JONATHAN RIVERA V. CENTURION, ET AL, No. 22-16818 (9th Cir. 2023)
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED NOV 21 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JONATHAN ERIC RIVERA, Plaintiff-Appellant, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS No. 22-16818 D.C. No. 4:22-cv-00031-JAS-PSOT v. MEMORANDUM* CENTURION; UNKNOWN PARTY, named as P.C.S.D. Medical Intake Jane Doe #1; PIMA COUNTY ADULT DETENTION COMPLEX; UNKNOWN PARTY, named as Centurion Nurse Jane Doe #2; UNKNOWN PARTY, named as Nurse Jane Doe #3 Centurion; UNKNOWN PARTY, named as Centurion Nurse Jane Doe #4; UNKNOWN ROBINSON, named as Nurse Robinson Centurion; NAPHCARE; UNKNOWN PARTY, named as Pima Count Sergeant Classification Officer John/Jane Doe #5; PIMA, COUNTY OF, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona James Alan Soto, District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 14, 2023** * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: SILVERMAN, WARDLAW, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges. Arizona state prisoner Jonathan Eric Rivera appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations related COVID-19 policies at the jail where Rivera was housed as a pretrial detainee. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Rivera’s action because Rivera failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018) (setting forth objective deliberate indifference standard for Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care and conditions-of-confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating standard for bringing § 1983 suits against private entities acting under color of state law); Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth elements for establishing liability based on failure to train under § 1983); Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[L]iability under section 1983 can be established by showing that the defendant personally participated in a deprivation of the plaintiff's rights [] or caused such a deprivation to occur.”); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se 2 22-16818 pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim). We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. 3 22-16818
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