United States v. Taylor, No. 16-1019 (7th Cir. 2016)

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In 2005 the defendant was sentenced by Judge Reinhard to 300 months in prison for possessing a shotgun illegally. The sentence was later invalidated; in 2015 the defendant was resentenced by Judge Reinhard to 176 months. The defendant was then 54 years old, had a serious vision problem, and had been a model prisoner during the 140 months that he had served: because of his good behavior he was credited with having served 160 months of imprisonment, so that the 176‐month sentence was effectively a sentence of 16 more months in prison. Both the probation service and the U.S. Attorney’s Office had recommended that he be sentenced to time served. The judge rejected the suggestions, citing the gravity of the defendant’s criminal history before 2005 and the fact that, while he had never threatened any officials, defendant had filed complaints (and one civil suit) critical of judicial behavior by Reinhard and other judges and alleging conspiracies linking judges and other officials to grievances the defendant had suffered decades ago. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that most of the defendant’s criminal history before the shotgun incident consisted of driving offenses and that defendant had a constitutional right to petition for redress of grievances. The court called the judge’s reasoning “flimsy” and stated that further crimes by the defendant were unlikely.

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In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 16 1019 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff Appellee, v. TERRY N. TAYLOR, Defendant Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division. No. 04 CR 50038 — Philip G. Reinhard, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED AUGUST 9, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2016 ____________________ Before BAUER, POSNER, and SYKES, Circuit Judges. POSNER, Circuit Judge. In 2005 the defendant had been sentenced by Judge Reinhard to 300 months in prison for federal gun related offenses (namely for possessing a shot gun illegally), but the sentence was later determined to be invalid and in December of last year the defendant was re sentenced by Judge Reinhard to 176 months, even though by that time the defendant was 54 years old, had a serious vi sion problem, and had been a model prisoner during the 140 2 No. 16 1019 months that he’d been in prison before he was resentenced. Indeed as a result of his good behavior he was credited with having served 160 months of imprisonment, so that Judge Reinhard’s 176 month sentence was effectively a sentence of sixteen more months in prison. The sixteen months will end on December 16 of this year, and the defendant has already been moved from prison to a halfway house in preparation for his imminent release. The 176 month sentence, however little it will affect the defendant’s incarceration, was more than double the high end of Taylor s recalculated guidelines range of 70 to 87 months. And so, unsurprisingly, at his resentencing hearing both the probation service and the U.S. Attorney’s Office recommended that he be sentenced to time served. Had the judge gone along with the recommendations, the defendant would have been released immediately. The judge refused to take the advice of the U.S. Attor ney’s Office and the probation service on two grounds: the gravity of the defendant’s criminal history before the offens es of which he had been convicted in 2005 (a history mostly predating the twenty first century) and the fact that the de fendant, while he had never threatened any officials, had filed complaints (and one civil suit) critical of judicial behav ior by Judge Reinhard and other judges and alleging con spiracies linking judges and various other officials to griev ances the defendant had suffered decades ago. Conceivably, Judge Reinhard supposed, the defendant might follow up the complaints with criminal harassment upon his release. The judge thought these two grounds predictive of the like lihood that upon release from prison the defendant will commit further crimes. No. 16 1019 3 These were flimsy grounds. Most of the defendant’s criminal history prior to the shotgun incident consisted of driving offenses, and he presumably can’t drive any longer because of his vision problem. As for pestering federal judg es (including the author of this opinion!) with seemingly groundless complaints about how he’s been treated by the criminal justice system, he has a constitutional right to peti tion the government for redress of grievances, though if he becomes an utter nuisance his petitioning activity can be reined in. He has not threatened anybody with violence or other criminal harm, and the judge offered no adequate rea son for inferring a risk of recidivism from the contents of his complaints. See United States v. Bradley, 628 F.3d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Due process requires that sentencing determina tions be based on reliable evidence, not speculation or un founded allegations.” (quoting United States v. England, 555 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2009))). The judge did cite 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which specifies fac tors that a sentencing judge must consider in deciding what sentence to impose, but he did not align the factors with the defendant’s situation. So far as relevant to this case, the stat ute provides that “The court shall impose a sentence suffi cient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection,” to wit “the need for the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the seri ousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford ade quate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the pub lic from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational train ing, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” (D) is obviously irrelevant. As for (A), 4 No. 16 1019 nearly twelve years in prison for a crime that caused no harm (except perhaps to frighten the person whom the de fendant supposedly brandished his shotgun at the day be fore he was arrested) should be enough to satisfy the re quirements of that subsection. And with further crimes by the defendant unlikely, (C) falls out of the picture, leaving (B); and again his decade plus in prison should provide ade quate deterrence to anyone thinking of emulating the de fendant’s crimes. In sum, the district judge did not adequately justify the sentence that he imposed and indeed based it in part on sheer speculation. The sentence is therefore vacated and the case remanded for another round of resentencing—we trust it will be the last. Time is of the essence, since under the sen tence that we’re vacating Taylor could be expected to be re leased from the halfway house just four months from now. We are therefore issuing the mandate forthwith and remind ing Taylor’s attorney that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143 he can move the district judge, pending resentencing, to release Taylor immediately. VACATED AND REMANDED

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