Parsley v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 1:2017cv03122 - Document 21 (E.D. Wash. 2018)

Court Description: ORDER GRANTING 19 DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT denying 12 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Case is closed. Signed by Senior Judge Robert H. Whaley. (AY, Case Administrator)

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Parsley v. Commissioner of Social Security Doc. 21 1 2 FI LED I N THE U.S. DI STRI CT COURT EASTERN DI STRI CT OF WASHI NGTON 3 Sep 10, 2018 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 TRAVIS P., 8 Plaintiff, No. 1:17-CV-03122-RHW v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 10 11 12 13 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, ECF 14 Nos. 12 & 19. Plaintiff brings this action seeking judicial review, pursuant to 42 15 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the Commissioner’s final decision, which denied his 16 application for Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social 17 Security Act, 42 U.S.C § 1381-1383F. After reviewing the administrative record 18 and briefs filed by the parties, the Court is now fully informed. For the reasons set 19 forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and 20 DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 I. Jurisdiction Plaintiff filed his application for Supplemental Security Income on October 3 7, 2013. AR 263-68. His alleged onset date of disability is September 18, 2013. AR 4 14, 263. Because there is a previous administratively final decision finding him not 5 disabled prior to his application date, the relevant issue is whether he has been 6 disabled since his application date of October 7, 2013. AR 14. Plaintiff’s 7 application was initially denied on February 26, 2014, AR 186-89, and on 8 reconsideration on April 4, 2014, AR 198-99. 9 A hearing with Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Wayne N. Araki 10 occurred on August 20, 2015. AR 40-69. On November 4, 2015, the ALJ issued a 11 decision finding Plaintiff ineligible for disability benefits. AR 14-30. The Appeals 12 Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on May 12, 2017, AR 1-4, making the 13 ALJ’s ruling the “final decision” of the Commissioner. 14 Plaintiff timely filed the present action challenging the denial of benefits, on 15 July 11, 2017. ECF No. 3. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are properly before this 16 Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 17 18 II. Sequential Evaluation Process The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any 19 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 20 mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 2 1 can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 2 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant shall be determined to be 3 under a disability only if the claimant’s impairments are of such severity that the 4 claimant is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering 5 claimant's age, education, and work experience, engage in any other substantial 6 gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). 7 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 8 for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social 9 Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) & 416.920(a)(4); Lounsburry v. 10 11 Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). Step one inquires whether the claimant is presently engaged in “substantial 12 gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) & 416.920(b). Substantial gainful 13 activity is defined as significant physical or mental activities done or usually done 14 for profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572 & 416.972. If the claimant is engaged in 15 substantial activity, he or he is not entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 16 404.1571 & 416.920(b). If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two. 17 Step two asks whether the claimant has a severe impairment, or combination 18 of impairments, that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to 19 do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) & 416.920(c). A severe 20 impairment is one that has lasted or is expected to last for at least twelve months, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 3 1 and must be proven by objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508-09 & 2 416.908-09. If the claimant does not have a severe impairment, or combination of 3 impairments, the disability claim is denied, and no further evaluative steps are 4 required. Otherwise, the evaluation proceeds to the third step. 5 Step three involves a determination of whether any of the claimant’s severe 6 impairments “meets or equals” one of the listed impairments acknowledged by the 7 Commissioner to be sufficiently severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 8 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526 & 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926; 9 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P. App. 1 (“the Listings”). If the impairment meets or 10 equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is per se disabled and qualifies 11 for benefits. Id. If the claimant is not per se disabled, the evaluation proceeds to the 12 fourth step. 13 Step four examines whether the claimant’s residual functional capacity 14 enables the claimant to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f) & 15 416.920(e)-(f). If the claimant can still perform past relevant work, the claimant is 16 not entitled to disability benefits and the inquiry ends. Id. 17 Step five shifts the burden to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant is 18 able to perform other work in the national economy, taking into account the 19 claimant’s age, education, and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(f), 20 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c) & 416.912(f), 416.920(g), 416.960(c). To meet this ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 4 1 burden, the Commissioner must establish that (1) the claimant is capable of 2 performing other work; and (2) such work exists in “significant numbers in the 3 national economy.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2); 416.960(c)(2); Beltran v. Astrue, 4 676 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2012). 5 6 III. Standard of Review A district court's review of a final decision of the Commissioner is governed 7 by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is limited, and the 8 Commissioner's decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported by 9 substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1144, 10 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing § 405(g)). Substantial evidence means “more than a 11 mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a 12 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Sandgathe v. 13 Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 14 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining 15 whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, “a 16 reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 17 simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Robbins v. Soc. 18 Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 19 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)). 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 5 1 In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its 2 judgment for that of the ALJ. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 3 1992). If the evidence in the record “is susceptible to more than one rational 4 interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by 5 inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 6 1111 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 7 2002) (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one 8 of w (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(b); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 19 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.1995)). 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 13 1 In November 2007, Plaintiff’s IQ testing established that he had a verbal 2 score of 72, a performance score of 95, and a full-scale IQ score of 80. AR 18, 20, 3 22, 26-27, 484, 514, 516, 783. Psychologists Roland Dougherty, Ph.D., and Arch 4 Bradley, M.Ed., opined that Plaintiff’s full-scale IQ score was in the average 5 range; his verbal IQ was in the borderline range; and his performance IQ was in the 6 average range. AR 486, 516. At multiple psychological examinations between 7 2012 and 2014, Plaintiff displayed primarily normal thought process, normal 8 memory, and normal concentration. AR 18-19, 802-08, 806-12, 823-24, 827-29, 9 853, 854-58, 870. 10 During an examination in March 2013, Plaintiff again displayed normal 11 thought process, normal memory, fund of knowledge within normal limits, and 12 normal concentration during a psychological evaluation by Mark Duris, Ph.D. AR 13 19, 858. IQ testing yielded a verbal score of 57, a performance score of 79, and a 14 full-scale IQ score of 64, resulting in a diagnosis of borderline intellectual 15 functioning. AR 19, 20, 23, 855, 856. 16 Plaintiff contends that these scores from March 2013 should be considered 17 valid and prove that he meets Listing 12.05. However, the ALJ found these IQ 18 scores from March 2013 are not valid for multiple reasons. AR 17-20. Specifically, 19 the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s treatment records did not refer to any event or 20 disease that would account for a subsequent cognitive decline between the two sets ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 14 1 of IQ scores. AR 27. A “person’s IQ is presumed to remain stable over time in the 2 absence of any evidence of a change in a claimant’s intellectual functioning.” 3 Muncy v. Apfel, 247 F.3d 728, 734 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Hodges v. Barnhart, 4 276 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001) (presumption that IQ scores “remain fairly 5 constant throughout life”). Additionally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s participation 6 in multiple activities was inconsistent with the lower IQ results. AR 20. The ALJ 7 noted that Plaintiff is able to maintain all of his basic activities, financial 8 management, shopping, and transportation on his own. AR 20. Plaintiff lives with 9 his girlfriend and her son without issue and reports that it is not difficult at all to 10 meet home, work, and social obligations. AR 20. The ALJ may rely on external 11 evidence of a score's invalidity, such as a claimant's participation in activities 12 inconsistent with the IQ score. Jones v. Colvin, 149 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1258 (D. Or. 13 2016). The ALJ also noted that all of the other psychological tests at this time 14 showed only normal findings. AR 20. Further, the ALJ’s decision is supported by 15 Dr. Gentile’s determination that Plaintiff does not meet Listing 12.05 and the 16 doctor’s note that the 23-point difference between Plaintiff’s IQ scores may be due 17 to a hearing deficit, rather than psychological impairment. AR 573, 581. 18 The ALJ pointed to multiple reasons, supported by the record, for not 19 finding Plaintiff’s March 2013 IQ scores to be valid. The Court finds the reasons 20 provided by the ALJ to be sufficient. When the ALJ presents a reasonable ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 15 1 interpretation that is supported by the evidence, it is not the role of the courts to 2 second-guess it. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857. The Court “must uphold the ALJ's 3 findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” 4 Molina, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111; see also Thomas, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (if the 5 “evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which 6 supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion must be upheld”). The Court’s review 7 of the record confirms that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s impairment 8 does not fall within the scope of Listing 12.05 is supported by substantial evidence. 9 As such, the Court concludes that a finding in Plaintiff’s favor is not warranted. 10 Because Plaintiff does not have a valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 59 11 or less or a valid verbal, performance, or full IQ of 60 through 70, the requirements 12 of Listing 12.05B and Listing 12.05C are not met. 13 14 15 B. The ALJ properly weighed the medical opinion evidence. a. Legal Standard. The Ninth Circuit has distinguished between three classes of medical 16 providers in defining the weight to be given to their opinions: (1) treating 17 providers, those who actually treat the claimant; (2) examining providers, those 18 who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (3) non-examining providers, those 19 who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th 20 Cir. 1996) (as amended). ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 16 1 A treating provider’s opinion is given the most weight, followed by an 2 examining provider, and finally a non-examining provider. Id. at 830-31. In the 3 absence of a contrary opinion, a treating or examining provider’s opinion may not 4 be rejected unless “clear and convincing” reasons are provided. Id. at 830. If a 5 treating or examining provider’s opinion is contradicted, it may only be discounted 6 for “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in 7 the record.” Id. at 830-31. 8 9 The ALJ may meet the specific and legitimate standard by “setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, 10 stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 11 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citation omitted). When rejecting a treating 12 provider’s opinion on a psychological impairment, the ALJ must offer more than 13 his or his own conclusions and explain why he or she, as opposed to the provider, 14 is correct. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988). 15 b. Jan Kouzes, Ed.D. 16 Dr. Kouzes is an examining doctor who completed a psychological 17 evaluation for the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services in 18 May 2012. AR 25, 821-24. Dr. Kouzes did not actually provide an opinion or 19 assessment of Plaintiff’s abilities of limitations, but stated that Plaintiff had issues 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 17 1 with self-esteem and self-confidence and a sheltered and flexible work site would 2 improve Plaintiff’s willingness to work. AR 25, 821-23. 3 The ALJ assigned no weight to Dr. Kouzes’ statements for multiple valid 4 reasons. AR 25-26. First, the ALJ noted that this is not actually a medical opinion 5 as it does not provide an assessment of Plaintiffs abilities or limitations. AR 25. 6 The regulations define “medical opinions” as “statements from physicians and 7 psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the 8 nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairments(s), including [her] symptoms, 9 diagnosis and prognosis, what [she] can still do despite impairments(s), and [her] 10 physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(1). Dr. Kouzes’ statements 11 regarding Plaintiff’s willingness to work contains no mention of a specific severity, 12 Plaintiff’s prognosis, how this condition would limit or impair Plaintiff, or what 13 Plaintiff can still do despite his impairments. Additionally, the ALJ stated that he 14 was instead relying on Plaintiff’s actual work history, longitudinal examination 15 findings, and activities since the date of the last ALJ decision. AR 25. An ALJ may 16 reject a doctor’s opinion when it is inconsistent with other evidence in the record. 17 See Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). 18 Additionally, an ALJ may properly reject an opinion that provides restrictions that 19 appear inconsistent with the claimant’s level of activity. Rollins v. Massanari, 261 20 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, Dr. Kouzes’ statements were made ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 18 1 roughly a year and a half before the alleged onset date of disability. See, Macri v. 2 Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that opinions from outside the 3 relevant period are of limited value because they do not provide reliable evidence 4 of a claimant’s functioning during the relevant time period); see also Vincent ex 5 rel. Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). 6 When the ALJ presents a reasonable interpretation that is supported by the 7 evidence, it is not the role of the courts to second-guess it. Rollins, 261 F.3d 853, 8 857. The Court “must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences 9 reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111; see also 10 Thomas, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one 11 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion 12 must be upheld”). Thus, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in his consideration of 13 Dr. Kouzes’ opinion. 14 15 c. Aaron R. Burdge, Ph.D. Dr. Burdge is an examining psychologist who completed a psychological 16 evaluation for the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services in 17 October 2012. AR 26, 826-30. Dr. Burdge opined that Plaintiff had mild or no 18 limitations in his abilities to plan independently, to ask simple questions, to be 19 aware or normal hazards, to make simple decisions, to adapt to changes in a 20 routine work setting, to perform routine tasks, to learn new tasks, to maintain ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 19 1 regular attendance, or to persist with wimple or detailed instructions; and that 2 Plaintiff had moderate limitations in his abilities to maintain appropriate behavior, 3 to communicate effectively in a work setting, or to complete a normal workday. 4 AR 828-29. Plaintiff briefly contends that the ALJ erred in discounting this opinion 5 by failing to provide specific reasons for doing so. ECF No. 12 at 14. 6 The ALJ did not completely reject Dr. Burdge’s opinion, indeed the ALJ 7 actually agreed with Dr. Burdge’s opinion and incorporated the assessed 8 limitations into Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity assessment. AR 26. 9 Nevertheless, this opinion was afforded some weight. Id. As noted by the ALJ, Dr. 10 Burdge provided this opinion nearly a year before the onset date of disability. AR 11 26, 826-30; see, Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that 12 opinions from outside the relevant period are of limited value because they do not 13 provide reliable evidence of a claimant’s functioning during the relevant time 14 period); see also Vincent ex rel. Vincent, 739 F.2d at 1394-95 (citation omitted). 15 Additionally, Dr. Burdge’s assessment applied only for six to nine months and 16 therefore does not satisfy the 12-month durational requirement. 42 U.S.C. §§ 17 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Importantly, Plaintiff identifies no additional 18 limitations in Dr. Burdge’s opinion that were not included by the ALJ. 19 When the ALJ presents a reasonable interpretation that is supported by the 20 evidence, it is not the role of the courts to second-guess it. Rollins, 261 F.3d 853, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 20 1 857. The Court “must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences 2 reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111; see also 3 Thomas, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one 4 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion 5 must be upheld”). Thus, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in his consideration of 6 Dr. Burdge’s opinion. 7 8 9 d. Mark Duris, Ph.D. Dr. Duris is an examining doctor who completed a psychological evaluation for the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services in March 2013. 10 AR 26, 854-58. Dr. Duris opined that Plaintiff had mild limitations in his abilities 11 to maintain appropriate behavior, to be aware of normal hazards, to make simple 12 decisions, or to persist with simple instructions; he opined that Plaintiff had 13 moderate limitations in his abilities to complete a normal workday, to ask simple 14 questions, to communicate effectively in a work setting, to adapt to changes in a 15 routine work setting, to perform routine tasks, to learn new tasks, or to maintain 16 regular attendance; and he opined that Plaintiff had marked limitations in his 17 ability to plan independently or to persist with detailed instructions. AR 857. 18 The ALJ did not completely discount Dr. Duris’ opinion, but afforded the 19 opinion some weight. AR 26. The ALJ provided multiple valid reasons for 20 assigning some weight to the opinion. Id. The ALJ found that the moderate and ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 21 1 marked limitations are inconsistent with Plaintiff’s examination findings, Dr. Duris 2 failed to provide an explanation for his opinion, the opinion appears to be based 3 heavily on subject reports from the Plaintiff and an invalidated WAIS-III exam, 4 and the opinion is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s daily activities. AR 26-27. As noted 5 by the ALJ, Plaintiff’s contemporary mental examinations performed by Dr. Duris 6 demonstrated that Plaintiff had normal thought process and content, normal 7 judgment, normal memory, normal concentration, and all other mental functioning 8 was within normal limits. AR 27, 858. Dr. Duris did not provide any reasoning for 9 his opinion or why it was more extreme than the mental status examination notes. 10 A discrepancy between a doctor’s recorded observations and opinions is a clear 11 and convincing reason for not relying on the doctor’s opinion. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 12 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). Additionally, “an ALJ need not accept the 13 opinion of a doctor if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported 14 by clinical findings.” Id. The ALJ also found that the opinion appears to be based 15 primarily on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints that the ALJ has found not entirely 16 credible, and on the WAIS-III testing the ALJ previously found to be invalid 17 because there is nothing more in the opinion and accompanying notes that would 18 account for the level of limitations in Dr. Duris’ opinion. An ALJ may discount 19 even a treating provider’s opinion if it is based largely on the claimant’s self- 20 reports and not on clinical evidence, and the ALJ finds the claimant not credible. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 22 1 Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). Lastly, the ALJ noted that 2 the opinion is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s actual level of activity, including his 3 ability to independently take care of all of his basic activities, financial 4 management, shopping, and transportation. AR 27. This determination is supported 5 by the record. An ALJ may properly reject an opinion that provides restrictions 6 that appear inconsistent with the claimant’s level of activity. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 7 856. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not identified any additional limitations in Dr. 8 Duris’ opinion that were not included by the ALJ. 9 When the ALJ presents a reasonable interpretation that is supported by the 10 evidence, it is not the role of the courts to second-guess it. Rollins, 261 F.3d 853, 11 857. The Court “must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences 12 reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111; see also 13 Thomas, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one 14 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion 15 must be upheld”). Thus, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in his consideration of 16 Dr. Duris’ opinion. 17 18 e. Rebecca A. Cline, Ph.D. Dr. Cline is an examining doctor who completed a psychological evaluation 19 for the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services in September 20 2014 and August 2015. AR 28, 849-53, 866-70. Dr. Cline opined in September ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 23 1 2014 that Plaintiff had mild or no limitations in his abilities to be aware of normal 2 hazards, to adapt to changes in a routine work setting, to perform routine tasks, to 3 maintain regular attendance, or to persist with simple instructions; he had moderate 4 limitations in his ability to plan independently, to maintain appropriate behavior, to 5 complete a normal workday, to ask simple questions, to make simple decisions, to 6 learn new tasks, or to persist with detailed instructions; and he had marked 7 limitations in his ability to communicate effectively in a work setting. AR 851-52. 8 In August 2015 Dr. Cline opined that Plaintiff had similar impairments as before, 9 but that he no longer had any marked impairments and his ability to communicate 10 effectively in a work setting was a moderate limitation instead. AR 868-69. Dr. 11 Cline also stated in August 2015 that Plaintiff “appears from a mental health 12 standpoint to be capable of employment, but lacks motivation and confidence to 13 seek it.” AR 869. Plaintiff briefly contends that the ALJ erred in discounting this 14 opinion by failing to provide specific reasons for doing so. ECF No. 12 at 14. 15 The ALJ did not completely reject or discount Dr. Cline’s opinion, but 16 afforded it some weight and actually incorporated the latter opinion’s limitations 17 into Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity assessment. AR 28. However, the 18 opinions were afforded less weight because they are inconsistent with longitudinal 19 examination findings and treatment records. AR 28. Indeed, Plaintiff’s longitudinal 20 record demonstrates very little mental health treatment and little effort to seek ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 24 1 mental health treatment, and the record is replete with normal mental health 2 examination findings, including the normal mental health findings described by Dr. 3 Cline. A discrepancy between a doctor’s recorded observations and opinions is a 4 clear and convincing reason for not relying on the doctor’s opinion. Bayliss v. 5 Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). Additionally, an ALJ may reject a 6 doctor’s opinion when it is inconsistent with other evidence in the record. See 7 Morgan, 169 F.3d 595, 602-603. Notably, Dr. Cline’s first assessment only applied 8 for six to nine months and the second assessment only applied for zero to six 9 months and therefore do not satisfy the 12-month durational requirement. 42 10 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Additionally, Plaintiff again has not 11 identified any additional limitations in Dr. Cline’s opinion that were not included 12 in the residual functional capacity by the ALJ. 13 When the ALJ presents a reasonable interpretation that is supported by the 14 evidence, it is not the role of the courts to second-guess it. Rollins, 261 F.3d 853, 15 857. The Court “must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences 16 reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111; see also 17 Thomas, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one 18 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion 19 must be upheld”). Thus, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in his consideration of 20 Dr. Cline’s opinion. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 25 1 2 f. Richard Borton, Ph.D. Dr. Borton is a reviewing doctor who reviewed Plaintiff’s records in April 3 2014. AR 27-28, 114-26. Dr. Borton opined that Plaintiff could understand, 4 remember, and carry out simple repetitive tasks; he could maintain concentration 5 in two-hour intervals, but that would be distracted by too many coworkers in his 6 close proximity; he would work best around few or no people; he could interact 7 appropriately with others on a superficial basis; he could work towards goals set by 8 others; and, based on the March 2013 evaluation, he would require close 9 supervision, both initially and over extended periods of time, and he was unable to 10 11 sustain a normal work routine without special supervision. Id. Again, the ALJ did not completely discount this opinion, but assigned it 12 some weight. AR 27. The ALJ stated that only some weight was given because the 13 ALJ had already appropriately found that the testing from the March 2013 14 evaluation is not an accurate representation of Plaintiff’s functioning; Plaintiff’s 15 work history and Plaintiff’s own statements regarding his ability to work 16 undermine the opinion; and Plaintiff’s unemployment is due to his criminal record 17 and substance abuse rather than his current functional capacity. AR 27-28. The 18 record supports the ALJ’s decision. Plaintiff himself states that he has no 19 difficulties with meeting all home, work, and social obligations, and that he has 20 stopped trying to look for work because his biggest barrier is his criminal record. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 26 1 AR 28, 803, 822, 826, 862. An ALJ may properly reject an opinion that provides 2 restrictions that appear inconsistent with the claimant’s level of activity. Rollins v. 3 Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2001). An ALJ may reject a doctor’s 4 opinion when it is inconsistent with other evidence in the record. See Morgan, 169 5 F.3d 595, 602-603. 6 When the ALJ presents a reasonable interpretation that is supported by the 7 evidence, it is not the role of the courts to second-guess it. Rollins, 261 F.3d 853, 8 857. The Court “must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences 9 reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111; see also 10 Thomas, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one 11 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion 12 must be upheld”). Thus, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in his consideration of 13 Dr. Borton’s opinion. 14 C. The ALJ did not err in finding Plaintiff’s subjective complaints not 15 entirely credible. 16 An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s 17 testimony regarding subjective symptoms is credible. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 18 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). First, the claimant must produce objective 19 medical evidence of an underlying impairment or impairments that could 20 reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptoms alleged. Id. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 27 1 Second, if the claimant meets this threshold, and there is no affirmative evidence 2 suggesting malingering, “the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the 3 severity of [her] symptoms only by offering specific, clear, and convincing reasons 4 for doing so.” Id. 5 In weighing a claimant's credibility, the ALJ may consider many factors, 6 including, “(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's 7 reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and 8 other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or 9 inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of 10 treatment; and (3) the claimant's daily activities.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. When 11 evidence reasonably supports either confirming or reversing the ALJ's decision, the 12 Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 13 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir.1999). Here, the ALJ found that the medically 14 determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms 15 Plaintiff alleges; however, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s statements of 16 intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms were not entirely 17 credible. AR 22. The ALJ provided multiple clear and convincing reasons for 18 discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective complaint testimony. AR 21-25. 19 20 First, the ALJ noted that the medical evidence does not support Plaintiff’s allegations of totally disabling physical and mental limitations. AR 22-24. The ALJ ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 28 1 specifically noted the multiple normal physical and mental examination findings 2 throughout the record. AR 18-20, 22-24, 809, 812-13, 823-24, 830, 853, 870. 3 Inconsistency between a claimant’s allegations and relevant medical evidence is a 4 legally sufficient reason to reject a claimant’s subjective testimony. Tonapetyan v. 5 Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). An ALJ may discount a claimant’s 6 subjective symptom testimony that is contradicted by medical evidence. Carmickle 7 v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008). 8 9 Second, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s reasons he provided for not working other than for issues related to his impairments. AR 24. Plaintiff states that his criminal 10 record was his “biggest barrier” to working and he has topped trying to look for 11 work because of his criminal record. AR 24-25, 27-28, 822, 826. Plaintiff had also 12 worked previously notwithstanding his psychological issues, but he lost his 13 previous job due to alcohol abuse. AR 24, 28, 822. The fact that Plaintiff stopped 14 work for reasons other than his impairments is a sufficient basis to discredit 15 testimony. Bruton v. Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001). 16 Third, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s mental impairments, aside from his 17 cognitive limitations, were well controlled with medication or in sustained 18 remission, and Plaintiff was noncompliant with medical treatment and 19 demonstrated a lack of effort to seek any mental health treatment. See AR 18, 19, 20 22, 23, 827. A claimant’s statements may be less credible when treatment is ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 29 1 inconsistent with the level of complaints or a claimant is not following treatment 2 prescribed without good reason. An ALJ may also find a claimant’s symptom 3 testimony not credible based on evidence of effective responses to treatment. See, 4 e.g., Burch, 400 F.3d at 681; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3), 416.1529(c)(3); Molina, 5 674 F.3d at 1114. “Unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek 6 treatment . . . can cast doubt on the sincerity of [a] claimant’s [] testimony.” Fair v. 7 Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). If a claimant’s condition is not severe 8 enough to motivate them to follow the prescribed course of treatment this is 9 “powerful evidence” regarding the extent to which they are limited by the 10 11 impairment. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681. Fourth, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s credibility in part because of his 12 inconsistent statements. AR 18, 23. For example, Plaintiff testified that he had 13 panic attacks, impaired concentration, and significant deficits in psychological 14 functioning; however, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff contradicted these claims in his 15 treatment records. AR 18, 23, 61-62, 846 (denies panic symptoms), 847 (denies 16 history of panic attacks), 850 (controlled with medication), 862. An ALJ may rely 17 on ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation such as inconsistent statements. 18 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. 19 Lastly, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling limitations are 20 belied by his daily activities. AR 24. These include Plaintiff’s ability to accomplish ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 30 1 his personal care alone, manage his own finances, do his own shopping, use the 2 computer, provide his own transportation, cook for himself and his girlfriend, go 3 fishing, and play video games. AR 17-19, 20, 24, 27, 49, 823, 855, 867. Activities 4 inconsistent with the alleged symptoms are proper grounds for questioning the 5 credibility of an individual’s subjective allegations. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 6 (“[e]ven where those activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be 7 grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict 8 claims of a totally debilitating impairment”); see also Rollins v., 261 F.3d at 857. 9 When the ALJ presents a reasonable interpretation that is supported by the 10 evidence, it is not the role of the courts to second-guess it. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857. 11 The Court “must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences 12 reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111; see also 13 Thomas, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one 14 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion 15 must be upheld”). The Court does not find the ALJ erred when discounting 16 Plaintiff’s credibility because the ALJ properly provided multiple clear and 17 convincing reasons for doing so. 18 \\ 19 \\ 20 \\ ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 31 1 VIII. Conclusion 2 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court finds the 3 ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error. 4 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 5 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 12, is DENIED. 6 2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 19, is 7 GRANTED. 8 3. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant and the file shall be 9 CLOSED. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order, 11 forward copies to counsel and close the file. 12 13 14 DATED this 10th day of September, 2018. s/Robert H. Whaley ROBERT H. WHALEY Senior United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 32

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