Redwine v. Woodard et al, No. 1:2017cv03063 - Document 11 (E.D. Wash. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER granting in part and denying in part ECF No. 9 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. This matter is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE with respect to Defendant Rizzi and DIMISSED WITH PREJUDICE with respect to Defendant Woodard. FILE CLOSED. Signed by Judge Rosanna Malouf Peterson. (TR, Case Administrator)
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Redwine v. Woodard et al Doc. 11 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 7 STEPHEN W. REDWINE, NO: 1:17-CV-3063-RMP Plaintiff, 8 ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS v. 9 10 JUDGE SUSAN WOODARD, and DOMINIC RIZZI, Chief of Police 11 Defendant. 12 13 BEFORE THE COURT is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Stephen Redwine’s 14 amended complaint by Defendants Yakima Municipal Court Judge Susan Woodard 15 and Yakima Chief of Police Dominic Rizzi, ECF No. 9. Mr. Redwine seeks relief 16 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations in the form of false 17 imprisonment, withholding of material he is entitled to under Brady v. Maryland1, 18 and interference with his right to a speedy trial. 19 20 21 1 373 U.S. 83 (1963). ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Mr. Redwine did not respond to Defendants’ motion to dismiss his amended 2 complaint. Although the Local Rules provide that failure to respond to a motion 3 may be interpreted as consent to entry of an adverse order, LR 7.1(d), the Court 4 nevertheless has analyzed the merits of the pending motion to dismiss. The Court 5 has reviewed Defendants’ motion, ECF No. 9, Defendants’ counsel’s declaration 6 and attached public record documents, ECF No. 10, the remaining record, and the 7 relevant law. Fully informed, and for the reasons that follow, the Court grants 8 Defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice in respect to Judge Woodard and 9 without prejudice in respect to Chief Rizzi. 10 11 BACKGROUND The following summary is composed of allegations asserted by Plaintiff in 12 his Amended Complaint, ECF No. 8, filed on June 2, 2017, and information 13 contained in public record documents submitted by Defendants. 14 Mr. Redwine was charged on July 12, 2014, with driving under the influence 15 of alcohol (“DUI”) in Yakima. As of the time the Defendants filed their motion to 16 dismiss in mid-June 2017, the City of Yakima’s charge against Mr. Redwine was 17 still pending in Yakima Municipal Court. Mr. Redwine has appeared in 18 proceedings in that criminal matter represented by five different public defenders 19 and two retained counsel. ECF No. 10-1 at 6. Mr. Redwine fired at least one 20 retained counsel, and the public defenders, from two public defender firms, moved 21 to withdraw due to what Judge Woodard described as “a common theme of ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 2 1 breakdown in communication and disintegration of the attorney client 2 relationship.” Id. 3 Mr. Redwine alleges that Judge Woodard “set [him] up with a bad time to 4 come to court at 10:00 a.m. on February 25, 2015.” Mr. Redwine further alleges 5 that he appeared, but that Judge Woodard told him “not to speak because [he] had 6 no attorney present at an earlier court appearance.” 7 In January 2017, Judge Woodard issued an order denying a motion for 8 change of venue by Mr. Redwine in his criminal matter. ECF No. 10-1 at 5–11. 9 The motion for change of venue alleged false arrest, similar to Mr. Redwine’s 10 present complaint. Id. Judge Woodard memorialized her findings regarding the 11 events of February 25, 2015, as she found them after she listened to the audio 12 recording of the February 25 morning docket and read a sworn statement from Mr. 13 Redwine. Id. at 5. Judge Woodard found that the court had called the criminal 14 matter involving Mr. Redwine three times, starting at 10:00 a.m.; the court issued a 15 bench warrant at 10:00:54 after the prosecutor requested one; the public defender 16 who represented Mr. Redwine at the time did not have any information as to why 17 Mr. Redwine was not present and requested permission to leave the courtroom to 18 check the other courtroom in case Mr. Redwine was present there instead; and the 19 court adjourned after hearing other cases at 10:35 a.m., without any appearance 20 from Mr. Redwine. Id. at 5, 9. 21 ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 3 1 Mr. Redwine alleges in his complaint that he went to see a bail bondsman on 2 the advice of an attorney in Judge Woodard’s courtroom on the morning of 3 February 25, 2015, and Mr. Redwine was arrested at the bail bond office on the 4 bench warrant issued by Judge Woodard. ECF No. 8 at 5. Mr. Redwine further 5 alleges that following his arrest on the bench warrant that he got a “copy of the 6 docket” that said he “was supposed to be [at court] at 8:30 a.m.” ECF No. 8 at 5. 7 Mr. Redwine does not allege any circumstances other than his arrest pursuant to 8 the bench warrant to support his claim of false imprisonment on February 25, 9 2015. See ECF No. 8 at 4-5. 10 Mr. Redwine also recounts making multiple requests for a list of all 11 witnesses to his arrest and the unedited video of his arrest.2 He claims to have 12 specifically sought the identity of a witness who he heard say, “Why are you trying 13 to ruin that man’s life?” ECF No. 8 at 7. 14 15 The criminal case against Mr. Redwine proceeded to trial in early April 2017, but resulted in a mistrial. ECF No. 10-1 at 15. At the time that Defendants 16 17 18 2 19 Mr. Redwine seeks is from the time of his arrest for the DUI, but the context of 20 Mr. Redwine’s description of the video request seems to indicate that it is. See 21 ECF No. 8 at 5. The Amended Complaint does not clearly state whether the “Coban” video that ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 4 1 filed the present motion to dismiss, the criminal matter was set for retrial on June 2 29, 2017. ECF No. 10-1 at 22. 3 LEGAL STANDARD 4 Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for 5 failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 6 To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must plead 7 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. 8 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible when the plaintiff 9 pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 10 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 11 678 (2009). 12 In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court “accept[s] factual 13 allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most 14 favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 15 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). A court is not required, however, to “assume 16 the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual 17 allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) 18 (internal quotation omitted). “[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 19 inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 20 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004). 21 ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 5 1 2 3 Defendants have submitted various documents in moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, to which no documents are attached. As a general rule, a district court must convert a Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. 5 P. 56 when it considers evidence outside of the pleadings, and the nonmoving party 6 must be given an opportunity to respond to the motion after it has been restyled as 7 a summary judgment motion. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 8 2003). However, courts may consider matters suitable for judicial notice without 9 converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment. “A court 10 may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to 11 dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 12 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). 13 DISCUSSION 14 As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Defendants submitted the 15 criminal complaint filed in Yakima Municipal Court against Mr. Redwine in July 16 2014; and the following documents from the same case: Judge Woodard’s Order 17 Denying Motion for Change of Venue issued on January 13, 2017; a Notice of 18 Case Setting issued on February 18, 2015; a Case Information Cover Sheet filed on 19 April 10, 2017; a Notice of Case Setting issued on April 10, 2017; the portion of 20 the Municipal Court docket spanning April 10, 2017, to June 5, 2017; a Notice of 21 Case Setting issued on June 2, 2017; and the portion of the Municipal Court docket ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 6 1 spanning September 28, 2016, to September 30, 2016. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff did 2 not respond to Defendants’ submission of these documents, nor did Plaintiff 3 respond to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 4 The Court takes notice of the documents submitted because they concern 5 events that Plaintiff refers to in his Amended Complaint. See United States v. 6 Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (courts “‘may take notice of 7 proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if 8 those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’”) (quoting United 9 States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.3d 244, 10 248 (9th Cir. 1992)). However, to the extent that any of the facts in the documents 11 are subject to reasonable dispute, the Court does not take judicial notice of those 12 facts. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). 13 Standing 14 Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge actions that 15 occurred in a criminal case that is in the process of being adjudicated. ECF No. 9 16 at 6–7. Defendants assert that Mr. Redwine has not shown any injury from the 17 alleged civil rights violations because he has not yet been convicted or sentenced. 18 Id. Defendants do not cite any authority for the proposition that a section 1983 19 injury may be suffered by a criminal defendant only upon conviction and sentence. 20 See ECF No. 9 at 7. Rather, Defendants refer to Supreme Court authority that a 21 federal court should not enjoin state officers from participating in state proceedings ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 7 1 in the pretrial or trial stage. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974) (citing 2 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Given that the Court is unaware of 3 whether the criminal matter proceeded to trial as scheduled, and Plaintiff does not 4 seek injunctive relief through his Amended Complaint, Defendants’ standing 5 arguments are unavailing. 6 False Arrest 7 To succeed on a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim under section 8 1983, a plaintiff must show that there was no probable cause for the arrest. 9 Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998) (per 10 curiam). Although Plaintiff alleges no facts to indicate that Chief Rizzi had any 11 role in Plaintiff’s arrest, even an arresting officer is not subject to liability for an 12 arrest executed pursuant to a facially valid bench warrant. Erdman v. Cochise Cty., 13 926 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1991). With respect to Judge Woodard, judges are 14 immune from damages liability for decisions made in their judicial capacity, such 15 as issuing a bench warrant. Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1995). 16 Mr. Redwine also does not dispute that Judge Woodard issued the bench warrant 17 upon the prosecutor’s motion when Mr. Redwine failed to appear for a scheduled 18 hearing. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts regarding Judge 19 Woodard’s involvement upon which relief can be granted. 20 To the extent that Plaintiff alleges a constitutionally defective arrest in 21 February 2015, he has not pleaded the essential elements of that claim. Moreover, ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 8 1 Judge Woodard is immune to suit for the same reason explained previously, and 2 Plaintiff has not alleged that Chief Rizzi was involved in the events at issue. 3 Brady Violation 4 Plaintiff also claims that he has been deprived of evidence in the possession 5 of the prosecution and/or it’s investigating officers relevant to his potential 6 defense, in violation of Brady, 373 U.S. 83. A Brady violation exists when a 7 criminal defendant shows that the prosecution did not disclose to the defense 8 favorable evidence material to the defense case. Id. at 87. 9 Mr. Redwine alleges that a Brady violation occurred when the police 10 department did not produce to him in response to his public records request “the 11 names of the other policemen on the scene of [his] arrest” or the “full untampered 12 with Coban [video] in raw form.” ECF No. 8 at 5. In addition, Mr. Redwine 13 alleges that the identity of an apparent bystander who yelled “Why are you trying 14 to ruin that man’s life?” at the time of Mr. Redwine’s arrest has been improperly 15 withheld from him. ECF No. 8 at 7. 16 To prove a Brady claim for section 1983 purposes, a plaintiff must prove 17 that the prosecution (1) suppressed or withheld evidence, (2) that is favorable to 18 the defendant, and (3) material to the defense. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 19 794–95 (1972). Failure to disclose evidence is a violation only if the evidence is 20 “material,” meaning that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 21 ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 9 1 been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 2 different.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995). 3 Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged any facts, even if accepted as 4 true, that would allow the Court to conclude that either Defendant suppressed 5 evidence material to Plaintiff’s guilt or punishment, and that Plaintiff has not 6 alleged any facts to indicate that he has been prejudiced by the non-disclosure of 7 any evidence that Plaintiff has sought. ECF No. 9 at 9 (citing Strickler v. Greene, 8 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. The Court agrees. 9 Even if either named Defendant had any role in failing to disclose any 10 information, Plaintiff does not allege that the material is favorable to his defense. 11 Nor is there any evidence before the Court that Plaintiff has been convicted in the 12 criminal matter. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot show that the result of the criminal 13 proceeding would have been different if he had been given the material at issue. 14 Consequently, Mr. Redwine has not stated a cognizable Brady claim. In addition, 15 judicial immunity would bar suit against Judge Woodard on Mr. Redwine’s Brady 16 violation claim, as all Plaintiff’s allegations are concerned with Judge Woodard’s 17 judicial acts. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987) 18 (“Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for their judicial 19 acts.”). 20 / / / 21 / / / ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 10 1 Speedy Trial 2 Mr. Redwine makes the bare, conclusory assertion that his speedy trial rights 3 were violated “by way of forcing [him] to sign [waivers] in order to obtain [his] 4 Brady material.” ECF No. 8 at 7. He acknowledges that speedy trial waivers have 5 been entered, but there is no indication of which individual he believes forced him 6 to sign a speedy trial waiver or any factual allegation of how that person forced 7 him. 8 9 However, the primary bar to allowing Mr. Redwine’s speedy trial violation claim to proceed is that a court cannot adjudicate Mr. Redwine’s Sixth 10 Amendment-based claim because there is no evidence of whether a judgment was 11 entered in his favor. Mr. Redwine would need to raise any speedy trial arguments 12 in the underlying state criminal proceedings, as discussed further below. See Heck 13 v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). 14 Leave to Amend 15 Once a court determines that a complaint should be dismissed, the next 16 decision is whether to grant leave to amend. When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the 17 court must give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his or her complaint unless it 18 appears that the deficiency cannot be cured by amendment. James v. Giles, 221 19 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000). However, a court may deny leave to amend due 20 to “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated 21 failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 11 1 the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of 2 amendment.” See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ'g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th 3 Cir. 2008) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). 4 The Court finds that Mr. Redwine’s complaint fails to state a claim on which 5 relief can be granted, and therefore, the complaint must be dismissed. Mr. 6 Redwine has not specified any injuries that he has suffered, nor any damages or 7 other remedy that he seeks. In addition, if Mr. Redwine is attempting to request 8 this Court direct a state court or city police department in the performance of its 9 duties in ongoing criminal proceedings, this Court would be obligated to abstain 10 from such interference. Younger, 401 U.S. 37. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has 11 found, in the context of a vexatious litigant, that a request to direct a state court in 12 an ongoing criminal proceeding is frivolous as a matter of law. Demos v. United 13 States, 925 F.2d 1160, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 1991). 14 On the other hand, if Mr. Redwine already has been convicted, yet 15 challenges the validity of his conviction on the basis of false arrest, Brady 16 violations, or speedy trial defects, he would need to appeal his conviction through 17 the state system and successfully invalidate his conviction. Smithart v. Towery, 79 18 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Heck, 512 U.S. 486-87. Consequently, 19 the Court concludes that the deficiencies of Mr. Redwine’s complaint may not be 20 curable by amendment at this time. 21 ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 12 1 In addition, Plaintiff does not allege personal participation by Chief Rizzi. 2 On that basis, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Chief Rizzi on which 3 relief may be granted, but it is not clear from the facts whether a valid claim 4 against Chief Rizzi could be alleged. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Chief 5 Rizzi shall be dismissed without prejudice. See Trimble v. Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 6 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that a dismissal of a Section 1983 7 action on the basis that it is not yet cognizable under Heck must be without 8 prejudice). By contrast, Judge Woodard is entitled to absolute immunity from suit 9 for her actions in presiding over the underlying criminal matter against Plaintiff. 10 Therefore, amendment of the claims stated against Judge Woodward would be 11 futile, and those claims are dismissed with prejudice. 12 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 13 1. 14 PART DENIED IN PART. This matter is DISMISSED WITHOUT 15 PREJUDICE with respect to Defendant Rizzi and DISMISSED WITH 16 PREJUDICE with respect to Defendant Woodard. 17 2. 18 The District Court Clerk is directed to enter this Order and provide copies to 19 20 21 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED IN Judgment shall be entered for Defendants. counsel and to pro se Plaintiff and close this case. DATED October 13, 2017. s/ Rosanna Malouf Peterson ROSANNA MALOUF PETERSON United States District Judge ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 13
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