Vinyard v. United States, No. 14-1134 (7th Cir. 2015)
Annotate this CaseVinyard pled guilty to conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute. At sentencing, he started to backtrack on whether he was admitting some of the relevant conduct. After consulting his attorney, he withdrew his objections. His hesitation prompted the district judge (Gilbert) to vacate his plea and sentence on the court’s own initiative, which led to unusual proceedings culminating in a writ of mandamus ordering the court to reinstate Vinyard’s plea and sentence. Vinyard tried to challenge his plea in district court proceedings conducted to comply with the mandate. Judge Stiehl rejected Vinyard’s challenge and reinstated the plea and sentence. Vinyard then could have filed either direct appeal or a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255. On his attorney’s advice, he chose collateral attack. He later sought reinstatement of his right to direct appeal, arguing that advice caused him to default some claims and amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington. The district court denied relief, concluding that the decision to forgo a direct appeal was strategic and not objectively unreasonable, and that Vinyard could not show prejudice in any event. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Vinyard proved neither deficient performance nor prejudice.
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