Marquez Villegas v. Berryhill, No. 1:2017cv03104 - Document 27 (E.D. Wash. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER Granting 17 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying in Part 25 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Rosanna Malouf Peterson. (PL, Case Administrator)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Marquez Villegas v. Berryhill Doc. 27 FI LED I N THE U.S. DI STRI CT COURT EASTERN DI STRI CT OF WASHI NGTON 1 Sep 20, 2018 2 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 7 MONICA M., NO: 1:17-CV-3104-RMP Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 10 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S ’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 11 Defendant. 12 13 BEFORE THE COURT, without oral argument, are cross-motions for 14 summary judgment from Plaintiff Monica M. 1, ECF No. 17, and the Commissioner 15 of Social Security (the “Commissioner”), ECF No. 25. Plaintiff sought judicial 16 review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the Commissioner’s denial of her claim 17 for supplemental security income. The Court has reviewed the motions, the 18 19 20 1 21 In the interest of protecting Plaintiff’s privacy, the Court will use only Plaintiff’s first name and last initial in this decision. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 administrative record, and is fully informed. For the reasons stated below, the Court 2 reverses and remands for an award of benefits. 3 BACKGROUND 4 A. Plaintiff’s Claim for Benefits and Procedural History 5 Plaintiff Monica M. was nineteen years old on the alleged date of disability 6 onset, December 14, 2009. Administrative Record (“AR”) 113.2 Plaintiff applied 7 for supplemental security income, under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 8 U.S.C. §§ 401-34, in April 2010. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on 9 reconsideration, and by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) after a hearing on 10 February 29, 2012. AR 504–14. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had severe 11 impairments of “low I.Q. and depression,” but would be able to perform her 12 previous employment as a supermarket courtesy clerk or bagger. AR 14, 20. 13 Plaintiff appealed the agency’s final decision to the District Court, where Plaintiff 14 and the Commissioner stipulated to reversal and remand to the Social Security 15 Administration, for the ALJ to: 16 (1) conduct a new hearing and issue a new decision; (2) reevaluate all of the medical opinion evidence and, if necessary, obtain clarification of an opinion if evidence is discounted; (3) obtain a consultative examination to assess Plaintiff’s IQ scores; (4) reevaluate Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity and provide appropriate rationale with specific reference to the record evidence in support of the assessed limitations; (5) reevaluate Plaintiff’s credibility in accordance with Social Security Ruling 96-7; and (6) if necessary, obtain supplemental vocational expert testimony 17 18 19 20 21 2 The AR is filed at ECF No. 10. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 2 1 regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform past relevant work or, alternatively, work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, ensuring vocational expert testimony addresses any conflict with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles in accordance with Social Security Ruling 00-4p. 2 3 4 5 AR 557. B. May 28, 2015 Hearing 6 Upon remand, ALJ Glenn Meyers heard Plaintiff’s claim for benefits at a 7 hearing on May 28, 2015, in Yakima, Washington. AR 415. Plaintiff responded to 8 questions from her attorney, Thomas Bothwell, and Judge Meyers. Vocational 9 expert Leta R. Berkshire, also responded to questions from Judge Meyers and Mr. 10 Bothwell. 11 Plaintiff left school in eleventh grade when she became pregnant with her first 12 child. AR 537. Plaintiff did not receive special education services while in school. 13 AR 826. Plaintiff recalled that her teachers reacted with frustration to her questions. 14 AR 198. She has since unsuccessfully tried to pass the test to obtain her GED. AR 15 467–68. Plaintiff has never had a driver’s license; she twice tried to pass the written 16 test, and failed. AR 467. Therefore, other people drive Plaintiff to the grocery store, 17 and accompany her inside, as well as provide Plaintiff rides to appointments. AR 18 466. 19 Plaintiff’s work history is scant. Before Plaintiff had her first child, she 20 worked part-time as a courtesy clerk at a Safeway grocery store. See AR 47, 58–59, 21 118. Plaintiff also worked brief stints at McDonalds and at area orchards, picking or ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 3 1 thinning fruits from trees and sorting fruit in a warehouse. AR 118, 429, 460–63. 2 At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was living with her boyfriend and staying home 3 to care for her three young children. Plaintiff reported that her mother and sister 4 come to her house nearly every day, so Plaintiff is rarely alone with her children. 5 AR 464. Occasionally Plaintiff’s mother or sister watches Plaintiff’s children while 6 Plaintiff showers. AR 466. 7 Although Plaintiff did not report any symptoms of depression at or around the 8 time of the second hearing, she struggled with depression post-partum and at other 9 times in her life. See AR 305, 917. Plaintiff attempted suicide in July and 10 September 2011. AR 254, 347. In addition, Plaintiff reported several traumatic 11 experiences, including that she has been in at least two abusive relationships. See 12 AR 334–37, 440–42, 1090. Plaintiff also was assaulted by a stranger in a parking lot 13 in 2012 and while taking her trash out from her residence in 2013. AR 1010, 1032– 14 33. 15 16 17 C. ALJ’s Decision On June 23, 2015, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. AR 394–407. Applying the five-step evaluation process, Judge Meyers found: 18 Step one: Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since she 19 applied for benefits in 2010. 20 Step two: Plaintiff has severe impairments in the form of borderline 21 intellectual functioning and depressive disorder. To reach that conclusion, the ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 4 1 ALJ agreed with the full scale IQ score by Jay Toews, EdD, who conducted 2 psychological with intellectual testing in February 2015, and who posited that 3 the previous IQ testing finding full scale IQ scores of 61 (from March 2010, 4 with Carrie Bishop, MA) and 54 (from September 2014, with Thomas Genthe, 5 PhD) was invalid. However, the ALJ rejected Dr. Toews’ conclusion that 6 Plaintiff has no mental impairments other than rule out symptom 7 exaggeration, finding instead that Plaintiff’s “full scale IQ score of 77 and the 8 longitudinal record point to a diagnosis of borderline intellectual functioning.” 9 AR 400. Rather, the ALJ accepted the 2013 finding of State agency 10 consultant Michael Brown, PhD, that Plaintiff has borderline intellectual 11 functioning and affective disorders. AR 549. 12 Step three: Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of 13 impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed 14 impairments. Specifically, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments do 15 not meet the criteria of any of the subdivisions of Listing 12.05. Plaintiff did 16 not meet the criteria of Listing 12.05, subdivision (C), because she “does not 17 have a valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a 18 physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant 19 work-related limitation of function.” AR 402 (emphasis in original). 20 Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”): The ALJ found that Plaintiff has 21 the RFC: ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 5 1 To perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: She can perform unskilled, repetitive, routine work; she can have occasional contact with public, supervisors, and co-workers; she works at her own pace but still meets minimum production requirements of the job: [sic] she is off task up to 10% of the time at work but still meets minimum production requirements of the job. 2 3 4 5 6 AR 402. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence, 7 and limiting effects of her borderline intellectual functioning and symptoms 8 associated with depression are not entirely credible. AR 404. The ALJ recounted 9 that records from employers did not substantiate Plaintiff’s testimony that her work 10 performance was marred by problems with concentration, memory, and a slow pace. 11 AR 404. Judge Meyers further opined that Plaintiff’s lower two IQ scores, which 12 Judge Meyers discounted as invalid, were anomalies associated with brief periods 13 during which Plaintiff was “dealing with postpartum depression and/or the residue 14 of domestic violence.” Id. Judge Meyers found the overall evidence in the record of 15 Plaintiff’s daily activities, including caring for her children and managing household 16 tasks such as preparing meals and cleaning, to indicate that she “is capable of a 17 reasonably high level of functioning, at a level consistent with maintaining unskilled 18 employment.” AR 405. 19 Step four: Plaintiff has no past relevant work. 20 Step five: The ALJ concluded that given Plaintiff’s age, education, work 21 experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 6 1 significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform, 2 including work as a janitor or as a motel housekeeper. Therefore, Plaintiff 3 was not disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act from April 6, 2010, 4 through the date of the ALJ’s decision. 5 6 AR 394–407. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 7 A. Standard of Review 8 Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner’s 9 decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of 10 benefits only if the ALJ’s determination was based on legal error or not supported by 11 substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing 12 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). “The [Commissioner’s] determination that a claimant is not 13 disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” 14 Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). 15 Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. 16 Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975); McCallister v. 17 Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601–02 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence “means such 18 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 19 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations omitted). “[S]uch 20 inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the 21 evidence” will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 7 1 1965). On review, the court considers the record as a whole, not just the evidence 2 supporting the decisions of the Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 3 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1980)). 4 It is the role of the trier of fact, not the reviewing court, to resolve conflicts in 5 evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational 6 interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 7 Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th 8 Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be 9 set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and 10 making a decision. Brawner v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 11 433 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support the 12 administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding 13 of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. 14 Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229–30 (9th Cir. 1987). 15 B. Definition of Disability 16 The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any 17 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 18 mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or 19 can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 20 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a benefits 21 claimant shall be determined to be under a disability only if her impairments are of ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 8 1 such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do her previous work but cannot, 2 considering her age, education, and work experiences, engage in any other 3 substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. 4 §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability consists of both 5 medical and vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 6 (9th Cir. 2001). 7 C. Sequential Process 8 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 9 for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Step one 10 determines if she is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If the claimant is 11 engaged in substantial gainful activities, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 12 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). 13 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activities, the decision 14 maker proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has a medically 15 severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 16 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination 17 of impairments, the disability claim is denied. 18 If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step, which 19 compares the claimant’s impairment with a number of listed impairments 20 acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude any gainful 21 activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); see also 20 C.F.R. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 9 1 § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed 2 impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. 3 If the impairment is not one conclusively presumed to be disabling, the 4 evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment 5 prevents the claimant from performing work she has performed in the past. If the 6 claimant is able to perform her previous work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. 7 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At this step, the claimant’s RFC 8 assessment is considered. 9 If the claimant cannot perform this work, the fifth and final step in the process 10 determines whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national 11 economy in view of her residual functional capacity and age, education, and past 12 work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); see also Bowen 13 v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). 14 The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie 15 case of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th 16 Cir. 1971); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). That burden is 17 met once the claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment prevents her 18 from engaging in her previous occupation. The burden then shifts, at step five, to 19 the Commissioner to show that (1) the claimant can perform other substantial gainful 20 activity, and (2) a “significant number of jobs exist in the national economy” that the 21 claimant can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984). ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 10 1 2 ISSUE ON APPEAL Should the Court credit as true the medical opinions and Plaintiff’s testimony 3 to find disability and direct the Commissioner to award benefits, or must the Court 4 remand for further substantive determinations at the agency level? 5 6 DISCUSSION The parties agree that the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error and are not 7 supported by substantial evidence. The parties disagree, however, regarding the 8 extent of the ALJ’s error and the appropriate remedy. Therefore, the question before 9 the Court is whether to remand for further administrative proceedings or reverse the 10 ALJ’s decision and direct payment of benefits, a determination that is within the 11 Court’s discretion. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 531 12 U.S. 1038 (2000). 13 As a general rule, upon finding that the Social Security Administration has not 14 determined a claimant’s benefits application appropriately, “the proper course . . . is 15 to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.” Benecke v. 16 Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004). However, in limited circumstances, a 17 court may “reverse or modify an administrative decision without remanding for 18 further proceedings.” Treichler v. Comm’r, 775 F.3d 1090, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 19 2014). The Ninth Circuit has provided a test for determining when a court may 20 credit improperly rejected evidence as true and direct entry of an immediate award 21 of benefits. See Harman, 211 F.3d at 1178. First, a court must ask whether “the ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 11 1 ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting [the particular] 2 evidence.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996). Next, a court 3 should consider “whether further administrative proceedings would be useful.” 4 Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101. Supplementary proceedings generally serve an 5 adequate purpose “where the record has not been fully developed, there is a need to 6 resolve conflicts and ambiguities, or the presentation of further evidence may well 7 prove enlightening in light of the passage of time.” Id. (several internal quotations 8 omitted). 9 10 11 Whether the ALJ has provided legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence The Commissioner acknowledges that the ALJ erred in: (1) accepting Dr. 12 Toews’ IQ testing conclusions while declaring Dr. Genthe’s IQ determinations to be 13 invalid because it is unclear whether Dr. Toews reviewed Dr. Genthe’s report; and 14 (2) failing to provide a basis for finding that Plaintiff would be “off-task” for ten 15 percent of the workday, as opposed to any greater or lesser percentage of time. ECF 16 No. 25 at 10–11. By failing to express why Plaintiff would be off task ten percent of 17 the time, the ALJ erroneously determined Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, 18 which, in turn, compromises the ALJ’s determination of what jobs would be 19 available in the national economy that Plaintiff is able to perform. 20 21 In addition, the Court finds that the ALJ also did not provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons, supported by record evidence, for rejecting Plaintiff’s ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 12 1 testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 2 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (to provide for meaningful review on appeal, and to 3 ensure that claimant’s testimony is not rejected arbitrarily, an ALJ must specify 4 which testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s 5 complaints). Rather than conflicting with other evidence in the record, Plaintiff’s 6 testimony at the second hearing in this matter coheres with the voluminous medical 7 records and offers information beyond what is available from Plaintiff’s employment 8 records. The ALJ does not identify specific evidence or reasons for discrediting 9 Plaintiff’s recounting of her employment history or the limitations she experiences 10 in her daily life. 11 Whether further development of the record would serve a useful purpose 12 The parties agree that the ALJ did not provide a sufficient basis to disregard 13 Plaintiff’s IQ results of under 70 as invalid. Rather, the Commissioner argues that 14 the agency should be given an opportunity to clarify the basis for disregarding Dr. 15 Genthe’s examination of Plaintiff, which was completed only five months before Dr. 16 Toews’ evaluation. However, the Court’s prior remand, according to the parties’ 17 stipulation, already instructed the agency to “reevaluate all of the medical opinion 18 evidence, and, if necessary, [to] obtain clarification of an opinion if evidence is 19 discounted.” AR 556–57. The record in this case already contains two hearings, 20 held more than three years apart, and medical and other records spanning a 21 timeframe of approximately six years with remarkably little change or glaring ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 13 1 ambiguities regarding Plaintiff’s circumstances over the passage of time. The time 2 and cost involved in remanding this matter yet again to do something that was 3 required by the language of the first remand, as well as the general law governing 4 Social Security applications, outweighs the limited purpose of a third hearing. 5 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has found that “severe delay” has been a reason 6 to exercise discretion in favor of applying the credit-as-true doctrine. Vasquez v. 7 Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 593–94 (9th Cir. 2009). The agency had an opportunity to 8 conduct a thorough, legally sound analysis during the second hearing, but failed to 9 address all of the issues that it was directed to address. Here, the lengthy period of 10 more than eight years since Plaintiff filed her application for Social Security benefits 11 weighs in favor of directing an award of benefits upon reversing the Commissioner’s 12 decision. 13 14 15 Whether, if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on remand Although the Commissioner concedes that the ALJ erred, the Court must 16 nevertheless briefly analyze the record, and the ALJ’s treatment of the record, to 17 determine whether a finding of disability would be compelled upon remand. Upon 18 review, the Court finds that the record, without any further development, supports a 19 determination of disability, under either of two analyses. 20 21 First, Plaintiff appears to meet Listing § 12.05(C). The Listings, set forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 were “designed to operate as a ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 14 1 presumption of disability that makes further inquiry unnecessary.” Sullivan v. 2 Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990). Once a claimant is found to meet a Listing, no 3 further finding regarding the claimant’s ability to perform past relevant work or 4 other jobs is necessary. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 1995). 5 Listing 12.05 addresses “significantly subaverage general intellectual 6 functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the 7 developmental period, i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the 8 impairment before 22.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12:05. Subdivision C 9 requires “[a] valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a 10 physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work- 11 related limitation of function.” Id. “In cases where more than one IQ is customarily 12 derived from the test administered, e.g., where verbal performance, and full scale 13 IQs are provided in the Wechsler series, we use the lowest in conjunction with 14 12.05.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, Appx. I § 12.00(D)(6)(C) (Intelligence tests). 15 There is no dispute that Plaintiff’s impairments manifested before age 22. In 16 addition, the ALJ identified, at step two of the five-step analysis, depression as a 17 severe impairment in addition to borderline intellectual functioning. See Fanning v. 18 Bowen, 827 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1987) (a person with a severe impairment apart 19 from compromised intellectual functioning establishes this prong of Listing § 20 12.05(C)). Finally, as discussed above, the ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons to 21 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 15 1 discount Dr. Genthe’s measurement of Plaintiff’s full scale IQ as 54. Plaintiff also 2 had been evaluated as having a full scale IQ of 61. AR 170. 3 Even if Plaintiff did not satisfy the requirements of Listing § 12.05(C), there is 4 no serious doubt to be gleaned from the record that Plaintiff is disabled. Plaintiff’s 5 highest full-scale IQ measurement in the record is 77. She has not worked full-time 6 at any point in her life. The fact that she has managed well as the primary caregiver 7 for her three young children, while a testament to her persistence and attention as a 8 mother, does not support a conclusion that Plaintiff could successfully transition to 9 substantially gainful employment, in addition to continuing to parent her children. 10 Given the lengthy delay from Plaintiff’s first application, and the Commissioner’s 11 opportunity to again develop the record according to the parties’ stipulated terms of 12 remand, the Court finds that the evidence in the record, particularly with Plaintiff’s 13 own testimony and Dr. Genthe’s determinations credited as true, compels a finding 14 that Plaintiff is disabled and entitled to the benefits that she seeks. 15 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 16 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 17, is GRANTED. 17 2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 25, is GRANTED 18 with respect to reversal and remand and DENIED with respect to 19 remand for further proceedings. 20 /// 21 /// ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 16 1 3. This case is remanded for calculation and award of benefits. 2 4. Judgment shall be entered for Plaintiff. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Clerk is directed to enter this 4 5 Order, enter Judgment as directed, provide copies to counsel, and close the case. DATED September 20, 2018. 6 7 s/ Rosanna Malouf Peterson ROSANNA MALOUF PETERSON United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 17
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
