Rouse v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 1:2017cv03031 - Document 16 (E.D. Wash. 2018)

Court Description: ORDER Granting 15 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge John T. Rodgers. (MO, Courtroom Deputy)

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Rouse v. Commissioner of Social Security Doc. 16 FI LED I N THE U.S. DI STRI CT COURT EASTERN DI STRI CT OF WASHI NGTON Jan 25, 2018 1 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 AMY ROUSE, No. 1:17-CV-3031-JTR Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. 13 14 BEFORE THE COURT are cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF 15 No. 14, 15. Attorney Cory J. Brandt represents Amy Rouse (Plaintiff); Special 16 Assistant United States Attorney Leisa A. Wolf represents the Commissioner of 17 Social Security (Defendant). The parties have consented to proceed before a 18 magistrate judge. ECF No. 7. After reviewing the administrative record and briefs 19 filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary 20 Judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 21 JURISDICTION 22 Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental 23 security income on April 20, 2011, alleging disability since January 1, 2009, due to 24 PTSD, severe depression and panic attacks. Tr. 218, 225, 262. Plaintiff’s 25 applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. 26 Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Kimberly Boyce held hearings on April 8, 27 2013, and September 11, 2013, Tr. 51-87, and issued an unfavorable decision on 28 October 17, 2013, Tr. 10-23. The Appeals Council denied review on March 17, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2015. Tr. 1-4. The ALJ’s October 2013 decision was then appealed to the United 2 States District Court. Tr. 609. On December 18, 2015, Chief Judge Rice issued an 3 order remanding the matter for additional proceedings. Tr. 612-625. ALJ Boyce 4 held a de novo hearing on May 4, 2016, Tr. 554-579, and issued another 5 unfavorable decision on November 21, 2016, Tr. 509-519. The ALJ’s November 6 2016 decision thus became the final decision of the Commissioner which is 7 appealable to the district court. 20 C.F.R. § 404.984(a). Plaintiff filed this action 8 for judicial review on February 16, 2017. ECF No. 1, 4. 9 STATEMENT OF FACTS The facts of the case are set forth in the administrative hearing transcript, the 10 11 ALJ’s decision, and the briefs of the parties. They are only briefly summarized 12 here. 13 Plaintiff was born on January 27, 1977, and was 31 years old on the alleged 14 onset date, January 1, 2009. Tr. 65, 218, 225. She obtained a GED at age 19 and 15 earned a certification in phlebotomy in 2000. Tr. 66. Plaintiff testified at the 16 September 2013 administrative hearing that she got married in May of 2010 and 17 resided in a home with her husband and two youngest children, ages six months 18 and two. Tr. 67-69. Plaintiff’s husband worked Monday through Friday or 19 Saturday, from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and Plaintiff cared for her young children 20 during those times. Tr. 69. Plaintiff also has two older children, ages 17 and 14 at 21 the time of the September 2013 administrative hearing, but those children were 22 being taken care of by her sister. Tr. 75. 23 Plaintiff’s disability report indicates she stopped working on June 4, 2009 24 because of her condition.1 Tr. 262. When asked why she believed she could not 25 26 1 Plaintiff’s mother reported that Plaintiff began counseling for depression at 27 age 12 (1989) and had drug abuse issues, including methamphetamine use, in her 28 late teens. Tr. 324. In 2000, Plaintiff was admitted to a long term drug treatment ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 2 1 work, Plaintiff testified she had difficulty leaving her house and being around 2 people. Tr. 72. With respect to her last job, she indicated she just got to a point 3 where she was not able to perform the work; stating “it just didn’t work out.” Tr. 4 77. She described having panic attacks on the job and an inability to calm down. 5 Tr. 77. Plaintiff also testified she has difficulty organizing her thoughts and 6 completing tasks, experienced disturbed sleep, and had low energy. Tr. 80-81, 7 572. 8 Plaintiff stated she has been in counseling for a long time (off and on for 10 9 years) and was on medication for her symptoms. Tr. 73. However, she indicated 10 at the September 2013 administrative hearing that she had not attended counseling 11 for about 18 months, Tr. 72, and, at the May 2016 administrative hearing, that she 12 had not seen a therapist for her PTSD since 2011, Tr. 560. Plaintiff stated she had 13 been seeing her family practitioner, Dr. Twe, once every three months for her 14 symptoms. Tr. 561. 15 16 STANDARD OF REVIEW The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in 17 medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 18 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s determinations of law are reviewed de novo, with 19 deference to a reasonable interpretation of the applicable statutes. McNatt v. Apfel, 20 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the ALJ may be reversed 21 only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. 22 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is 23 24 center and subsequently obtained sobriety. Tr. 324. On November 24, 2000, 25 Plaintiff was attacked in her apartment by a male friend. Tr. 324-325. Plaintiff 26 was stabbed 23 times, sustained broken facial bones, and injured her eye and right 27 hand in the attack. Tr. 325. Plaintiff’s mother indicated that, following the attack, 28 Plaintiff has had significant issues with anxiety, depression and PTSD. Tr. 325. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 3 1 defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. at 2 1098. Put another way, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 3 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. 4 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one 5 rational interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 6 ALJ. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Morgan v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 7 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If substantial evidence supports the 8 administrative findings, or if conflicting evidence supports a finding of either 9 disability or non-disability, the ALJ’s determination is conclusive. Sprague v. 10 Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-1230 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a decision 11 supported by substantial evidence will be set aside if the proper legal standards 12 were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. 13 Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). 14 15 SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 16 for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 17 416.920(a); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142 (1987). In steps one through 18 four, the burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie case of 19 entitlement to disability benefits. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-1099. This burden is 20 met once a claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment prevents the 21 claimant from engaging in past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 22 416.920(a)(4). If a claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds 23 to step five, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that (1) the 24 claimant can make an adjustment to other work; and (2) specific jobs exist in the 25 national economy which claimant can perform. Batson v. Commissioner of Social 26 Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193-1194 (2004). If a claimant cannot make an 27 adjustment to other work in the national economy, a finding of “disabled” is made. 28 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 4 1 2 3 4 ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION On November 21, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful 5 activity since the alleged onset date, January 1, 2009. Tr. 511. At step two, the 6 ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: depression and 7 post-traumatic stress disorder. Tr. 512. At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did 8 not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically 9 equals the severity of one of the listed impairments. Tr. 512. 10 The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) and 11 determined she could perform a full range of work at all exertional levels with the 12 following nonexertional limitations: in order to meet ordinary and reasonable 13 employer expectations regarding attendance, production and work place behavior, 14 she could understand, remember and carry out unskilled, routine and repetitive 15 work that could be learned by demonstration and in which tasks to be performed 16 were predetermined by the employer; she could cope with occasional work setting 17 changes and occasional interaction with supervisors; she could work in proximity 18 to coworkers, but not in a team or cooperative effort; and she could perform work 19 that did not require interaction with the general public as an essential element of 20 the job, but occasional incidental contact with the general public was not 21 precluded. Tr. 513-514. 22 At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not able to perform her past 23 relevant work. Tr. 517. However, at step five, the ALJ determined that based on 24 the testimony of the vocational expert, and considering Plaintiff’s age, education, 25 work experience and RFC, Plaintiff could perform other jobs present in significant 26 numbers in the national economy, including the jobs of industrial cleaner, kitchen 27 helper and laundry worker II. Tr. 518-519. The ALJ thus concluded Plaintiff was 28 not under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 5 1 from January 1, 2009, the alleged onset date, through the date of the ALJ’s 2 decision, November 21, 2016. Tr. 519. 3 ISSUES 4 The question presented is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 5 decision denying benefits and, if so, whether that decision is based on proper legal 6 standards. Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in this case by (1) improperly rejecting 7 the opinions of her treating physician, Sui M. Twe, M.D.; (2) improperly rejecting 8 Plaintiff’s subjective complaints; and (3) relying on an incomplete hypothetical at 9 step five of the sequential evaluation process. ECF No. 14 at 8-17. DISCUSSION 10 11 12 13 A. Sui M. Twe, M.D. Plaintiff first contends the ALJ erred by improperly rejecting the opinions of her treating physician, Sui M. Twe, M.D. ECF No. 14 at 8-12. 14 If the opinion of a treating physician is not contradicted, it can only be 15 rejected with clear and convincing reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. If contradicted, 16 the opinion can be rejected for “specific” and “legitimate” reasons that are 17 supported by substantial evidence in the record. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043. 18 Historically, the courts have recognized conflicting medical evidence, the absence 19 of regular medical treatment during the alleged period of disability, and the lack of 20 medical support for doctors’ reports based substantially on a claimant’s subjective 21 complaints of pain as specific, legitimate reasons for disregarding an examining or 22 treating physician’s opinion. Flaten v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 44 23 F.3d 1453, 1463-1464 (9th Cir. 1995); Fair, 885 F.2d at 604. 24 Here, Dr. Twe’s opinions were contradicted by other medical sources of 25 record, including state agency reviewing physicians, Tr. 97-98 & 123-124 (John D. 26 Gilbert, Ph.D., and Steven Haney, M.D., indicating Plaintiff was capable of 27 performing simple, repetitive work involving limited contact with the public and 28 co-workers); Crystal Coffey, Pharm. D., of Central Washington Comprehensive ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 6 1 Mental Health, Tr. 344, 426-428, 433-436 (consistently noting no impairment of 2 memory or intellectual functioning and fair to good insight and judgment); and 3 Roland Dougherty, Ph.D., Tr. 472-478 (finding Plaintiff’s prognosis to be fair and 4 dependent upon her sustained use of counseling resources and that she should be 5 able to understand, remember and follow simple directions though some 6 concentration problems were likely). Therefore, the ALJ needed to only provide 7 specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions of Dr. Twe. 8 9 On March 7, 2011, Dr. Twe opined that Plaintiff, who was pregnant at the time, was limited to sedentary work. Tr. 332. On August 14, 2013, Dr. Twe filled 10 out a “Medical Report” form indicating Plaintiff was not capable of performing 11 any work at the time due to her symptoms and that Plaintiff’s limitations had 12 existed since at least 2004. Tr. 496. Dr. Twe also marked that work on a regular 13 and continuous basis would cause Plaintiff’s condition to deteriorate. Tr. 496. Dr. 14 Twe filed out a “Mental Medical Source Statement” form at that time which found 15 Plaintiff “markedly limited” (very significant interference with basic work-related 16 activities) or “severely limited” (inability to perform one or more basic work- 17 related activities) in all categories of functioning. Tr. 499-502. 18 19 The ALJ noted several valid reasons for according Dr. Twe’s extreme limitation findings “little weight” in this case. Tr. 516-517. 20 First, the ALJ determined Dr. Twe’s limitation to sedentary work in 2011, 21 Tr. 332, was primarily based on Plaintiff’s temporary pregnancy condition, not a 22 physical ailment. There is no notation of Dr. Twe performing a physical 23 examination, and no other medical professional of record has limited Plaintiff to 24 sedentary work. The Court agrees with the Commissioner that there is no support 25 for Plaintiff being limited to sedentary exertional level work. 26 The ALJ next indicated Plaintiff’s ability to be the primary caregiver for her 27 young children greatly undermined Dr. Twe’s opinion that Plaintiff was incapable 28 of engaging in work activity. Tr. 516-517. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 7 1 successful primary parenting of two small children, an emotionally demanding 2 activity, suggested she did not have as severe emotional difficulty as assessed by 3 Dr. Twe. Tr. 516. The ALJ explained that although childcare activity in the home 4 does not generally involve going out in public or being around strangers, the record 5 reflected that Plaintiff had been taking her daughter to therapy sessions and 6 cooperating with medical personnel during those appointments which suggested 7 Plaintiff had a greater ability to be in the public than alleged. Tr. 516. The ALJ 8 further explained that Plaintiff’s ability to organize, occupy and supervise her 9 children’s time required her to adhere to a schedule of basic care, make decisions 10 and respond appropriately to unexpected scenarios such as illness, accidents and 11 mood disturbances or misbehavior on the part of her children. Tr. 517. Plaintiff’s 12 demonstrated ability to care for her two young children was inconsistent with Dr. 13 Twe’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s mental functioning. 14 Next, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s activities of daily living were inconsistent 15 with Dr. Twe’s opinions. Tr. 516. Plaintiff reported daily bike riding, which 16 required her to go outside of her home, and attending a church class on 17 interpersonal boundaries. Tr. 395. Plaintiff’s sister reported that Plaintiff would 18 leave the house twice daily, go outside on her own, go shopping, and attend church 19 and sporting events on a fairly regular basis, which involved going out in public 20 and being around strangers. Tr. 272-273. The foregoing activities are inconsistent 21 with the extreme limitations opined by Dr. Twe in this case. 22 The ALJ next found that Plaintiff’s performance on mental status 23 examinations and other objective medical evidence of record were not consistent 24 with the marked to severe limitations assessed by Dr. Twe. Tr. 517. As noted by 25 the ALJ, Tr. 517, mental status examinations revealed Plaintiff’s thought content 26 was appropriate, thought process was intact, judgment was fair, intellect was 27 average, and there was no impairment of her cognition or memory, Tr. 343, 358. It 28 was additionally noted that, on exam, Plaintiff’s remote memory was okay, she ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 8 1 was able to carry out a three-step command with ease, she had no difficulty 2 following conversation, and she was able to give appropriate, abstract explanation 3 for common proverbs. Tr. 476. Finally, the ALJ indicated that after her pregnancy 4 in 2013, Plaintiff denied having depression or anxiety and reported her moods were 5 doing well. Tr. 782. The aforementioned medical examination findings and 6 objective medical evidence of record are not consistent with the significant 7 limitations assessed by Dr. Twe. The ALJ also indicated that Dr. Twe’s opinions were not fully consistent 8 9 with Dr. Twe’s own treatment notes. Tr. 517. Although Dr. Twe stated that 10 Plaintiff had severe and long-term anxiety symptoms, her notes reflect that 11 Plaintiff experienced an improvement in her symptoms. Tr. 517. For example, in 12 May 2014, Plaintiff reported “doing OK” since Dr. Twe upped the dose of her 13 Paxil. Tr. 778. Plaintiff also reported to Dr. Twe’s office in November 2015 that 14 her medications were working and she was doing “very well.” Tr. 770. The 15 treatment notes reflect findings by Dr. Twe that Plaintiff was alert, pleasant, 16 cooperative, and appropriate. Tr. 767-781. In March 2014, Dr. Twe encouraged 17 Plaintiff to try to at least work part-time. Tr. 779. As concluded by the ALJ, Dr. 18 Twe’s treatment notes and recommendation for Plaintiff to obtain part-time work 19 are inconsistent with the marked to severe limitations assessed by Dr. Twe. Tr. 20 571, 779. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ provided specific, 21 22 legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence for according “little 23 weight” to the significant limitations assessed by Dr. Twe in this case. The ALJ 24 did not err with respect to her findings regarding Dr. Twe’s opinions. 25 B. Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony Plaintiff asserts the ALJ also erred by improperly rejecting Plaintiff’s 26 27 subjective complaints. ECF No. 14 at 12-15. 28 /// ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 9 1 It is the province of the ALJ to make credibility determinations. Andrews, 2 53 F.3d at 1039. However, the ALJ’s findings must be supported by specific 3 cogent reasons. Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). Absent 4 affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s 5 testimony must be “specific, clear and convincing.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 6 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). 7 “General findings are insufficient: rather the ALJ must identify what testimony is 8 not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester, 81 9 F.3d at 834; Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). 10 In this case, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments 11 could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, Plaintiff’s 12 statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these 13 symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence of 14 record. Tr. 514. 15 16 17 The ALJ first held that the objective medical evidence of record did not substantiate Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling functional limitations. Tr. 514-515. A lack of supporting objective medical evidence is a factor which may be 18 considered in evaluating an individual’s credibility, provided it is not the sole 19 factor. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 347 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Carmickle 20 v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Contradiction 21 with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the claimant’s subjective 22 testimony.”); Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007) (in 23 determining credibility, the ALJ may consider “whether the alleged symptoms are 24 consistent with the medical evidence”). 25 Despite Plaintiff’s allegations of significant mental limitations, the ALJ 26 found her performance on mental status examinations established she was capable 27 of performing, at a minimum, unskilled routine and repetitive work. Tr. 514. As 28 noted above, mental status examination findings revealed Plaintiff’s thought ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 10 1 content was appropriate, thought process was intact, judgment was fair, intellect 2 was average, and there was no impairment of her cognition or memory, Tr. 343, 3 358, and further that Plaintiff’s remote memory was okay, she was able to carry 4 out a three-step command with ease, she had no difficulty following conversation, 5 and she was able to give appropriate, abstract explanation for common proverbs, 6 Tr. 476. It was also noted by the ALJ that Plaintiff did not exhibit an impairment 7 of memory or intellectual functioning during her medication management 8 examinations in late 2009, Tr. 426, 434, and she was able to engage in a 9 cooperative manner with medical personnel, indicating she was capable of being 10 around others, Tr. 357, 426, 434, 475. The ALJ additionally indicated that after 11 her pregnancy in 2013, Plaintiff denied having depression or anxiety and reported 12 her moods were doing well. Tr. 515, 782. 13 14 15 16 17 As determined by the ALJ, the objective medical evidence of record does not support the disabling limitations alleged by Plaintiff in this case. The ALJ next determined Plaintiff reported an improvement in her symptoms with medication. Tr. 515. The effectiveness of medication in alleviating pain and other symptoms is a 18 relevant factor to consider in evaluating the severity of a claimant’s symptoms. 20 19 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(iv); see e.g. Morgan v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 169 20 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (an ALJ may properly rely on a report that a 21 plaintiff’s mental symptoms improved with the use of medication); Odle v. 22 Heckler, 707 F.2d 439, 440 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting impairments that are controlled 23 by treatment cannot be considered disabling). 24 As indicated above, in addition to denying depression and anxiety and 25 reporting her moods as doing well in 2013, Tr. 782, Plaintiff indicated in May 26 2014 that she was “doing OK” since Dr. Twe upped the dose of her Paxil. Tr. 778. 27 Plaintiff also reported to Dr. Twe’s office in November 2015 that her medications 28 were working and she was doing “very well.” Tr. 770. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 11 This noted improvement of symptoms on medication is relevant to the ALJ’s 1 2 assessment of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 3 The ALJ next noted that Plaintiff had a history of limited mental health 4 treatment attendance with various no-shows and cancellations. Tr. 515. 5 In assessing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ properly relies upon 6 “‘unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 7 prescribed course of treatment.’” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 8 Cir. 2008) (quoting Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284); Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. “[I]f the 9 frequency or extent of the treatment sought by an individual is not comparable with 10 the degree of the individual’s subjective complaints, or if the individual fails to 11 follow prescribed treatment that might improve symptoms, we may find the 12 alleged intensity and persistence of an individual’s symptoms are inconsistent with 13 the overall evidence of record.” SSR 16-3p. Moreover, an “unexplained, or 14 inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment may be the basis for an adverse 15 credibility finding unless one of a ‘number of good reasons for not doing so’ 16 applies.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 638 (9th Cir. 2007). Despite Plaintiff’s allegations of severely disability mental health symptoms, 17 18 the record in this case is replete with Plaintiff’s medical appointment cancellations 19 and no-shows. Furthermore, the evidence demonstates that Plaintiff engaged in 20 minimal mental health treatment overall. At the September 2013 administrative 21 hearing, Plaintiff testified she had not attended counseling for about 18 months, Tr. 22 72, and, at the May 2016 administrative hearing, that she had not seen a therapist 23 for her PTSD since 2011, Tr. 560. Plaintiff stated she had been managing her 24 symptoms by visiting her family practitioner, Dr. Twe, only once every three 25 months. Tr. 561. As noted by the ALJ, while Central Washington Comprehensive 26 Mental Health offered Plaintiff home visits for treatment, Tr. 409, 411, there was 27 no indication Plaintiff ever pursued those services. Tr. 515. 28 /// ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 12 It was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that the frequency of Plaintiff’s 1 2 treatment was inconsistent with the level of Plaintiff’s complaints in this case. 3 SSR 16-3p. As such, the ALJ did not err by relying, in part, upon Plaintiff’s 4 minimal mental health treatment in concluding Plaintiff had limited credibility. The ALJ is responsible for reviewing the evidence and resolving conflicts or 5 6 ambiguities in testimony. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 7 1989). It is the role of the trier of fact, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in 8 evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. The Court has a limited role in 9 determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and 10 may not substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ even if it might justifiably 11 have reached a different result upon de novo review. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). After 12 reviewing the record, the Court finds that the ALJ provided clear and convincing 13 reasons, which are fully supported by the record, for discounting Plaintiff’s 14 subjective complaints. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by finding Plaintiff’s 15 allegations were not entirely credible in this case. 16 C. 17 Step Five Plaintiff contends that the ALJ also erred by relying on the vocational 18 expert’s testimony in response to a hypothetical that was not supported by the 19 weight of the record evidence. ECF No. 14 at 15-16. 20 As determined above, the ALJ did not err by according “little weight” to the 21 extreme limitations assessed by Dr. Twe in this case or by finding Plaintiff’s 22 subjective complaints less than fully credible. See Supra. Consequently, the 23 weight of the record evidence in this case supports the ALJ’s ultimate RFC 24 determination. 25 The ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform work at all exertional levels 26 with certain nonexertional limitations. Tr. 513-514. At the administrative hearing 27 held on May 4, 2016, the vocational expert testified that with the restrictions 28 assessed by the ALJ, Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform a significant number ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 13 1 of jobs existing in the national economy, including the positions of industrial 2 cleaner, kitchen helper, and laundry worker II. Tr. 576-577. Since the vocational 3 expert’s testimony was based on a proper RFC determination by the ALJ, 4 Plaintiff’s Step Five argument, ECF No. 14 at 15-16, is without merit. 5 CONCLUSION 6 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court finds the 7 ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. 8 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 9 10 1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 15, is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 14, is DENIED. 11 2. 12 The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order and provide a copy 13 to counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant. Judgment shall be entered for Defendant 14 and the file shall be CLOSED. 15 DATED January 25, 2018. 16 17 18 _____________________________________ JOHN T. RODGERS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 14

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