Waite v. Church of Jesus Christ, Latterday Saints et al, No. 2:2005cv00399 - Document 80 (E.D. Wash. 2007)
Court Description: ORDER Granting 49 Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Edward F. Shea. (CV, Case Administrator)
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Waite v. Church of Jesus Christ, Latterday Saints et al Case 2:05-cv-00399-EFS Doc. 80 Document 80 Filed 03/27/2007 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 8 THOMAS A. WAITE, 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Plaintiff, NO. CV-05-0399-EFS v. CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST, LATTER-DAY SAINTS d/b/a Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, a Utah corporation, d/b/a Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, a Utah Corporation; DONALD C. FOSSUM, and STEVEN D. BRODHEAD, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendants. 19 20 On March 20, 2007, the Court heard oral argument in the above- 21 captioned matter. Stephen Nordstrom appeared on behalf of Plaintiff 22 Thomas A. Waite, Brian T. Rekofke appeared on behalf of Defendants Church 23 of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (“LDS Church”) and Donald Fossum 24 (collectively, “LDS Defendants”). 25 Defendant Brodhead. 26 Summary Judgment regarding Affirmative Defenses (Ct. Rec. 49). Andrew Smythe appeared on behalf of Before the Court was Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial After 1 Dockets.Justia.com Case 2:05-cv-00399-EFS oral argument and Document 80 considering Filed 03/27/2007 1 hearing the submitted 2 relevant authority, the Court was fully informed. 3 memorialize and supplement the Court’s oral ruling. 4 I. materials and This Order serves to Factual Background1 5 Plaintiff was a missionary for the Defendant LDS Church. The 6 parties agree that Plaintiff was riding in the bed of a mission-owned 7 pickup truck, driven by Defendant Fossum when the truck was struck by a 8 vehicle driven by Defendant Brodhead. 9 Plaintiff was not wearing a seatbelt, and no seatbelt was available in At the time of the collision, 10 that part of the truck. Plaintiff was ejected from the pickup truck bed 11 and injured. The LDS Church required its missionaries to sign a “Driving 12 Contract.” Prior to the collision, Plaintiff had signed such a “Driving 13 Contract” for which he agreed to “[w]ear a seat belt at all times while 14 the vehicle is moving,” “[i]n exchange for the privilege of being allowed 15 to drive or ride in a mission-owned car while serving in the Washington 16 Spokane mission.” II. Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 17 18 Plaintiff seeks a partial summary judgment on two aspects of the 19 Affirmative Defenses of the Defendants. First, Plaintiff argues that his 20 failure to use a seatbelt while riding in the back of a mission-owned 21 pickup truck cannot be a defense to negligence as a matter of law. RCW 22 23 24 25 26 1 This background is based on the Joint Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (Ct. Rec. 78). The facts detailed in this section are either not in dispute or are construed in favor of Defendants, the non-moving parties. 2 Case 2:05-cv-00399-EFS Document 80 Filed 03/27/2007 1 § 46.61.688. Second, Plaintiff argues that the LDS Church’s private 2 “Driving Contract” between it and Mr. Waite cannot be used to circumvent 3 Washington Statutes that prohibit use of such evidence. 4 The LDS Defendants oppose the Motion on five grounds. First, the 5 seatbelt statute by its terms does not apply because the back of a pickup 6 truck does not have restraints available for use by passengers. 7 riding in the back of a pickup truck is undisputedly risky conduct. 8 Third, the safety rules agreed to by contract do not violate public 9 policy. Second, Fourth, Mr. Waite should be estopped from “voiding the rules he 10 agreed to,” and evidence of the Driving Contract between the LDS Church 11 and Mr. Waite should be admissible evidence of comparative fault of the 12 plaintiff. 13 Driving Contract, he is precluded from doing so by the First Amendment, 14 as the Driving Contract was part of the missionary training, policy and 15 procedures. 16 their affirmative defenses of Assumption of the risk, comparative fault, 17 and estoppel. Fifth, if Mr. Waite is attempting to void application of the LDS Defendants argue that they should be permitted to try 18 Defendant Brodhead, the driver of the car that collided with the 19 pickup truck, joins the LDS Defendants’ opposition to the Motion for 20 Summary Judgment. (Ct. Rec. 54). 21 III. Summary Judgment Standard 22 Summary judgment will be granted if the “pleadings, depositions, 23 answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 24 affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 25 material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 26 matter of law.” FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c). 3 When considering a motion for Case 2:05-cv-00399-EFS judgment, court summary 2 credibility; instead, “the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, 3 and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” 4 v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 5 trial exists only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 6 return a verdict” for the party opposing summary judgment. Id. at 248. 7 In other words, issues of fact are not material and do not preclude 8 summary judgment unless they “might affect the outcome of the suit under 9 the governing law.” Id. the may not Filed 03/27/2007 1 favoring a Document 80 weigh the evidence nor assess Anderson A genuine issue for There is no genuine issue for trial if the 10 evidence non-movant 11 significantly probative.” Id. at 249. is “merely colorable” or “not 12 If the party requesting summary judgment demonstrates the absence 13 of a genuine material fact, the party opposing summary judgment “may not 14 rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must 15 set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” 16 or judgment may be granted as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 17 This requires the party opposing summary judgment to present or identify 18 in the record evidence sufficient to establish the existence of any 19 challenged element that is essential to that party’s case and for which 20 that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. 21 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 22 party’s facts with counter affidavits or other responsive materials may 23 result in the entry of summary judgment if the party requesting summary 24 judgment is otherwise entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson 25 v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996). 26 4 Failure to contradict the moving Case 2:05-cv-00399-EFS Filed 03/27/2007 IV. Analysis 1 2 Document 80 1. Plaintiff’s failure to use a Seatbelt at time of Collision as a Defense to Liability and Defendants’ “Inherent Risk” Argument 3 RCW 46.61.688 requires every person who operates a vehicle to use 4 a safety belt, but precludes using the person’s failure to wear a safety 5 belt as evidence of that person’s negligence in a civil action: 6 7 8 (6) Failure to comply with the requirements of this section does not constitute negligence, nor may failure to wear a safety belt assembly be admissible as evidence of negligence in any civil action. 9 RCW 46.61.688(6). This provision bars using the failure to wear a 10 seatbelt as a defense. Clark v. Payne, 61 Wash. App. 189, 193, rev. den. 11 117 Wash. 2d 1022 (1991) (extending to “failure to mitigate” damages 12 defense as implicit in statutory bar to use as evidence of negligence). 13 The statute essentially abrogates the common law principle that violation 14 of a safety statute is evidence of negligence. Under Clark, Plaintiff 15 is correct that his failure to use a safety belt assembly is not 16 admissible evidence of negligence. To the extent that Defendants’ 17 affirmative defenses intend to introduce plaintiff’s failure to use a 18 seatbelt as evidence of plaintiff’s fault, plaintiff’s motion is granted. 19 This applies regardless of whether the affirmative defense is 20 characterized as “assumption of the risk,” “estoppel” or some other 21 theory of fault. 22 Defendants have not expressly stated such a defense, but the 23 seatbelt statute is relevant to the following affirmative defenses: (3) 24 plaintiff was negligent in his disregard of church policy and rules;(5) 25 plaintiff’s claims are barred by 26 5 the free exercise clause and Case 2:05-cv-00399-EFS Document 80 Filed 03/27/2007 1 establishment clause of the First Amendment; (6) Plaintiff “assumed the 2 risk” by riding in the back of the truck; and (7) estoppel applies to the 3 plaintiff for his failure to follow church policy and rules. 4 Defendants first argue that riding in the back of a pickup truck is 5 not governed by the seatbelt statute, because it does not apply “to a 6 vehicle occupant for whom no safety belt is available when all designated 7 seating positions . . . are occupied.” 8 is unpersuasive as the statute by its terms applies to trucks. RCW 9 46.61.688(1)(e). RCW 46.61.688(2). This argument The statute mandates wearing seatbelts, but makes an 10 exemption for occupants of certain vehicles exempt from having such 11 seatbelts. 12 in no way limited to some occupant or another and contains no exception 13 for exempt vehicles. 14 requirement to use seatbelts does not create one rule of evidence for 15 some people, and another rule of evidence for others. 16 statutory rule of evidence by its own language applies “in any civil 17 action.” 18 The statute separately contains a rule of evidence, which is The existence of a statutory exception to the Instead, the RCW 46.61.688(6). Defendants next argue that riding in the back of a pickup truck is 19 inherently risky. In support of this argument, Defendants cite two 20 Hawaii cases, Maneely v. General Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th 21 cir. 1997); and Josue v. Isuzu Motors of America, Inc., 958 P.2d 535, 540 22 (Hawaii 1988). Indeed, some state laws may distinguish riding in a cargo 23 bed from other law on failure to wear a seatbelt, based on the idea that 24 a cargo area is not designed to hold people. 25 Defendants cite no Washington authority in support of this point. 26 Reading Clark v. Payne and the statute as a whole, permitting this 6 Case 2:05-cv-00399-EFS Document 80 Filed 03/27/2007 1 evidence to be presented would thwart the purpose of the statute. 2 Clark, the defendant argued that despite the statutory bar on using the 3 failure to wear a seatbelt to show negligence, the failure could be 4 admissible as evidence of a plaintiff’s failure to mitigate damages. 5 Clark rejected this approach as an end-run around the rule barring use 6 of a plaintiff’s failure to wear a seatbelt as evidence of comparative 7 fault. 8 statute which favors holding those who cause an injury fully responsible 9 for the damages without any reduction for an occupant’s failure to use 10 11 In The Clark decision gave full effect to the public policy of the a seatbelt. The effort to distinguish “cargo bed” as not “designed” to hold 12 passengers is a similar attempt to change the law by picking new words 13 to describe the plaintiff’s failure to use a seatbelt. The only aspect 14 of a “cargo bed design” that renders the ride dangerous is the absence 15 of a seatbelt, and plaintiff’s failure to wear one. However, Plaintiff 16 and Defendants agreed at oral argument that the jury will necessarily 17 learn of the facts surrounding the accident, including the location of 18 the Plaintiff in the bed of the pickup truck. The parties and the Court 19 agree that such facts are admissible in evidence, and the Court will give 20 a limiting instruction as appropriate.2 21 22 23 24 25 26 2 See 6 Wash. Prac., WPI 70.08, Use of Safety Belts, which “should be used when a party’s failure to wear a safety belt is before the jury, explicitly or implicitly, or has been admitted as evidence for a purpose other than showing negligence or contributory negligence.” 7 Id., Note. Case 2:05-cv-00399-EFS 1 2. Document 80 Filed 03/27/2007 LDS Church Defendants’ alleged breach of Driving Contract/Estoppel as Defense to Liability 2 3 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s breach of the Driving Contract is 4 a violation of church policy, and that breach of the contract should be 5 a defense to liability. Defendants likewise argue that enforcing a 6 safety rule, as a duty agreed to by the parties by contract, does not 7 violate public policy. However, Defendants fail to cite any law of motor 8 vehicle collisions to support these arguments. 9 The Court assumes for purposes of this motion that Defendant LDS 10 Church and the Plaintiff had a valid, enforceable contract. If Plaintiff 11 breached such a contract, the Defendant had a full panoply of remedies 12 for that breach. For example, it could have disciplined the plaintiff, 13 removed him from missionary duties, or barred him from using mission14 owned vehicles. 15 The primary flaw in this argument from the Defendants is that it 16 ignores the seatbelt statute as creating a substantive rule of evidence. 17 Even assuming a breach of contract, nothing supports the notion that 18 Defendant’s appropriate remedy for the breach is to change Washington law 19 applicable to this diversity action. Assuming that the Driving Contract 20 was valid and enforceable, such a contract cannot change state law on 21 evidence in civil actions where a person in a vehicle is injured and was 22 not wearing a seat belt. 23 3. First Amendment as an argument that LDS Church Defendants not bound by Washington Law 24 25 In response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 26 Defendant LDS Church inserts the argument that the First Amendment to the 8 Case 2:05-cv-00399-EFS 1 United States’ Constitution 2 summary judgment. Document 80 prohibits Filed 03/27/2007 Plaintiff from prevailing on Plaintiff alleges a “special relationship,” and that 3 he did not question riding in the back of a canopied pickup truck as part 4 of that special relationship. 5 Plaintiff is challenging the The LDS Church therefore argues that Church’s policies and procedures in 6 conducting its mission activities, and that such a suit in this secular 7 federal court would require the Court to inject itself into church 8 policies and procedures, in violation of the First Amendment. LDS 9 Defendants cite Turner v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 18 10 S.W. 3d 877 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (holding First Amendment barred several 11 substantive claims of church missionaries); and Dowd v. Society of St. 12 Colombans, 861 F.2d. 761, 764 (1st Cir. 1988) (applying doctrine of res 13 judicata to bar a missionary’s claim) in support of their contention. 14 Dowd does not apply, because res judicata is not at issue in this case. 15 Defendant LDS Church did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment, 16 but rather presents this affirmative defense in support of its other 17 affirmative defenses for assumption of the risk, comparative fault and 18 estoppel. Plaintiff counters that churches do not have tort immunity in 19 Washington, and further 20 21 22 23 ‘[t]he First Amendment does not provide churches with absolute immunity to engage in tortious conduct. So long as liability is predicated on secular conduct and does not involve the interpretation of church doctrine or religious beliefs, it does not offend constitutional principles.’ The court held that because these principles were not offended by the case before it, there was no constitutional bar to the claim. 24 25 S.H.C. v. Sheng-Yen Lu, 113 Wash. App. 511, 520 (2002), cert. denied, 149 26 Wash. 2d 1011 (2003) (citing CJC v. Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash. 9 Case 2:05-cv-00399-EFS Document 80 Filed 03/27/2007 1 2d 699, 727-28 (1999), Saunders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 2 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1998)). 3 Here, the First Amendment does not exempt the LDS Church Defendants 4 from the application of Washington law as stated in RCW 46.61.688. 5 Whether the 6 affirmative First defense Amendment to any 7 presently before the Court. 8 Plaintiff from claiming otherwise of should Plaintiffs’ bar or specific serve claims as is an not The First Amendment does nothing to prevent the benefit of the RCW 46.61.688 and the 9 evidentiary rule contained therein. 10 11 V. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion 12 for Partial Summary Judgment regarding Affirmative Defenses. The statute 13 applies to this plaintiff, riding in a pickup bed with no seatbelt 14 available. Neither the Driving Contract nor the First Amendment change 15 secular Washington law, which precludes any defendant from presenting the 16 Plaintiff’s failure to use a seatbelt as evidence of comparative 17 negligence, assumption of the risk, or some other theory designed to 18 attribute the same as fault of the Plaintiff. 19 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 20 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 21 Affirmative Defenses (Ct. Rec. 49) is GRANTED. Judgment regarding The Court finds that the 22 seatbelt statute applies to this case in all its particulars; and that no 23 exception applies to the statute barring the Plaintiff’s failure to use 24 a seatbelt as evidence of fault and barring a finding of fault on this 25 basis. 26 10 Case 2:05-cv-00399-EFS 1 2. Document 80 Filed 03/27/2007 At trial, the parties may present evidence of where the 2 plaintiff was riding and how injury came about; but are barred from using 3 the lack of a seatbelt as evidence or argument concerning fault. The 4 Court will give the Washington Pattern Jury Instruction 70.08 on the 5 seatbelt statute, and will consider an appropriate limiting instruction 6 as contemplated by the instruction. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to enter 8 this Order and provide copies to counsel. 9 DATED this 27th day of March 2007. 10 11 S/ Edward F. Shea EDWARD F. SHEA United States District Judge 12 13 14 Q:\Civil\2005\0399.MPSJ.wpd 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 11
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