Dixon v. Colvin, No. 1:2014cv03183 - Document 22 (E.D. Wash. 2015)

Court Description: ORDER Granting Defendant's 20 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge James P. Hutton. (MO, Courtroom Deputy)

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Dixon v. Colvin Doc. 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 Case No. 1:14-cv-03183-JPH 9 10 KAREN DIXON, 11 Plaintiff, 12 vs. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 13 14 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 Defendant. 16 BEFORE THE COURT are cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF No. 17 15, 20. Attorney D. James Tree represents plaintiff (Dixon). Special Assistant 18 United States Attorney Benjamin Groebner represents defendant (Commissioner). 19 Plaintiff filed a reply. ECF No. 21. The parties consented to proceed before a 20 magistrate judge. ECF No. 6. After reviewing the administrative record and the ORDER ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 briefs filed by the parties, the court grants defendant’s motion for summary 2 judgment, ECF No. 20. 3 JURISDICTION 4 Dixon protectively applied for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and 5 supplemental security income disability benefits (SSI) on August 17, 2010, alleging 6 onset beginning July 1, 2005 (Tr. 216-31, 232-41 ). The claims were denied initially 7 and on reconsideration (Tr. 130-144, 147-158). On January 23, 2013, Administrative 8 Law Judge (ALJ) Tom L. Morris held a hearing. Plaintiff, represented by counsel, 9 and a vocational expert testified (Tr. 42-83). On March 29, 2013, the ALJ issued an 10 unfavorable decision (Tr. 21-34). The Appeals Council denied review on September 11 26, 2014 (Tr. 1-5), making the ALJ’s decision final. On December 1, 2014, plaintiff 12 filed this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g). ECF No. 1, 4. 13 STATEMENT OF FACTS 14 The facts have been presented in the administrative hearing transcript, the 15 ALJ’s decision and the parties’ briefs. They are only briefly summarized here and 16 throughout this order as necessary to explain the Court’s decision. 17 Plaintiff was 45 years old when she applied for benefits and 47 at the hearing. 18 She graduated from high school and earned a two-year degree in chemical 19 dependency studies. She has worked as a bookkeeper, administrative clerk and 20 billing clerk. She last worked in 2003 and had an unsuccessful work attempt in 2005. ORDER ~ 2 1 Plaintiff lives with her mother. Activities include reading, writing, cooking, driving 2 and using a computer. She underwent spinal fusion surgery in March 2012. She 3 alleges physical and mental limitations (Tr. 45, 47, 67, 72, 252, 260, 370, 623-34). 4 SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 5 The Social Security Act (the Act) defines disability as the “inability to engage 6 in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical 7 or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or 8 can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 9 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a plaintiff shall 10 be determined to be under a disability only if any impairments are of such severity 11 that a plaintiff is not only unable to do previous work but cannot, considering 12 plaintiff’s age, education and work experiences, engage in any other substantial 13 work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 14 1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability consists of both medical and 15 vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). 16 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 17 for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step 18 one determines if the person is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If so, 19 benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404. 1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If not, the 20 decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether plaintiff has a ORDER ~ 3 1 medially severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 2 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). 3 If plaintiff does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, 4 the disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to 5 the third step, which compares plaintiff’s impairment with a number of listed 6 impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude 7 substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 8 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed 9 impairments, plaintiff is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is 10 not one conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth 11 step, which determines whether the impairment prevents plaintiff from performing 12 work which was performed in the past. If a plaintiff is able to perform previous work 13 that plaintiff is deemed not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 14 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At this step, plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC) is 15 considered. If plaintiff cannot perform past relevant work, the fifth and final step in 16 the process determines whether plaintiff is able to perform other work in the national 17 economy in view of plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, age, education and past 18 work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Bowen v. 19 Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). 20 The initial burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to establish a prima facie case ORDER ~ 4 1 of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 2 1971); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). The initial burden is 3 met once plaintiff establishes that a mental or physical impairment prevents the 4 performance of previous work. The burden then shifts, at step five, to the 5 Commissioner to show that (1) plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful 6 activity and (2) a “significant number of jobs exist in the national economy” which 7 plaintiff can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984). 8 STANDARD OF REVIEW 9 Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner’s 10 decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A Court must uphold a Commissioner’s decision, 11 made through an ALJ, when the determination is not based on legal error and is 12 supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 13 1985); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). “The [Commissioner’s] 14 determination that a plaintiff is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are 15 supported by substantial evidence.” Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 16 1983)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, 17 Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n 10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a 18 preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1989). 19 Substantial evidence “means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 20 adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 ORDER ~ 5 1 (1971)(citations omitted). “[S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] 2 may reasonably draw from the evidence” will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebreeze, 3 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On review, the Court considers the record as a 4 whole, not just the evidence supporting the decision of the Commissioner. Weetman 5 v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989)(quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 6 526 (9th Cir. 1980)). 7 It is the role of the trier of fact, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. 8 Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational 9 interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 10 Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th 11 Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be 12 set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and 13 making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 14 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support the 15 administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding 16 of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. 17 Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 18 ALJ’S FINDINGS 19 The ALJ found Dixon was insured through March 30, 2006 (Tr. 21, 23). At 20 step one ALJ Morris found Dixon did not work at SGA levels after onset (Tr. 23). ORDER ~ 6 1 At steps two and three, he found Dixon suffers from degenerative disc disease status 2 post L5-S1 fusion, an impairment that is severe but does not meet or medically equal 3 a Listed impairment (Tr. 23, 26). The ALJ found Dixon less than fully credible (Tr. 4 27-32). He found she is able to perform a range of light work (Tr. 26). At step four, 5 relying on a vocational expert, the ALJ found Dixon is able to perform her past 6 relevant work as an administrative clerk (Tr. 32). Alternatively, at step five, again 7 relying on a VE, the ALJ found Dixon can perform other jobs, such as small 8 product assembler inspector and hand packager and housekeeper/cleaner (Tr. 33-34). 9 Accordingly, the ALJ found Dixon is not disabled as defined by the Act (Tr. 34). 10 ISSUES 11 Dixon alleges the ALJ erred when he evaluated the medical evidence and 12 assessed credibility. She alleges the requirements of the credit-as-true rule are 13 satisfied and the case should be remanded for payment of benefits ECF No. 15 at 8; 14 21 at 1-10. The Commissioner responds that the ALJ’s findings are factually 15 supported and free of harmful legal error. She asks the court to affirm. ECF No. 20 16 at 2. 17 DISCUSSION 18 A. Credibility 19 Dixon alleges the ALJ’s credibility assessment is not properly supported. ECF 20 No. 15 at 9-15. ORDER ~ 7 1 When presented with conflicting medical opinions, the ALJ must determine 2 credibility and resolve the conflict. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 3 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004)(citation omitted). The ALJ’s credibility findings must be 4 supported by specific cogent reasons. Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th 5 Cir. 1990). Absent affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for 6 rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be “clear and convincing.” Lester v. Chater, 7 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). “General findings are insufficient: rather the ALJ 8 must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the 9 claimant’s complaints.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 10 (9th Cir. 1993). 11 The ALJ’s finding is fully supported. 12 Plaintiff alleges she is unable to work because of back pain, depression and 13 anxiety. The ALJ is correct that the medical record contradicts claimed disabling 14 limitations. 15 Before back surgery plaintiff had two injections to relieve back pain. In March 16 2011 examining physician James Opara, M.D., opined plaintiff could stand and walk 17 a total of two hours in an eight hour day and sitting was unlimited. 18 underwent spinal fusion surgery in March 2012. [She was insured for DIB purposes 19 through March 30, 2006.] Six weeks later she reported she had absolutely no lower 20 extremity pain or weakness, only minimal residual lower lumbar discomfort. She has ORDER ~ 8 She 1 been active every day. In October 2012 she told her neurosurgeon’s office the 2 surgery results in essence have “given her back her life.” She is now back doing 3 many activities she was unable to do before the surgery. At the hearing plaintiff 4 testified she does not take pain medication (Tr. 29, 62, 341, 362, 453, 551,623-24, 5 627, 693). 6 Daily activities are inconsistent with the limitations alleged. Plaintiff says she 7 uses a computer to check email and do research, drives, cooks, shops, takes care of 8 her dog and writes. She has helped her mother who has a serious health problem, 9 including running errands for her. She has taken her daughter in law to work and 10 picked her up, at the same time she was taking her grandchildren to school and 11 attending college. She has cared for her grandchildren. She talks to a friend daily. 12 She attended college full time from 2009 until 2012 when she earned a two year 13 degree. This is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s reports that depression makes her unable 14 to get out of bed (Tr. 25, 60, 64, 66, 273, 275-76, 313, 336-37, 356, 369, 372, 434, 15 532). 16 The ALJ considered plaintiff’s activities inconsistent with claimed physical 17 limitations. In July 2008 plaintiff reported she was carrying a heavy object while 18 moving to another residence. In March 2011 she reported she could sit comfortably 19 for two to three hours and drive or ride in a car for about three hours and lift or carry 20 ORDER ~ 9 1 ten pounds. She also reported she has good computer skills and can be on the 2 computer for three hours (Tr. 27, 356, 360, 451). 3 In April 2010 treating physician Venugopal Bellum, M.D., notes plaintiff has 4 never had physical therapy and takes no pain medication (Tr. 436). Following back 5 surgery plaintiff has received conservative treatment or no treatment. She does not 6 take any pain medication. She has failed to follow recommended medical treatment, 7 including take medications as prescribed, without adequate explanation. She has had 8 no mental health treatment since 2010 (Tr. 62, 453). 9 Although lack of supporting medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for 10 discounting pain testimony, it is a factor the ALJ can consider when analyzing 11 credibility. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005). Subjective 12 complaints contradicted by medical records and by daily activities are properly 13 considered. Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 14 2008); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). Unexplained or 15 inadequately explained failure to seek treatment diminishes credibility. Tommasetti 16 v. Astrue, 533, F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008); Unexplained or inadequately 17 explained failure to comply with treatment diminishes credibility. Fair v. Bowen, 18 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). 19 20 The ALJ’s credibility assessment is fully supported by the evidence and free of harmful error. ORDER ~ 10 1 B. Medical evidence: Dr. Orr and Ms. Anderson 2 Plaintiff alleges the ALJ failed to properly credit the opinions of treatment 3 providers Flint Orr, M.D., and Elizabeth Anderson, PAC. ECF No. 15 at 15-20. The 4 Commissioner responds that the ALJ appropriately weighed the evidence. ECF No. 5 20 at 12-18. 6 The Commissioner is correct. 7 On July 5, 2011, Elizabeth Anderson, PAC, completed a form for DSHS. The 8 record indicates this was the date she initiated care (Tr. 542). She opined work 9 functioning was impaired, deteriorating and she expected functioning would be 10 impaired for twelve months. Plaintiff had no postural restrictions but back bending 11 restricted fine or gross motor skills, worsens plaintiff’s condition and increases pain. 12 Anderson indicates no physical evaluation was performed for her incapacity 13 evaluation (Tr. 29, referring to Tr. 537-38; 681). 14 The ALJ gave this opinion little weight because Ms. Anderson is not an 15 acceptable medical source, she did not provide a detailed opinion of plaintiff’s 16 functioning, such as how long she could stand or how much she could lift, and, 17 although she submitted treatment records with the assessment, the records lacked 18 any objective findings to support her opinions, such as reports of decreased strength 19 or positive straight leg raising tests, to support her opinion (Tr. 29). 20 The ALJ is correct. A nonacceptable (“other source”) medical source’s ORDER ~ 11 1 opinion, such as that of a physician’s assistant, may be rejected for germane reasons. 2 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012)(citations omitted). An ALJ 3 may reject any opinion that is brief, conclusory and inadequately supported by 4 clinical findings. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). 5 ALJ’s reasons are germane. The 6 Next, in June 2012, three months after back surgery, Anderson gave another 7 opinion of plaintiff’s functioning. She notes lumbar back pain is improving post 8 surgery, including left leg numbness/pain and depression. Plaintiff needs to lie down 9 during the day due to pain and fatigue. She is taking several prescribed medications 10 that cause drowsiness and is completing physical therapy. Ms. Anderson expected 11 back pain “should improve over the next six months,” plaintiff is unable to work “in 12 the short term” and depression and PTSD are currently well controlled (Tr. 29, 13 referring to Tr. 681-82). The ALJ notes the PA is “clearly assessing reasonable short 14 term limitations” related to plaintiff’s back surgery, and again, there is no detailed 15 opinion of plaintiff’s functional abilities (Tr. 29). Both are correct. 16 Also in June 2012, Anderson completed a more detailed form describing 17 plaintiff’s functioning. She opined plaintiff can sit for most of the day and walk or 18 stand for brief periods; lift a maximum of 15 pounds, and frequently carry two 19 pounds. Training or employment activities are appropriate and limitations are 20 expected to last twelve months. She is unable to work at this time due to her ORDER ~ 12 1 neurosurgeon’s restrictions. Dr. Orr also signed this assessment (Tr. 29, referring to 2 Tr. 684-87). 3 The ALJ gave some weight to this opinion, finding it contains limitations that 4 are reasonable during a recovery period expected to last less than twelve continuous 5 months and shows the treatment provider did not expect plaintiff would be so 6 functionally limited long-term (Tr. 30). 7 In January 2013 Dr. Orr attached a note to Ms. Anderson’s June 2012 opinion 8 (Tr. 750). He indicated he reviewed the case and Ms. Anderson’s recommendations 9 “with which I concurred; subsequent neurosurgery notes (through October 2012) 10 substantiated ongoing activity restrictions following lumbosacral surgery” (Tr. 750). 11 The ALJ notes there is no evidence Dr. Orr personally examined plaintiff (Tr. 12 30). He notes Ms. Anderson’s records do not contain more recent objective findings 13 to continue to support the degree of limitation Dr. Orr endorses, the neurosurgeon’s 14 records report good examination findings, and plaintiff reported she was doing well 15 engaging in many activities (Tr. 30, 693). 16 The ALJ is correct. As a reviewing physician, Dr. Orr’s opinion is entitled to 17 less weight. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (Apr 9, 18 1996)(the opinion of an examining physician is entitled to greater weight than the 19 opinion of a nonexamining physician). Four months after surgery, In July 2012, 20 plaintiff told the treating neurosurgeon’s physician’s assistant she was doing quite ORDER ~ 13 1 well and feels well (Tr. 717). As the Commissioner accurately points out, she also 2 did well on examination. ECF No. 20 at 18, referring to Tr. 717. About a month later 3 plaintiff reported she was taking care of her mother (Tr. 695). 4 The ALJ’s reasons are specific, legitimate and supported by substantial 5 evidence. An ALJ may reject a medical opinion if is brief, conclusory and 6 inadequately supported by clinical findings. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. 7 As noted, as a non-acceptable source, Ms. Anderson’s opinion need only be 8 rejected by germane reasons. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). 9 Here, the ALJ’s reasons are germane. Ms. Anderson’s opinion is contradicted by 10 other evidence, including plaintiff’s self-reported activities. 11 C. Psychological impairments 12 Plaintiff alleges the ALJ should have found at step two she suffers severe 13 mental impairments that limit her functioning. ECF No. 15 at 21-24. The 14 Commissioner responds that, although plaintiff’s records show evidence of 15 psychological impairments, the ALJ correctly determined they were not severe. 16 ECF No. 20 at 3. 17 An impairment or combination of impairments may be found “not severe only 18 if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal 19 effect on an individual’s ability to work.” Webb. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th 20 Cir. 2005)(citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). If an ORDER ~ 14 1 adjudicator is unable to determine clearly the effect of an impairment or combination 2 of impairments on the individual’s ability to do basic work activities, the sequential 3 evaluation should not end with the not severe evaluation step. Webb, 433 F.3d at 4 687, citing S.S.R. No. 85-28 (1985). 5 The ALJ stated: 6 “The claimant’s medically determinable impairments of affective disorder, 7 anxiety disorder and history of substance addictions, considered singly and in 8 combination, do not cause more than minimal limitation and are therefore 9 nonsevere. The claimant was also diagnosed with an obsessive compulsive disorder 10 and antisocial personality features. Similarly, there is no evidence these impairments 11 significantly limit the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities” (Tr. 24). 12 In 2010 Kathleen Schormann, MHP and a medical doctor (whose signature is 13 illegible) conducted a DSHS psychological examination. They did not observe 14 reported symptoms of depression or anxiety. They opined plaintiff had no limitations 15 in most areas of cognitive and social functioning, with a mild limitation in following 16 complex instructions and working with the public (Tr. 31). They also opined 17 plaintiff would only be this limited up to eight months with mental health treatment. 18 (Tr. 31-32, citing Ex. 1F/24, 12F). The ALJ credited this opinion in part because it is 19 consistent with plaintiff’s ability to engage in a wide range of activities such as 20 completing a college degree, driving, shopping, cooking and housework (Tr. 32). ORDER ~ 15 1 On March 16, 2011, Roland Dougherty, Ph.D., evaluated plaintiff (Tr. 350- 2 58). Plaintiff told him she had never had mental health counseling, took Paxil for a 3 year and it was not helping. She has been clean and sober since 2008. She attends 4 AA meetings at least three times a week. She had just completed one year at a 5 community college and earned excellent grades. Her goal was to become a chemical 6 dependency counselor (Tr. 351-54). Dr. Dougherty diagnosed dysthymia, PTSD, 7 obsessive compulsive disorder, substance abuse in sustained remission and antisocial 8 personality features. He opined she should be able to understand, follow and 9 remember at least simple directions and probably complex directions if not under 10 much stress (Tr. 357). The ALJ credited this opinion (Tr. 31). 11 Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred when he found psychiatric symptoms are “not 12 significantly limiting because Ms. Dixon has not sought more extensive mental 13 health treatment.” She alleges she did not seek counseling because she lacked 14 insurance coverage. ECF No. 15 at 22, citing Tr. 24, 443. The ALJ notes plaintiff 15 testified she has not sought mental health treatment since 2010 (Tr. 24, 69). At the 16 hearing she did not give a reason for the lack of treatment. 17 Plaintiff alleges the record shows she has significant psychiatric symptoms 18 resulting from decades of abuse. She cites Tr. 60 (plaintiff’s own testimony); 19 257(plaintiff’s unreliable self-report); 272 (same); 290 (same). 20 She next cites evaluations at Tr. 311-17 (MSW’s opinion); 317-25 (M.Ed.’s ORDER ~ 16 1 opinion); 326-33 (MSW’s opinion). ECF No. 15 at 22. She then cites Tr. 257 2 (plaintiff’s unreliable self-report); 272 (same); 282 (same); 315 (MSW’s opinion); 3 335 (MHP and M.D, quoting plaintiff’s description of symptoms); 347 (at a pain 4 management appointment, plaintiff’s description of psychological symptoms); 434 5 (complains of fatigue and excessive sleepiness, could possibly be related to 6 metoprolol, depression or hypothyroidism); 453 (again complains of fatigue and 7 excessive sleepiness, spouse says has never been compliant with prescribed 8 medication and at this time has been off of medication for a month); 681 (opinion of 9 a physician’s assistant); 695 (same). ECF No. 15 at 23. 10 The ALJ was not required to credit these opinions over those of the examining 11 sources (Drs. Dougherty and the M.D. who co-signed Ms. Schormann’s evaluation). 12 Nor was he required to credit plaintiff’s discredited descriptions of her symptoms. 13 The ALJ is correct that opinions plaintiff suffers psychological limitations are 14 inconsistent with her demonstrated functioning. She attended college full time, 15 spending four hours a day at school, earned good grades and did two to three hours 16 of homework a night from 2009 through 2012 (Tr. 28, 63-64, 356, 434). 17 Plaintiff has not sought mental health treatment since 2010. In 2011 she 18 reported the antidepressants she has taken for two years have helped her depression 19 (Tr. 369). She has been noncompliant with taking prescribed medications. All of 20 these factors fully support the ALJ’s determination plaintiff does not suffer a severe ORDER ~ 17 1 mental impairment. 2 The ALJ’s reasons for rejecting some opinions are specific, legitimate and 3 supported by the record. An ALJ may properly reject any opinion that is brief, 4 conclusory and inadequately supported by clinical findings. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 5 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). Opinions given in formats that provide little 6 opportunity for the physician to explain the bases of their opinion, such as check-box 7 forms, are entitle to little weight. Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1996). 8 Moreover, plaintiff said she did not want to work while she was attending classes 9 because her grades would drop. She has engaged in a wide range of activities, 10 including at times caring for her mother who has significant CVD issues and 11 providing daily transportation for family members (Tr. 28, 336-37, 695). This 12 indicates much greater ability than alleged. 13 Dixon alleges the ALJ should have weighed the evidence differently, but the 14 ALJ is responsible for reviewing the evidence and resolving conflicts or ambiguities 15 in testimony. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). It is the role 16 of the trier of fact, not this court, to resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson, 402 17 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the Court 18 may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 19 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th 1984). If there is substantial evidence 20 to support the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will ORDER ~ 18 1 support a finding of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the 2 Commissioner is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 3 1987). 4 The ALJ’s determinations are supported by the record and free of harmful 5 legal error. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to address plaintiff’s credit as true 6 argument. 7 8 9 CONCLUSION After review the Court finds the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free of harmful legal error. 10 IT IS ORDERED: 11 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 20, is granted. 12 Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 15, is denied. 13 The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order, provide copies to 14 15 counsel, enter judgment in favor of defendant and CLOSE the file. DATED this 23rd day of December, 2015. 16 S/ James P. Hutton 17 JAMES P. HUTTON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 18 19 20 ORDER ~ 19

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