Valencia v. Thompson et al, No. 1:2018cv03007 - Document 17 (E.D. Wash. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES. Defendants Motion to Dismiss Complaint ECF No. 10 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs claims are DISMISSED without leave to amend in federal court. This di smissal is without prejudice to Plaintiff bringing a state court action. Defendants Motion for an Award of Attorneys Fees ECF No. 11 is DENIED. The telephonic hearing on these motions, currently scheduled for 6/28/2018, is STRICKEN. The file is CLOSED. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas O. Rice. (LLH, Courtroom Deputy)
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Valencia v. Thompson et al Doc. 17 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 IVAN HUERTA VALENCIA, 7 NO. 1:18-CV-3007-TOR Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 TIMOTHY N. THOMPSON, et al., 10 11 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES Defendants. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 BEFORE THE COURT are Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (ECF No. 10) and Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees (ECF No. 11). These matters were heard without oral argument, the Court determined pursuant to LR 7.1(h)(3)(B)(iv) that oral argument is not warranted. The Court has reviewed the record and files herein, and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED and Defendant’s Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees (ECF No. 11) is DENIED. // ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 BACKGROUND 2 On January 25, 2018, Plaintiff Ivan Huerta Valencia, proceeding pro se, 3 filed a Complaint alleging a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Defendant Timothy N. 4 Thompson and other unnamed Defendants. ECF Nos. 1; 4. Mr. Thompson was 5 served on April 18, 2018 and proof of service was filed on May 2, 2018. ECF No. 6 9. On May 9, 2018, Mr. Thompson filed the instant Motion to Dismiss and Motion 7 for Attorney’s Fees. ECF Nos. 10; 11. On June 20, 2018, Plaintiff filed an 8 Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 16. 9 10 FACTS The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s Complaint and are accepted 11 as true for the purposes of the instant motion. Plaintiff asserts his claim against 12 Mr. Thompson in his individual capacity and other unnamed Defendants in their 13 individual capacities. ECF No. 4 at 2-3. Plaintiff contends that the underlying 14 facts of his § 1983 claim are “malfeasance as per lease option to purchase, which 15 was eradicated and erroneous.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff states that there was a “violation 16 of constitutional and judicial rights by Defendants willfully violating standard 17 court procedures, including, but not limited to, Defendants’ violation of Plaintiff’s 18 due process rights relating to federal judicial procedures.” Id. He asserts that the 19 injuries are to be determined, and demands immediate relief of $750,000.00 for 20 punitive and actual damages. Id. at 5. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES ~ 2 1 DISCUSSION 2 A. Standard of Review 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may 4 move to dismiss the complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 5 granted.” Fed. R. of Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive dismissal, a plaintiff must allege 6 “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 7 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 8 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This requires the plaintiff to 9 provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 10 elements.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. When deciding, the court may consider the 11 plaintiff’s allegations and any “materials incorporated into the complaint by 12 reference.” Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061 13 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 14 322 (2007)). A plaintiff’s “allegations of material fact are taken as true and 15 construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[,]” but “conclusory allegations 16 of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for 17 failure to state a claim.” In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 18 1996) (citation and brackets omitted). 19 // 20 // ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES ~ 3 1 2 B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a cause of action may be maintained “against any 3 person acting under color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights, privileges, or 4 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,’ of the United States.” S. Cal. 5 Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 6 § 1983). The rights guaranteed by § 1983 are “liberally and beneficially 7 construed.” Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443 (1991) (quoting Monell v. N.Y. 8 City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 684 (1978)). “A person deprives another 9 ‘of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an 10 affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act 11 which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff 12 complains.’” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (brackets and 13 emphasis omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). 14 But, “the state-action requirement reflects . . . the fact that ‘most rights secured by 15 the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments.’” Lugar 16 v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (citation omitted). A private 17 party may only be appropriately characterized as a “state actor” when he exercises 18 authority as a state official, acts together with or obtains significant aid from state 19 officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State. See Lugar, 20 457 U.S. at 937. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES ~ 4 1 1. Defendant Thompson 2 Defendant requests the Court dismiss the Complaint because Plaintiff fails to 3 plead any facts in support of the position that Defendant is a state actor or acted 4 under color of law. ECF No. 10 at 4. Defendant emphasizes that no facts were 5 provided as to how he violated standard court procedures or how these alleged 6 violations would constitute state action. ECF Nos. 10 at 4; 4 at 4. Defendant 7 argues that the only substantive fact set forth in the Complaint is in relation to a 8 lease with option to purchase, but even liberally construing this fact does not 9 provide an explanation for how Defendant’s conduct was that of a state actor. ECF 10 11 No. 10 at 5. Plaintiff insists that the question regarding his denial of “Due Process and 12 constitutional rights per improper mortgage company procedures” cannot factually 13 be answered by the Defendant, and thus his allegations are “enough to raise a right 14 to relief above the speculative level.” ECF No. 16 at 3. 15 The Court finds that Plaintiff does not allege any facts demonstrating how 16 Defendant is a state actor or acting under color of state law. Even if there may be a 17 question of fact regarding improper mortgage company procedures, Plaintiff 18 cannot sue Defendant under § 1983 because it is clear that Defendant is not a state 19 actor. Plaintiff then fails to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face when 20 there are no facts alleged that Defendant is a state actor. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES ~ 5 1 555. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted as the Court lacks 2 jurisdiction under § 1983. 3 2. 4 The Court also dismiss Plaintiff’s claim as it relates to the unnamed Unnamed Defendants 5 Defendants. To establish liability pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth 6 facts demonstrating how each defendant caused or personally participated in 7 causing a deprivation of plaintiff’s specific protected rights. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. 8 Machines Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 9 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts demonstrating 10 how any individual unnamed defendant caused or personally participated in 11 depriving Plaintiff of his Constitutional rights. Plaintiff is unable to provide any 12 facts as to the unnamed Defendants’ involvement in this case or that they were 13 acting under color of state law. See ECF No. 4 at 2-3. The Court thus could not 14 find enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face in regards to 15 these unnamed defendants without knowing their individual actions. See Twombly, 16 550 U.S. at 555. 17 C. Leave to Amend 18 Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend a 19 party’s pleading “should [be] freely give[n] . . . when justice so requires,” because 20 the purpose of the rule is “to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES ~ 6 1 pleadings or technicalities.” Novak v. United States, 795 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2 2015) (citation omitted). “[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no 3 request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 4 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 5 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 926 (9th 6 Cir. 2012). 7 Here, Defendant insists that leave to amend should not be granted because 8 amendment would be futile. ECF No. 10 at 6. Defendant emphasizes that Plaintiff 9 alleges a real estate dispute. Id. Defendant argues that even if Plaintiff could 10 conceivably amend the Complaint to allege a plausible claim for breach of 11 contract, there is no set of circumstances where he will be able to amend the 12 Complaint to allege a § 1983 claim or otherwise properly invoke the jurisdiction of 13 this Court. Id. at 6-7. 14 The Court finds that Plaintiff cannot prevail and it would be futile to give 15 him an opportunity to amend. Plaintiff does not have jurisdiction under § 1983 nor 16 would he be able to assert diversity jurisdiction. The Court determines that there 17 are no set of facts Plaintiff could allege to overcome this lack of jurisdiction. 18 Plaintiff’s pleading then cannot possibly be cured by other facts and the Court 19 dismisses his claims without leave to amend in federal court, but without prejudice 20 to a state court action. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES ~ 7 1 2 D. Attorney’s Fees Defendant moves the Court for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 3 U.S.C. § 1988 for $2,941.50. ECF No. 11 at 1, 7. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 4 “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United 5 States, a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). “A prevailing defendant 6 may recover an attorney’s fee only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or 7 brought to harass or embarrass the defendant.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 8 424, 429 n.2 (1983). 9 Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint is groundless and without 10 merit. ECF No. 11 at 5. Defendant also states that the underlying contract has a 11 provision that awards attorney’s fees to the prevailing party for “any dispute 12 arising out of or relating to this Lease ….” ECF Nos. 11 at 6; 13 at 18. Defendant 13 alleges that there is an element of bad faith because Plaintiff accepted and 14 deposited the down payment check offered by Defendant. ECF Nos. 11 at 6-7; 12 15 at 6-13. 16 The Court declines to award attorney’s fees. The Court invokes its 17 discretion to deny attorney’s fees as Plaintiff is a pro se litigant with limited 18 understanding of the jurisdictional rules of federal court. The Court also notes that 19 this suit was easily resolved without a great burden on Defendant, as the case was 20 dismissed in less than six months after Defendant filed one motion. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES ~ 8 1 Moreover, while this Court does not have jurisdiction over the contractual 2 dispute, the state courts would have jurisdiction. This Court did not reach the 3 merits of the dispute, only whether Plaintiff brought his complaint in the right 4 court. 5 ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 6 1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED. 7 Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED without leave to amend in federal 8 court. This dismissal is without prejudice to Plaintiff bringing a state 9 court action. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 2. Defendant’s Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees (ECF No. 11) is DENIED. 3. The telephonic hearing on these motions, currently scheduled for June 28, 2018, is STRICKEN. The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and Judgment accordingly, furnish copies to the parties and CLOSE the file DATED June 25, 2018. 17 18 THOMAS O. RICE Chief United States District Judge 19 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES ~ 9
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