Lane v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 1:2017cv03008 - Document 19 (E.D. Wash. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 17 - denying 13 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Robert H. Whaley. (VR, Courtroom Deputy)
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Lane v. Commissioner of Social Security Doc. 19 FI LED I N THE U.S. DI STRI CT COURT EASTERN DI STRI CT OF WASHI NGTON 1 Apr 04, 2018 2 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 DAVID MARK LANE, 8 Plaintiff, No. 1:17-CV-03008-RHW v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 10 11 12 13 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, ECF 14 Nos. 13 & 17. Mr. Lane brings this action seeking judicial review, pursuant to 42 15 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the Commissioner’s final decision, which denied his 16 application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II and his application for 17 Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 18 U.S.C §§ 401-434, 1381-1383F. After reviewing the administrative record and 19 briefs filed by the parties, the Court is now fully informed. For the reasons set forth 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and 2 DENIES Mr. Lane’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 3 I. Jurisdiction 4 Mr. Lane filed his applications for Supplemental Security Income and 5 Disability Insurance Benefits on August 31, 2011. AR 15, 195, 346-58. His alleged 6 onset date of disability is May 5, 2011. AR 15, 195, 356, 353. Mr. Lane’s 7 applications were initially denied on February 14, 2012, AR 223-38, and on 8 reconsideration on March 29, 2012, AR 241-52. 9 A hearing with Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Larry Kennedy occurred 10 on April 23, 2013. AR 36-88. On August 27, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision 11 finding Mr. Lane ineligible for disability benefits. AR 195-211. The Appeals 12 Council remanded the case back to the ALJ on April 17, 2015, so the ALJ could 13 view the new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council that indicated the 14 impairments might be more limiting. AR 217-20. 15 A subsequent hearing with the ALJ occurred on September 21, 2015. AR 16 89-127. On February 10, 2016, the ALJ issued a second decision, incorporating the 17 first decision, finding Mr. Lane ineligible for disability benefits prior to July 12, 18 2014, and finding that Mr. Lane became disabled on July 12, 2014. AR 15-24. The 19 Appeals Council denied Mr. Lane’s request for review on November 10, 2016, AR 20 1-4, making the ALJ’s ruling the “final decision” of the Commissioner. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 2 1 2 Mr. Lane timely filed the present action challenging the denial of benefits, 3 on January 11, 2017. ECF No. 3. Accordingly, Mr. Lane’s claims are properly 4 before this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 5 6 II. Sequential Evaluation Process The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any 7 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 8 mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or 9 can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 10 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant shall be determined to be 11 under a disability only if the claimant’s impairments are of such severity that the 12 claimant is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering 13 claimant's age, education, and work experience, engage in any other substantial 14 gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). 15 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 16 for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social 17 Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) & 416.920(a)(4); Lounsburry v. 18 Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). 19 20 Step one inquires whether the claimant is presently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) & 416.920(b). Substantial gainful ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 3 1 activity is defined as significant physical or mental activities done or usually done 2 for profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572 & 416.972. If the claimant is engaged in 3 substantial activity, he or she is not entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 4 404.1571 & 416.920(b). If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two. 5 Step two asks whether the claimant has a severe impairment, or combination 6 of impairments, that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to 7 do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) & 416.920(c). A severe 8 impairment is one that has lasted or is expected to last for at least twelve months, 9 and must be proven by objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508-09 & 10 416.908-09. If the claimant does not have a severe impairment, or combination of 11 impairments, the disability claim is denied, and no further evaluative steps are 12 required. Otherwise, the evaluation proceeds to the third step. 13 Step three involves a determination of whether any of the claimant’s severe 14 impairments “meets or equals” one of the listed impairments acknowledged by the 15 Commissioner to be sufficiently severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 16 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526 & 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926; 17 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P. App. 1 (“the Listings”). If the impairment meets or 18 equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is per se disabled and qualifies 19 for benefits. Id. If the claimant is not per se disabled, the evaluation proceeds to the 20 fourth step. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 4 1 Step four examines whether the claimant’s residual functional capacity 2 enables the claimant to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f) & 3 416.920(e)-(f). If the claimant can still perform past relevant work, the claimant is 4 not entitled to disability benefits and the inquiry ends. Id. 5 Step five shifts the burden to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant is 6 able to perform other work in the national economy, taking into account the 7 claimant’s age, education, and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(f), 8 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c) & 416.912(f), 416.920(g), 416.960(c). To meet this 9 burden, the Commissioner must establish that (1) the claimant is capable of 10 performing other work; and (2) such work exists in “significant Gallo in the 11 national economy.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2); 416.960(c)(2); Beltran v. Astrue, 12 676 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2012). 13 14 III. Standard of Review A district court's review of a final decision of the Commissioner is governed 15 by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is limited, and the 16 Commissioner's decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported by 17 substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1144, 18 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing § 405(g)). Substantial evidence means “more than a 19 mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a 20 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Sandgathe v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 5 1 Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 2 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining 3 whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, “a 4 reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 5 simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Robbins v. Soc. 6 Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 7 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)). 8 9 In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 10 1992). If the evidence in the record “is susceptible to more than one rational 11 interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by 12 inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 13 1111 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 14 2002) (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one 15 of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion must be upheld”). Moreover, 16 a district court “may not reverse an ALJ's decision on account of an error that is 17 harmless.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. An error is harmless “where it is 18 inconsequential to the [ALJ's] ultimate nondisability determination.” Id. at 1115. 19 The burden of showing that an error is harmful generally falls upon the party 20 appealing the ALJ's decision. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409–10 (2009). ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 6 1 2 IV. Statement of Facts The facts of the case are set forth in detail in the transcript of proceedings 3 and only briefly summarized here. Mr. Lane was 48 years old on the date the 4 applications were filed. AR 346, 353. He has at least a high school education and is 5 able to communicate in English. 22, 210. Mr. Lane has past relevant work as a 6 carpenter and construction laborer. AR 21, 197. 7 8 9 V. The ALJ’s Findings The ALJ determined that Mr. Lane was not under a disability within the meaning of the Act from May 5, 2011, the alleged onset date, and prior to July 12, 10 2014, but became disabled on that date and has continued to be disabled through 11 the date of the ALJ’s decision. AR 15-16, 24. 12 At step one, the ALJ found that Mr. Lane had not engaged in substantial 13 gainful activity since May 5, 2011 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571 et seq., and 14 416.971 et seq.). AR 16. 15 At step two, the ALJ found Mr. Lane had the following severe impairments: 16 Crohn’s disease with pain, history of ileocecectomy, status post left inguinal hernia 17 repair, and obesity (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). AR 17. 18 At step three, the ALJ found that Mr. Lane did not have an impairment or 19 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 20 the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. AR 18-19. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 7 1 At step four, the ALJ found, prior to July 12, 2014, Mr. Lane had the 2 residual functional capacity to perform light work, including: he could lift up to 20 3 pounds occasionally and lift and/or carry up to 10 pounds frequently; He could 4 stand and/or walk for about six hours in an eight-hour workday with normal 5 breaks; he could sit for about six hours in an eight-hour workday with normal 6 breaks; he could occasionally reach overhead and frequently reach below shoulder 7 level; he could frequently handle and finger but he had to avoid repetitive forceful 8 gripping, grasping, and turning; he could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, and 9 crouch; he could never crawl or climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds, ramps, or stairs; he 10 had to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, heat, and vibration; he had to 11 have reasonable access to a restroom facility; he could understand, remember, and 12 carry out simple and detailed instructions; and he could make judgments on simple 13 and detailed work-related decisions, that is, he could do unskilled and some 14 semiskilled work. AR 19. 15 The ALJ found, since July 12, 2014, Mr. Lane has the residual functional 16 capacity to perform light work, including: he can lift up to 20 pounds occasionally 17 and lift and/or carry up to 10 pounds frequently; he can stand and/or walk for about 18 six hours in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks; he can sit for about six 19 hours in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks; he can occasionally reach 20 overhely, the ALJ noted that Mr. Lane “held himself out as able and available to work for the purposes of obtaining unemployment benefits during the ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 12 1 same period he alleged [total] disability in connection with his Social Security 2 claim.” AR 20, 207. Mr. Lane certified, weekly, to the State of Washington that he 3 was ready, able and willing to work. AR 208. These claims directly conflict with 4 his allegations of complete disability during the same time period. An ALJ may 5 rely on ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation such as prior inconsistent 6 statements. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039. “[R]eceipt of unemployment benefits 7 can undermine a claimant’s alleged inability to work fulltime” when a claimant has 8 held herself out as available for full-time work. Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. 9 Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2008). 10 The ALJ also noted other instances of inconsistent statements. AR 20, 206. 11 In February 2012, Mr. Lane told a medical provider that his “hands stopped 12 swelling.” AR 1120. That same month, Plaintiff reported to the Commissioner 13 through his representative that his “hands swell and fall asleep throughout the day” 14 and that the condition was “[g]radually worsening.” AR. 719. The ALJ reasonably 15 weighed these inconsistent statements in determining Mr. Lane’s credibility. An 16 ALJ may consider inconsistencies in a claimant’s statements when weighing his 17 credibility. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59. 18 The ALJ also noted a failure to follow treatment recommendations. If a 19 claimant’s condition is not severe enough to motivate them to follow the 20 prescribed course of treatment this is “powerful evidence” regarding the extent to ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 13 1 which they are limited by the impairment. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 2 (9th Cir. 2005). While smoking can be difficult to quit, Mr. Lane’s doctor’s 3 continually recommended he do so. In 2011, shortly after he alleged that he 4 became disabled, a doctor talked to Mr. Lane about “cessation of smoking as that 5 would definitely help his GI tract,” which was his primary impediment to working. 6 AR 997. More than a year later, though, Mr. Lane was again “strongly 7 encouraged” by his treating doctor to quit smoking, “as this can worsen his 8 underlying Crohn’s disease.” AR 1168. The following year, Plaintiff was still 9 smoking a pack of cigarettes every day. AR 207, 1210. 10 When the ALJ presents a reasonable interpretation that is supported by the 11 evidence, it is not the role of the courts to second-guess it. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857. 12 The Court “must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences 13 reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111; see also 14 Thomas, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one 15 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion 16 must be upheld”). The Court does not find the ALJ erred when discounting Mr. 17 Lane’s credibility because the ALJ properly provided multiple clear and 18 convincing reasons for doing so. 19 \\ 20 \\ ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 14 1 2 3 B. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Opinion Evidence. a. Legal Standard. The Ninth Circuit has distinguished between three classes of medical 4 providers in defining the weight to be given to their opinions: (1) treating 5 providers, those who actually treat the claimant; (2) examining providers, those 6 who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (3) non-examining providers, those 7 who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th 8 Cir. 1996) (as amended). 9 A treating provider’s opinion is given the most weight, followed by an 10 examining provider, and finally a non-examining provider. Id. at 830-31. In the 11 absence of a contrary opinion, a treating or examining provider’s opinion may not 12 be rejected unless “clear and convincing” reasons are provided. Id. at 830. If a 13 treating or examining provider’s opinion is contradicted, it may only be discounted 14 for “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in 15 the record.” Id. at 830-31. 16 The ALJ may meet the specific and legitimate standard by “setting out a 17 detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, 18 stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 19 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citation omitted). When rejecting a treating 20 provider’s opinion on a psychological impairment, the ALJ must offer more than ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 15 1 his or her own conclusions and explain why he or she, as opposed to the provider, 2 is correct. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988). 3 b. Dr. Scott Lee, M.D. 4 Dr. Lee is a treating physician who provided assessments of Mr. Lane in 5 December 2013, and August 2015. AR 20-21. Mr. Lane contests the weight the 6 ALJ afforded to the earlier, December 2013, assessment in which Dr. Lee opined 7 that Mr. Lane’s impairments made him unable to “obtain much less sustain 8 consistent employment.” AR 20, 1236-37. 9 The ALJ did not completely discount Dr. Lee’s December 2013 opinion, but 10 assigned it little weight. AR 20. The ALJ discounted Dr. Lee’s opinion for multiple 11 valid reasons. First, the ALJ noted that the short opinion is inconsistent with the 12 treatment record showing that Mr. Lane’s condition was adequately managed until 13 he was hospitalized in July 2014. AR 20. The medical record notes that Mr. Lane 14 was “doing fine” until shortly before he reported to the emergency room on July 15 12, 2014, when Mr. Lane had started to have abdominal pain days before his 16 hospital admission. AR 1383. Although Mr. Lane reported chronic pain related to 17 his Crohn’s disease, he had no tenderness in his abdomen and physical 18 examinations were routinely normal other than some swelling in his hands prior to 19 his July 2014 hospitalization. AR 1243, 1245, 1253, 1255, 1257, 1260, 1262, 1264, 20 1266, 1281. An ALJ may reject a doctor’s opinion when it is inconsistent with ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 16 1 other evidence in the record. See Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 2 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). 3 Second, the ALJ found that Dr. Lee’s opinion is directly inconsistent with 4 Mr. Lane’s own reports to the State of Washington that he was ready, able, and 5 available to work. AR 20. An ALJ may reject a doctor’s opinion when it is 6 inconsistent with other evidence in the record. See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600. An 7 ALJ may properly reject an opinion that provides restrictions that appear 8 inconsistent with the claimant’s level of activity. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 9 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001) (an ALJ may give less weight to a medical opinion that 10 conflicts with the claimant’s own assessment of his impairments). 11 When the ALJ presents a reasonable interpretation that is supported by the 12 evidence, it is not the role of the courts to second-guess it. Rollins, 261 F.3d 853, 13 857. The Court “must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences 14 reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111; see also 15 Thomas, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one 16 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion 17 must be upheld”). Thus, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in his consideration of 18 Dr. Lee’s opinions. 19 \\ 20 \\ ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 17 1 2 c. Dr. Anita Afzali, M.D., M.P.H. Dr. Afzali treated Mr. Lane from August to September 2012, and provided a 3 letter on behalf of Mr. Lane in December 2012. AR 1234-35. In the letter, Dr. 4 Afzali opined, in total, that Mr. Lane was “unable to perform material and 5 substantial duties of any occupation.” Id. 6 The ALJ did not completely discount Dr. Afzali’s opinion, but assigned the 7 opinion little weight. AR 209-10. The ALJ discounted Dr. Afzali’s opinion 8 because of inconsistencies between the opinion and the medical record. Id. In 9 particular, the ALJ noted that Dr. Afzali stated that Mr. Lane “remains off all 10 therapy for his disease since no current medical treatments have been successful.” 11 AR 1234. However, the record is clear that treatment of Mr. Lane’s condition with 12 Humira was successful but that it was Mr. Lane’s “financial constraints,” rather 13 than the failure of any treatments, that left him “unable to receive any further 14 medications for management of his Crohn’s disease.” AR 210, 1165, 1172. An 15 ALJ may reject a doctor’s opinion when it is inconsistent with other evidence in 16 the record. See Morgan, 169 F.3d 595, 602-603 (9th Cir. 1999). 17 Additionally, the ALJ noted that the severity of Mr. Lane’s symptoms, as 18 noted by Dr. Afzali, existed for at least two years prior, during which time Mr. 19 Lane was able to engage in substantial gainful activity. AR 210. Dr. Afzali opined 20 that Mr. Lane’s impairments were disabling at the same time during which Mr. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 18 1 Lane was able to perform substantial gainful activity. An ALJ may reasonably 2 discount a medical opinion describing longstanding limitations that have not been 3 disabling in the past. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). An 4 ALJ may properly reject an opinion that provides restrictions that appear 5 inconsistent with the claimant’s level of activity. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 856. 6 When the ALJ presents a reasonable interpretation that is supported by the 7 evidence, it is not the role of the courts to second-guess it. Rollins, 261 F.3d 853, 8 857. The Court “must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences 9 reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111; see also 10 Thomas, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one 11 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion 12 must be upheld”). Thus, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in his consideration of 13 Dr. Afzali’s opinion. 14 15 d. Dr. Timothy Brown, M.D. Dr. Brown wrote a letter on Mr. Lane’s behalf in April 2012. AR 1112. In 16 the letter, Dr. Brown notes that Mr. Lane has a history of Crohn’s disease, 17 underwent surgery in 2012, requires ongoing treatment, and there does not appear 18 to be a short term solution for Mr. Lane’s pain and bowel function. Id. Dr. Brown 19 opined that “it is difficult for [Mr. Lane] to undertake any sustained activities 20 which include painful and plan (sic)” and “[d]isability may be necessary.” Id. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 19 1 Mr. Lane argues that the ALJ erred by not addressing the opinion from Dr. 2 Brown, thus the opinion must be credited and as true and this case must be 3 remanded for an award of benefits. 4 The ALJ did not commit harmful error by not specifically addressing the 5 letter provided from Dr. Brown. See Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 6 (9th Cir. 1984) (ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence submitted; rather, he 7 must only explain why significant probative evidence has been rejected). The letter 8 signed by Dr. Brown is extremely brief, it consists of only seven sentences, and 9 provides the opinion that it is difficult for Mr. Lane to undertake sustained 10 activities and that disability may be necessary. AR 1112. There is no indication 11 that this opinion has been rejected. 12 The ALJ did not reject the opinion that it was difficult for Mr. Lane to 13 undertake sustained activities. On the contrary, the ALJ found that Mr. Lane’s 14 impairments did indeed make activities difficult and provided numerous significant 15 work-related limitations in assessing Mr. Lanes residual functional capacity. Dr. 16 Brown’s opinion that disability may be necessary does not mean that Mr. Lane was 17 indeed disabled, and was also not rejected; but rather, is consistent with the entire 18 process the ALJ follows in order to determine if disability is actually necessary. 19 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 20 1 The Court finds that Dr. Brown’s opinion does not constitute significant 2 probative evidence that was rejected by the ALJ, thus the ALJ did not harmfully 3 err by failing to specifically address Dr. Brown’s opinion. 4 e. Dr. Jesse McClelland, M.D. 5 Dr. McClelland is an examining psychiatrist who provided an opinion in 6 November 2011. AR 1028-33. Dr. McClelland opined that Mr. Lane should be 7 able to perform simple and repetitive tasks, he may struggle with detailed and 8 complex tasks, his cognitive problems may cause him to have difficulty accepting 9 instructions from supervisors, he may struggle to maintain regular attendance in 10 the workplace, he may have interruptions during the day from panic attacks and 11 being too anxious or too depressed, he would likely struggle with the usual 12 workplace, and he has poor coping skills and does not do well with stress or 13 change. Id. Dr. McClelland also opined that Mr. Lane’s problems are treatable. AR 14 1032. 15 The ALJ did not completely discount Dr. McClelland’s opinions, but 16 assigned them little weight. AR 209. The ALJ discounted the opinions because Dr. 17 McClelland met with Mr. Lane only once, during which time Mr. Lane interacted 18 and performed well with Dr. McClelland, and because the longitudinal record does 19 not support the severity of symptoms opined by Dr. McClelland, the limitations are 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 21 1 inconsistent with Mr. Lane’s work history, and with medication management the 2 mental impairments are non-severe. Id. 3 The ALJ detailed numerous records that contradict Dr. McClelland’s 4 assessment. AR 18, 201-02, 209. The medical records contain frequent normal 5 mental status examinations, he was alert and oriented with normal mood, affect, 6 and memory, and Mr. Lane’s own admission that he was “doing well” on 7 medication. AR 1024-26, 1075-79, 1136-41, 1209-33, 1242, 1248, 1250, 1253, 8 1255, 1257, 1259, 1262, 1264, 1266, 1268, 1270, 1281, 1285, 1287. An ALJ may 9 reject a doctor’s opinion when it is inconsistent with other evidence in the record. 10 See Morgan, 169 F.3d at 600. Additionally, although Mr. Lane told Dr. 11 McClelland that he had always had difficulty focusing, he was nevertheless able to 12 sustain substantial gainful activity despite these problems. AR 209. An ALJ may 13 reasonably discount a medical opinion describing longstanding limitations that 14 have not been disabling in the past. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. 15 When the ALJ presents a reasonable interpretation that is supported by the 16 evidence, it is not the role of the courts to second-guess it. Rollins, 261 F.3d 853, 17 857. The Court “must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences 18 reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111; see also 19 Thomas, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one 20 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 22 1 must be upheld”). Thus, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in his consideration of 2 Dr. McClelland’s opinions. 3 C. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Lay Witness Opinion. 4 The opinion testimony of Mr. Lane’s former co-worker, Fray Dodson, falls 5 under the category of “other sources.” “Other sources” for opinions include nurse 6 practitioners, physicians' assistants, therapists, teachers, social workers, spouses, 7 and other non-medical sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d), 416.913(d). An ALJ is 8 required to “consider observations by non-medical sources as to how an 9 impairment affects a claimant's ability to work.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 10 1232 (9th Cir.1987). Non-medical testimony can never establish a diagnosis or 11 disability absent corroborating competent medical evidence. Nguyen v. Chater, 100 12 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir.1996). An ALJ is obligated to give reasons germane to 13 “other source” testimony before discounting it. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915 (9th 14 Cir.1993). 15 On April 24, 2012, a letter was submitted to the electronic file from Mr. 16 Dodson. AR 734. Mr. Dodson stated that he had worked with Mr. Lane on several 17 jobs from the 1980s to 2001, and briefly described difficulties Mr. Lane had 18 performing construction work due to his Crohn’s disease. Id. The ALJ gave little 19 weight to Mr. Dodson’s statements because he had not worked with Mr. Lane since 20 2001, a decade prior to the alleged onset date and applications for disability. AR ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 23 1 208. There is no statement or description of any interaction with Mr. Lane or 2 difficulties faced by Mr. Lane during the relevant period that began in 2011. The 3 degree of contact a lay witness has with the claimant is relevant in determining the 4 weight to be attributed to their statements. Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251, 254 (9th 5 Cir. 1995). 6 7 8 9 The Court finds the ALJ properly provided a germane reason for not fully crediting Mr. Dodson’s letter. D. The ALJ did not err by not calling a medical expert to infer the onset date of disability. 10 The ALJ found Mr. Lane disabled beginning on July 12, 2014. Mr. Lane 11 briefly argues the ALJ failed to meet his duty by not calling a medical expert to 12 opine as to when disability began. 13 In Social Security cases, the ALJ has a special duty to develop the record 14 fully and fairly and to ensure that the claimant's interests are considered, even 15 when the claimant is represented by counsel. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 16 1150 (9th Cir.2001); Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir.1983). The 17 regulations provide that the ALJ may attempt to obtain additional evidence when 18 the evidence as a whole is insufficient to make a disability determination, or if after 19 weighing the evidence the ALJ cannot make a disability determination. 20 C.F.R. § 20 404.1527(c)(3); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519a. “[W]here a record is ambiguous ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 24 1 as to the onset date of disability, the ALJ must call a medical expert to assist in 2 determining the onset date.” Armstrong v. Comm’r of the SSA, 160 F.3d 587, 590 3 (9th Cir. 1998). Ambiguous evidence, or the ALJ's own finding that the record is 4 inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence, triggers the ALJ's duty 5 to “conduct an appropriate inquiry.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288; Armstrong, 160 F.3d 6 at 590. Importantly, “[a]n ALJ's duty to develop the record further is triggered only 7 when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for 8 proper evaluation of the evidence.” Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459–60 9 (9th Cir. 2001); Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150. 10 The ALJ did not err by not calling a medical expert to infer an onset date of 11 disability. The record before the ALJ was neither ambiguous nor inadequate to 12 allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. Substantial evidence supported the 13 ALJ's decision that Mr. Lane was not disabled prior to July 12, 2014. The record 14 demonstrates that Mr. Lane “doing fine” until just before July 12, 2014, when Mr. 15 Lane started to have abdominal pain” that was “progressively getting worse” and 16 he went to the emergency room. AR 1383. Accordingly, the ALJ’s duty to call a 17 medical expert to assist in determining the onset date was not triggered, and the 18 ALJ did not err. 19 \\ 20 \\ ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 25 1 VIII. Conclusion 2 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court finds the 3 ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error. 4 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 5 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 13, is DENIED. 6 2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 17, is 7 GRANTED. 8 3. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant and the file shall be 9 CLOSED. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order, 11 forward copies to counsel and close the file. 12 13 14 DATED this 4th day of April, 2018. s/Robert H. Whaley ROBERT H. WHALEY Senior United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 26
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