Grenz v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 1:2017cv03110 - Document 15 (E.D. Wash. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ECF No. 12 and denying ECF No. 13 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. FILE CLOSED. Signed by Magistrate Judge John T. Rodgers. (PH, Case Administrator)
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Grenz v. Commissioner of Social Security Doc. 15 1 2 3 4 5 FI LED I N THE U.S. DI STRI CT COURT EASTERN DI STRI CT OF WASHI NGTON 6 7 Jun 14, 2018 8 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 11 12 13 JANINE G., No.1:17-CV-03110-JTR Plaintiff, 14 v. 15 16 17 18 ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. 19 20 BEFORE THE COURT are cross-motions for summary judgment. ECF 21 Nos. 12, 13. Attorney D. James Tree represents Janine G. (Plaintiff); Special 22 Assistant United States Attorney Leisa A. Wolf represents the Commissioner of 23 Social Security (Defendant). The parties have consented to proceed before a 24 magistrate judge. ECF No. 5. After reviewing the administrative record and the 25 briefs filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS, in part, Plaintiff’s Motion for 26 Summary Judgment; DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment; and 27 REMANDS the matter to the Commissioner for additional proceedings pursuant to 28 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION . . . - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 JURISDICTION 2 Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) on 3 January 6, 2013, Tr. 198, alleging disability since December 1, 2012, Tr. 169, due 4 to pain, fatigue, depression, and edema, Tr. 187. The application was denied 5 initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 113-15, 118-22. Administrative Law Judge 6 (ALJ) Larry Kennedy held a hearing on September 21, 2015 and heard testimony 7 from Plaintiff and vocational expert, Trevor Duncan. Tr. 31-84. The ALJ issued 8 an unfavorable decision on January 19, 2016. Tr. 15-26. Plaintiff requested 9 review from the Appeals Council, Tr. 7, and submitted a medical opinion from 10 Julia Robertson, M.D., Tr. 469-71. The Appeals Council denied review on April 11 14, 2017 and associated Dr. Robertson’s opinion with the administrative record. 12 Tr. 1-6. The ALJ’s January 19, 2016 decision became the final decision of the 13 Commissioner, which is appealable to the district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14 405(g). Plaintiff filed this action for judicial review on June 15, 2017. ECF No. 1. 15 STATEMENT OF FACTS The facts of the case are set forth in the administrative hearing transcript, the 16 17 ALJ’s decision, and the briefs of the parties. They are only briefly summarized 18 here. 19 Plaintiff was 51 years old at the alleged date of onset. Tr. 169. She has a 20 bachelor’s of science degree in nursing. Tr. 41. She reported her past work was as 21 a registered nurse. Tr. 209. Plaintiff reported that she stopped working on 22 November 14, 2011 stating that she was let go following a conflict with 23 management and that she could not deal with the stress. Tr. 187, 238. 24 25 STANDARD OF REVIEW The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in 26 medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 27 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court reviews the ALJ’s determinations of law de novo, 28 deferring to a reasonable interpretation of the statutes. McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION . . . - 2 1 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the ALJ may be reversed only if it is 2 not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. Tackett v. 3 Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is defined as 4 being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. at 1098. Put 5 another way, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 6 might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 7 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). 8 9 If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 10 1097. If substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or if conflicting 11 evidence supports a finding of either disability or non-disability, the ALJ’s 12 determination is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 13 1987). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will be set aside 14 if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making 15 the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 16 433 (9th Cir. 1988). 17 SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 18 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 19 for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); see Bowen 20 v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). In steps one through four, the burden of 21 proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie case of entitlement to 22 disability benefits. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99. This burden is met once the 23 claimant establishes that physical or mental impairments prevent her from 24 engaging in her previous occupations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). If the claimant 25 cannot do her past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to step five, and the burden 26 shifts to the Commissioner to show that (1) the claimant can make an adjustment to 27 other work, and (2) specific jobs which the claimant can perform exist in the 28 national economy. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193-94 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION . . . - 3 1 (9th Cir. 2004). If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work in the 2 national economy, a finding of “disabled” is made. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). 3 ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 4 5 6 7 8 9 On January 19, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 1, 2012, the alleged date of onset. Tr. 17. At step two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: obesity; edema; adrenal insufficiency; idiopathic 10 hyperparathyroidism; steatosis of the liver; fibromyalgia versus fibromyositis 11 versus unspecified myalgia; plantar fasciitis; and knee osteoarthritis. Tr. 17. 12 At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 13 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of 14 the listed impairments. Tr. 20. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 At step four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s residual function capacity and determined she could perform a range of light work with the following limitations: she can stand and/or walk for about four hours in an eight-hour workday. She can frequently handle, finger, and feel. Her work should not require the operation of foot controls. She cannot crawl or climb. She can occasionally balance, stoop, knee, and crouch. She should avoid concentrated exposure to vibration, extreme temperatures, and hazards. 22 Tr. 21. The ALJ identified Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a general nurse and a 23 healthcare administrator and concluded that Plaintiff was able to perform her past 24 relevant work as a healthcare administrator. Tr. 24. 25 As an alternative to a step four denial, the ALJ found at step five that, 26 considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience and residual functional 27 capacity, and based on the testimony of the vocational expert, there were other jobs 28 that exist in significant numbers in the national economy Plaintiff could perform, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION . . . - 4 1 including the jobs of consulting nurse and hospital admitting clerk. Tr. 25-26. The 2 ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not under a disability within the meaning of the Social 3 Security Act at any time from December 1, 2012, through the date of the ALJ’s 4 decision. Tr. 26. ISSUES 5 The question presented is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 6 7 decision denying benefits and, if so, whether that decision is based on proper legal 8 standards. Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by (1) failing to properly weigh the 9 medical source opinions, (2) failing to properly address all of Plaintiff’s severe 10 impairments at step two, and (3) failing to properly address Plaintiff’s symptom 11 statements. DISCUSSION 12 13 14 1. Medical Opinions Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s treatment of the opinion from a nonexamining 15 reviewing physician, Gordon Hale, M.D., and the opinion from an examining 16 physician, William Drenguis, M.D., and the Appeals Council’s treatment of the 17 opinion from Plaintiff’s treating physician, Julia Robertson, M.D. ECF No. 12 at 18 18-20. 19 In weighing medical source opinions, the ALJ should distinguish between 20 three different types of physicians: (1) treating physicians, who actually treat the 21 claimant; (2) examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; 22 and, (3) nonexamining physicians who neither treat nor examine the claimant. 23 Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ should give more 24 weight to the opinion of a treating physician than to the opinion of an examining 25 physician. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007). Likewise, the ALJ 26 should give more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than to the 27 opinion of a nonexamining physician. Id. 28 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION . . . - 5 1 When a treating physician’s opinion is not contradicted by another 2 physician, the ALJ may reject the opinion only for “clear and convincing” reasons. 3 Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991). When a treating 4 physician’s opinion is contradicted by another physician, the ALJ is only required 5 to provide “specific and legitimate reasons” for rejecting the opinion. Murray v. 6 Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983). Likewise, when an examining 7 physician’s opinion is not contradicted by another physician, the ALJ may reject 8 the opinion only for “clear and convincing” reasons, and when an examining 9 physician’s opinion is contradicted by another physician, the ALJ is only required 10 to provide “specific and legitimate reasons” to reject the opinion. Lester, 81 F.3d 11 at 830-31. 12 The specific and legitimate standard can be met by the ALJ setting out a 13 detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, 14 stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 15 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ is required to do more than offer his 16 conclusions, he “must set forth his interpretations and explain why they, rather 17 than the doctors’, are correct.” Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 18 1988). 19 A. The Opinions 20 On October 27, 2013, Dr. Hale reviewed the medical evidence available at 21 that time, including the opinion of Dr. Dreguis, to which he assigned great weight. 22 Tr. 105. Dr. Hale opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and/or carry twenty 23 pounds, frequently lift and/or carry ten pounds, stand and/or walk for four hours, 24 and sit for about six hours. Tr. 105. He limited Plaintiff’s ability to push and pull 25 in the upper extremities to frequent and in the lower left extremity to frequent. Id. 26 All posturals were limited to occasional except balancing, which was limited to 27 frequent. Tr. 105-06. Plaintiff’s handling, fingering, and feeling were limited to 28 frequent bilaterally. Tr. 106. He opined that Plaintiff should avoid concentrated ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION . . . - 6 1 exposure to extreme cold, vibrations, and hazards such as machinery and heights. 2 Tr. 106-07. Then in the “Additional Explanation” section, Dr. Hale stated that 3 “[i]n view of the claimant’s combined impairments related primarily to 4 fibromyalgia, she is capable of no more than sedentary work activity.” Tr. 107. 5 Dr. Drenguis examined Plaintiff on July 27, 2013 and reviewed three clinic 6 notes dated August 29, 2012, April 4, 2012, and March 13, 2012. Tr. 328-32. All 7 of these clinic records predate Plaintiff’s alleged date on onset. He limited 8 Plaintiff’s standing/walking to three hours and sitting to five hours. Tr. 331. He 9 limited her lifting/carrying to twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds 10 frequently. Tr. 332. He limited climbing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and 11 crawling to occasionally. Id. He limited reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling 12 to frequent. Id. He did not provide any environmental limitations. Id. 13 On February 24, 2016, Plaintiff’s treating provider, Dr. Robertson, 14 completed a medical report form stating that Plaintiff had been diagnosed with 15 fibromyalgia syndrome, adrenal hypofunction, menopausal symptoms, fatigue, 16 idiopathic peripheral neuropathy, anxiety, obesity, Crohn’s disease, osteoarthritis, 17 insomnia, and chronic pain. Tr. 470. She stated that working on a regular and 18 continuous basis would cause Plaintiff’s condition to deteriorate. Tr. 471. 19 Additionally, when asked if she thought Plaintiff would miss work due to her 20 impairments, she stated “[Patient] is not able to work due to condition.” Id. She 21 stated that these limitations had existed since August of 2012. Id. 22 B. The ALJ’s Decision 23 The ALJ gave significant weight to Dr. Hale’s opinion, but he represented 24 the opinion as a limitation to light work with additional limitations in Plaintiff’s 25 ability to stand and/or work. Tr. 23-24. The ALJ never addressed Dr. Hale’s final 26 statement limiting Plaintiff to sedentary work. 27 28 The ALJ then used Dr. Hale’s opinion as justification for giving only some weight to the opinion of Dr. Drenguis, finding that the record supported a residual ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION . . . - 7 1 functional capacity with fewer limitations, therefore, “I give greater weight to 2 another medical assessment, from a physician who reviewed a greater range of the 3 claimant’s medical records.” Tr. 23. Since Dr. Hale’s opinion is the only other 4 physical residual functional capacity opinion addressed in the ALJ’s decision, the 5 ALJ’s reference to “another medical assessment” must be to that of Dr. Hale. 6 The ALJ did not review Dr. Robertson’s opinion as it was submitted after 7 the ALJ’s decision. However, it was addressed by the Appeals Council and 8 associated with the record. Tr. 2, 4. Therefore, this Court is to consider the 9 opinion when determining whether the ALJ’s determination is supported by 10 substantial evidence. Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1162- 11 63 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]hen the Appeals Council considers new evidence in 12 deciding whether to review a decision of the ALJ, that evidence becomes part of 13 the administrative record, which the district court must consider when reviewing 14 the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence.”). 15 C. Discussion 16 The ALJ erred in the treatment of Dr. Hale’s and Dr. Drenguis’ opinions in 17 two ways. First, the ALJ failed to address Dr. Hale’s limitation to sedentary work. 18 See S.S.R. 96-8p (“The RFC [residual functional capacity] assessment must always 19 consider and address medical source opinions. If the RFC assessment conflicts 20 with an opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the 21 opinion was not adopted.”). The failure to address the limitation to sedentary 22 work, assigning the opinion significant weight, and adopting an amended light 23 residual functional capacity determination is synonymous to rejection of the 24 limitation to sedentary work without providing a reason. Thus, the ALJ erred. 25 Second, the ALJ rejected the opinion of Dr. Drenguis partially based on the 26 presumption that Dr. Hale’s opinion was less limiting. See Tr. 23 (finding that 27 Plaintiff’s activities, examination findings, and treatment records showed Plaintiff 28 was more capable than Dr. Drenguis opined and, as a result, he gave significant ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION . . . - 8 1 weight to Dr. Hale’s opinion). However, Dr. Hale’s limitation to sedentary work 2 means his opinion is more limiting than Dr. Drenguis’. Therefore, the ALJ’s 3 rationale for the weight assigned to the two opinions in the record becomes 4 nonsensical. In addition, when determining if the ALJ’s residual functional capacity is 5 6 supported by substantial evidence, this Court is to consider the opinion of 7 Plaintiff’s treating provider, Dr. Robertson, who opined Plaintiff was unable to 8 work. Tr. 471. As such, the record currently holds three medical source opinions: 9 First, the opinion of the nonexamining reviewer, Dr. Hale, that Plaintiff is limited 10 to sedentary work. Second, the opinion of examining provider, Dr. Dreguis, who 11 opined limitations somewhere between sedentary work 1 and light work2. Tr. 331- 12 32. Third, the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating provider, Dr. Robertson, that Plaintiff 13 was not capable of work. Tr. 471. All three of the medical source opinions are 14 more limiting than the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination finding 15 Plaintiff could stand/walk for a total of four hours. Tr. 21. Therefore, the ALJ’s 16 residual functional capacity determination is not supported by substantial evidence 17 and the case is remanded for the ALJ to reweigh the medical source opinions in the 18 file and formulate a new residual functional capacity determination supported by 19 substantial evidence. 20 2. Step Two 21 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to recognize Plaintiff’s 22 attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), cognitive disorder, anxiety, and 23 depression as severe at step two. ECF No. 12 at 6-10. 24 25 The step-two analysis is “a de minimis screening device used to dispose of groundless claims.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2005). A 26 27 1 Sedentary work is defined at 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a). 28 2 Light work is defined at 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b). ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION . . . - 9 1 medically determinable impairment “must be established by objective medical 2 evidence from an acceptable medical source.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521. Once the 3 ALJ has established that a claimant has a medically determinable mental 4 impairment, he “must specify the symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings that 5 substantiate the presence of the impairment(s)” and document his findings as to the 6 four broad functional areas set out in the 12.00C criteria. 20 C.F.R 404.1520a(b), 7 (e). An impairment is “not severe” if it does not “significantly limit” the ability to 8 conduct “basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(a). Basic work activities are 9 “abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b). “An 10 impairment or combination of impairments can be found not severe only if the 11 evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on 12 an individual’s ability to work.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 13 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 14 The ALJ stated that Plaintiff “conceded that she had not been diagnosed 15 with a cognitive disorder or with any attention deficit disorder.” Tr. 18. This is 16 the end of the ALJ’s discussion of either ADHD or a cognitive disorder. Tr. 18-19. 17 The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable mental 18 impairments do not cause more than minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to 19 perform basic mental work activities.” Tr. 19. 20 Plaintiff’s testimony that she was not sure whether she had been diagnosed 21 with ADHD is not sufficient to support a finding that there was no medically 22 determinable impairment. Tr. 66-68. ADHD is a medically determinable 23 impairment. Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Robertson, administered testing 24 demonstrating that Plaintiff was markedly positive for inattention and positive for 25 hyperactivity and diagnosed Plaintiff with ADHD. Tr. 358; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 26 (A medical determinable impairment “must be established by objective medical 27 evidence from an acceptable medical source.”). However, it is unclear if the ALJ 28 considered ADHD and its resulting symptoms in his evaluation of the 12.00C ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION . . . - 10 1 criteria as the ALJ only addressed, depression, anxiety, memory and a general 2 reference to “psychological impairments.” Tr. 18-19. Likewise, the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s statement that she has not been 3 4 diagnosed with a cognitive disorder is insufficient to support a finding of no 5 psychological limitations. Plaintiff had been diagnosed with fibromyalgia, which 6 the ALJ deemed to be a severe impairment at step two. Tr.17. The Commissioner 7 has promulgated a regulation which recognizes cognitive or memory problems, 8 commonly known as a “fibro fog,” as a symptom of fibromyalgia. See S.S.R. 12- 9 2p. The ALJ failed to address the psychological symptoms associated with 10 Plaintiff’s diagnosis of fibromyalgia in the opinion. 11 Neither Plaintiff’s diagnosis of ADHD nor the potential of cognitive of 12 memory problems from fibromyalgia were considered by the ALJ. Since this case 13 is being remanded for the ALJ to properly address the medical source opinions in 14 the file, the ALJ will readdress Plaintiff’s psychological impairments at step two 15 and take testimony from a medical expert and a psychological expert regarding any 16 potential for functional limitations resulting from Plaintiff’s medically 17 determinable impairments. 18 3. 19 20 21 Plaintiff’s Symptom Statements Plaintiff contests the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s symptoms statements were not entirely credible. ECF No. 12 at 10-18. Since the case is being remanded for the ALJ to properly address the 22 medical source opinions in the file, the ALJ is further instructed to make a new 23 determination as to the supportability of Plaintiff’s symptom statements in 24 accordance with S.S.R. 16-3p. 25 REMEDY 26 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or reverse and 27 award benefits is within the discretion of the district court. McAllister v. Sullivan, 28 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). An immediate award of benefits is appropriate ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION . . . - 11 1 where “no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, 2 or where the record has been thoroughly developed,” Varney v. Secretary of Health 3 & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1988), or when the delay caused 4 by remand would be “unduly burdensome,” Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1280 5 (9th Cir. 1990). See also Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) 6 (noting that a district court may abuse its discretion not to remand for benefits 7 when all of these conditions are met). This policy is based on the “need to 8 expedite disability claims.” Varney, 859 F.2d at 1401. But where there are 9 outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination can be made, and it 10 is not clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find a claimant 11 disabled if all the evidence were properly evaluated, remand is appropriate. See 12 Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004); Harman v. Apfel, 211 13 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2000). 14 In this case, it is not clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to 15 find Plaintiff disabled if all the evidence were properly evaluated. Further 16 proceedings are necessary for the ALJ to weigh the medical source opinions in the 17 file, make a new step two determination, and address Plaintiff’s symptom 18 statements in accord with S.S.R. 16-3p. The ALJ will also supplement the record 19 with any outstanding evidence, send Plaintiff for a psychological consultative 20 examination, and take testimony from a vocational, a medical, and a psychological 21 expert at any remand proceedings. CONCLUSION 22 23 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 24 1. 25 26 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 13, is DENIED. 2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 12, is 27 GRANTED, in part, and the matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for 28 additional proceedings consistent with this Order. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION . . . - 12 1 3. Application for attorney fees may be filed by separate motion. 2 The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order and provide a copy 3 to counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant. Judgment shall be entered for Plaintiff 4 and the file shall be CLOSED. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 DATED June 14, 2018. 7 8 9 _____________________________________ JOHN T. RODGERS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION . . . - 13
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