based upon an estimate prior to any cooperation or 5K1 letter. The Court: Are you saying he wants to repudiate the plea agreement? Id. at 4 Woltmann filed a notice of appeal, and the government 6 1 moves to dismiss citing the appeal waiver in Paragraph 4 of 2 the Agreement. 3 court s treatment of the 5K1.1 letter and the § 3553(a) 4 factors requires us to vacate the sentence and remand for 5 re-sentencing. Woltmann in turn argues that the district We agree. 6 III 7 8 9 Plea agreements are reviewed in accordance with principles of contract law. United States v. Vaval, 404 10 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 11 omitted). 12 parties as to the terms of the agreement. 13 Colon, 220 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 2000). 14 plea agreements are unique contracts, . . . we temper the 15 application of ordinary contract principles with special due 16 process concerns for fairness and the adequacy of procedural 17 safeguards. 18 Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 contracts are narrowly construed. We consider the reasonable understanding of the United States v. Moreover, because United States v. Granik, 386 F.3d 404, 413 (2d Such Id. 20 It is a well-settled legal principle that the 21 sentencing judge is of course not bound by the estimated 22 range in a plea agreement. United States v. Hamdi, 432 7 1 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 2 omitted). 3 district court must consider both a 5K1.1 letter (if one is 4 proffered), United States v. Campo, 140 F.3d 415, 418-19 & 5 n.5 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam), and the factors enumerated 6 in § 3553(a), Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-51 7 (2007). 8 9 To the contrary, before imposing sentence, a Ordinarily, appeal waivers are enforced--and for good reason. See United States v. Morgan, 386 F.3d 376, 380 (2d 10 Cir. 2004) (explaining that voiding such waivers would 11 render the plea bargaining process and the resulting 12 agreement meaningless (internal quotation marks omitted)); 13 United States v. Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d 315, 318 (2d Cir. 14 2000) ( [T]he benefits of such waivers inure to both 15 government and the defendant alike, with the government 16 receiving the benefit of reduced litigation, and the 17 defendant receiving some certainty with respect to his 18 liability and punishment. ); United States v. Yemitan, 70 19 F.3d 746, 747-48 (2d Cir. 1995) ( If this waiver does not 20 preclude a challenge to the sentence as unlawful, then the 21 covenant not to appeal becomes meaningless and would cease 22 to have value as a bargaining chip in the hands of 8 1 defendants. ). But we will not enforce an appeal waiver 2 where--as here--the sentencing decision . . . was reached 3 in a manner that the plea agreement did not anticipate, 4 United States v. Liriano-Blanco, 510 F.3d 168, 174 (2d Cir. 5 2007); see also United States v. Roque, 421 F.3d 118, 123-24 6 (2d Cir. 2005) (suggesting that an appeal waiver would be 7 unenforceable if the defendant failed to underst[an]d fully 8 the consequences of his bargain, both in terms of what he 9 was gaining and what he was giving up ), or where the 10 sentencing court failed to enunciate any rationale for the 11 defendant s sentence, thus amounting to an abdication of 12 judicial responsibility subject to mandamus, Gomez-Perez, 13 215 F.3d at 319 (brackets and internal quotation marks 14 omitted). 15 Applying these principles, we hold that vacatur is 16 required because the district court: (1) improperly relied 17 on the Agreement to the exclusion of the 5K1.1 letter and 18 the § 3553(a) factors; and (2) misread the Agreement as 19 manifesting Woltmann s enforceable concession that any 20 sentence at or below 27 months obviated the need to consider 21 the 5K1.1 letter and the § 3553(a) factors. 22 the district court failed to give effect to the parties 9 In so doing, 1 expectations and deprived Woltmann of the benefit that he 2 (and the government) agreed he would receive from signing 3 the Agreement (i.e., a weighing of the 5K1.1 letter and the 4 § 3553 factors). 5 abdicated its judicial responsibility in the way posited 6 by Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d at 319. At the same time, the court also 7 A 8 9 As the transcript of the December 11 Hearing 10 unambiguously shows, the district court felt itself entitled 11 to rely on the Agreement notwithstanding our law that such 12 reliance is misplaced. 13 example, when the government raised the 5K1.1 letter at the 14 outset of the hearing, the court responded: [T]his is all 15 very good, but we have--starting this case off, with an 16 agreement that you and counsel for the defendant made, and 17 signed by the defendant, and as far as I m concerned, that 18 is still the governing instrument here. . . . 19 agreement is the controlling instrument. 20 11 Hearing at 4-5. 21 at 5 ( [The government], the defendant, and the defense 22 lawyer made an agreement, and that agreement has been, in my See Hamdi, 432 F.3d at 124. Other examples abound. 10 For The plea Tr. of December See, e.g., id. 1 book, controlling right from the start here. ); id. at 7 2 ( [A]s I see it at the moment, [the Agreement] overrides all 3 else in this picture. ); id. at 11 ( [Y]ou made an agreement 4 and I m entitled to rely on it. ); id. at 15 ( I m troubled 5 by the government s position that I may ignore this 6 agreement, which I don t think that I can or I may, I can, 7 but I may not. ); id. at 20 ( What is controlling in my book 8 is the agreement. . . . ). 9 This (improper) reliance caused the district court to 10 misread the Agreement and, as a result, to impose a sentence 11 inconsistent with the parties expectations in signing the 12 Agreement. 13 unambiguously understood by both parties, and as it was 14 initially understood by the district court--contemplated 15 that sentence would be imposed only after the district court 16 considered the 5K1.1 letter and the § 3553(a) factors. 17 Agreement ¶ 2 ( The defendant understands that . . . the 18 Guidelines are advisory and the court is required to 19 consider any applicable Guidelines provisions [i.e., 20 § 5K1.1] as well as other factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 21 § 3553(a) to arrive at an appropriate sentence in this 22 case. ); id. ¶ 3 ( The Guidelines estimate set forth in The Agreement--by its own terms, as it was 11 See 1 [P]aragraph 2 is not binding on . . . the Court. ); 2 Transcript of Plea Colloquy at 15 (September 18, 2007) 3 (district court summarizing Paragraph 2 of the Agreement and 4 ensuring that Woltmann understood that his sentence would be 5 based on any applicable guidelines together with the 6 factors contained in 18 U.S.C. [§] 3553(a) ); December 11 7 Hearing at 8 (government urging the court to impose a below- 8 Guidelines sentence pursuant to the 5K1.1 letter); see also 9 Tr. of January 22 Hearing at 4 (defense counsel emphasizing 10 to the court that all of the guideline calculations were 11 based upon an estimate prior to any cooperation or 5K1[.1] 12 letter ). 13 Moreover, the government explained to the district 14 court that although some plea agreements preclude both 15 parties from making any motions, this Agreement did not: 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 This agreement does not preclude motions by any party. Occasionally we will insert in these agreements that the parties agree that no motions will be filed in connection with the sentencing. That sentence is not in this agreement. And since the signing of the agreement, Mr. Woltmann has cooperated, and I was--the government was simply trying to bring that to the Court s attention in formulating a sentence. Tr. of December 11 Hearing at 15-16. 27 intentional: This omission was The government intended to preserve its 12 1 ability to offer a 5K1.1 letter for the court s 2 consideration at sentencing. 3 Notwithstanding all this, the court concluded that, in 4 urging consideration of the 5K1.1 letter, the parties were 5 improperly attempting to repudiate or modify the Agreement-- 6 and repeatedly rebuked them for doing so. 7 9 ( [T]he government is changing its position here with 8 respect to this waiver. ); id. at 11 (sparring with the 9 government and finding it necessary to read [the Agreement] See, e.g., id. at 10 to you again because you apparently have not been reading 11 it ); id. at 11-12 ( I never had a case where the government 12 has made a firm agreement and then goes out and tries to 13 modify it, in effect. ); id. at 13 ( [The government is] 14 trying to modify that agreement. ); id. at 14 ( [The 15 government] can t amend it this way, as I see it. ); id. at 16 15 ( And to attempt to modify that agreement in this fashion 17 I find very troubling. ); id. at 16 ( I don t think that you 18 can modify this agreement that you made here. ). 19 In effect, the court refused to consider the 5K1.1 20 letter and the § 3553(a) factors on the ground that the 21 appeal waiver and the sentencing range in the Agreement 22 obviated anything else. This erroneous conclusion denied 13 1 the parties their bargain and reasonable expectations. In 2 this way, the district court erred, and the appeal waiver 3 provision is unenforceable. 4 174; Roque, 421 F.3d at 123-24. Liriano-Blanco, 510 F.3d at 5 6 B 7 The district court misconstrued the Agreement as an 8 enforceable concession by Woltmann that any sentence at or 9 below 27 months was appropriate--without regard to any 5K1.1 10 letter and the § 3553(a) factors. 11 following colloquy took place at the December 11 hearing: 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 For example, the [Prosecutor]: [T]he government does not believe that [the 5K1.1 letter] affects the plea agreement in any way. However, when the Court moves to set a sentence under 3553(a), we ask the Court to consider a sentence below the guidelines in part because of the cooperation of Mr. Woltmann. So I think it plays a role in the second step, when you get to the 3553(a) factors. The Court: What need do I have to get to that level when I have a plea agreement where he has consented to such and such a sentence? [Prosecutor]: Well, what s been consented to and agreed to is the guidelines. The Court: No. 14 No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 December 11 Hearing at 6-7 (emphasis added). Similarly: [Prosecutor]: The Court: Id. at 8. [P]aragraph 4 of the plea agreement . . . is simply a waiver of appeal or challenge to the sentence. All it does is set a ceiling below which there cannot be any appeal. . . . It is not an agreement to a sentence of that length. It is simply a waiver of appeal. What the parties have agreed within the agreement is that the guidelines are 18 to 24 months, and then if the Court accepts that and moves from the agreement to 3553, and considers the factors under 3553, the government believes one of the factors is Mr. Woltmann s cooperation, which the government believes warrants a sentence below the 18 to 24 month guideline. That is a lot of double-talk when you get right down to [it]. And again: [Prosecutor]: There s an appeal waiver up to 27 months. That was never a sentencing recommendation of the government. There s a guideline of 18 to 24 months. Those two facts come out of the plea agreement. At that point when the Court enters its 3553 analysis, the guidelines [are] one of the things that the Court--one of the items that the Court looks at in formulating a sentence. So there s a guideline of 18 to 24 months, 15 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 and then one of the things the Court considers-The Court: What you re saying is that this is, I m not entitled to rely on the agreement that the defendant has made. [Prosecutor]: You are entitled to rely on it. He has waived his appeal and any challenge to it for a sentence up to 27 months. He agrees that the guidelines are 18 to 24 months. Those two things are agreed. But then the Court is required to move under Gall, G-A-L-L, over to the 3553. The Court: I don t have to do anything if I have this agreement. Because it s not challengeable according to you, the agreement itself. [Prosecutor]: But the agreement doesn t contain any sentencing recommendation. The Court: The agreement says he may not challenge anything that the Court does . . . in the event the Court imposes a term of imprisonment of 27 months or below. This waiver is binding without regard to the sentencing analysis used by the Court. The defendant waives all defenses . . . . You re trying to modify that agreement. [Prosecutor]: No. The Court: I don t think you may. [Prosecutor]: The fact that nobody can 16 The fact-- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 challenge it does not mean that it s the appropriate sentence or that anybody-The Court: It s not a question of an appropriate sentence. It is appropriate by both sides[ ] agreement if it s 27 months or below. [Prosecutor]: Well, not that it s appropriate, but that no one will appeal it or challenge it in any way. Id. at 12-14 (emphases added). 16 The district court s actions amount[ed] to an 17 abdication of judicial responsibility, Gomez-Perez, 215 18 F.3d at 319, requiring us to deem the appeal waiver 19 unenforceable. 20 n.5, and Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-51, is that a district court 21 must consider a 5K1.1 letter and the § 3553(a) factors when 22 formulating the appropriate sentence. 23 these things is an error categorically different from a 24 misapplication of a guideline, or a mistake of law, or a 25 dubious finding of fact. 26 category of error contemplated in Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d at 27 319, which states that an appeal waiver is unenforceable 28 when the district court abdicates its duties in imposing 29 sentence. The mandate of Campo, 140 F.3d at 418-19 & Refusal to consider What happened here is in the 17 1 2 IV 3 On remand, Woltmann s re-sentencing should proceed 4 5 before a different district court judge. Three considerations guide our analysis: (1) whether 6 the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand 7 to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her 8 mind previously-expressed views or findings determined to be 9 erroneous, (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve 10 the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment 11 would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any 12 gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. 13 States v. Hernandez, 604 F.3d 48, 55-56 (2d Cir. 2010) 14 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted). 15 These considerations favor reassignment. 16 1. United In light of the scorn with which Judge Platt 17 approached the matters pertaining to sentencing, we have 18 considerable doubt as to whether on remand he would give 19 fair consideration to the 5K1.1 letter and the § 3553(a) 20 factors. 21 11 Hearing, when the district court considered itself to be 22 (in terms or effect) a party to the Agreement, or a Our doubt is reinforced by events at the December 18 1 beneficiary of the appeal waiver. 2 declared: I am entitled to rely on an agreement. 3 make that abundantly clear that s my position. 4 December 11 Hearing at 22; see also id. at 11 ( [The 5 government] made an agreement and I m entitled to rely on 6 it. ). 7 respect to all three of us. . . , id. at 14 (emphasis 8 added). 9 For example, the court I want to Tr. of And: [The government] made an agreement with The district court s strange misconception of its role 10 vis-a-vis the parties and the Agreement may explain the 11 court s asserted right to rely on the Agreement, and its 12 conspicuous frustration at what the court viewed 13 (erroneously) as the parties attempt to repudiate or modify 14 the Agreement. 15 judge on remand to suppress a view of the Agreement premised 16 on his own claim of right. 17 2. It also casts doubt on the ability of the In considering the appearance of justice, we must 18 consider Judge Platt s pattern of error regarding 5K1.1 19 letters. 20 2003) (per curiam); Campo, 140 F.3d 415. 21 22 3. See United States v. Doe, 348 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. Finally, reassignment would not waste substantial judicial resources, because all the district court must do 19 1 on remand is what district courts do as a matter of routine: 2 consider the 5K1.1 letter and the § 3553(a) factors, and 3 impose sentence accordingly. 4 CONCLUSION 5 6 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the sentence and 7 remand for re-sentencing before a different district court 8 judge. 20

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