Warren v. Colvin (previously Astrue), No. 2:2012cv00335 - Document 23 (E.D. Wash. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; denying plaintiff's 16 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting defendant's 18 Motion for Summary Judgment; DCE shall enter judgment in favor of defendant and close the file. Signed by Judge Lonny R. Suko. (LE, Case Administrator)
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Warren v. Colvin (previously Astrue) Doc. 23 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 DAVID K. WARREN, 7 Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 10 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security, 11 Defendant. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ) ) No. CV-12-0335-LRS ) ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ) ) ) ) ) ) ) BEFORE THE COURT are cross-motions for summary judgment, noted for hearing without oral argument. Attorney Maureen J. Rosette represents Plaintiff; Special Assistant United States Attorney Richard A. Morris represents the Commissioner of Social Security (Defendant or Commissioner). After reviewing the administrative record and the briefs filed by the parties, the court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 18. JURISDICTION Plaintiff filed his applications for disability insurance benefits and SSI benefits on March 25, 2008 (Tr. 127). He alleged disability since March 22, 2007 because of “Cognitive disorder, Schizophrenia, Memory, Anger, Concentration, Personality Disorder, and possible dementia” (Tr. 171). At the hearing, Plaintiff amended the alleged onset date to November 1, 2009 (Tr. 21, 64-65). Plaintiff’s applications were denied at the initial (Tr. 28 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 77) and reconsideration (Tr. 83, 85) levels. Plaintiff filed a 2 Request for Hearing on August 27, 2008 (Tr. 87). On March 25, 3 2010, an ALJ conducted a hearing where Plaintiff appeared and 4 testified, represented by an attorney (Tr. 36-72). A vocational 5 expert also testified. On June 15, 2010, the ALJ issued a 6 decision finding Plaintiff not disabled as defined in the Social 7 Security Act (Tr. 18-35). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 8 request for review (Tr. 1), making the ALJ’s decision the 9 Commissioner’s final decision. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481, 10 422.210. Plaintiff timely filed a Complaint in this Court on May 11 2, 2012. STATEMENT OF FACTS 12 13 The facts have been presented in the administrative hearing 14 transcript, the ALJ's decision, and the briefs of the parties. 15 This court will adopt those facts and provide a brief summary. 16 Plaintiff was 63 years old on the alleged onset date and the 17 date of the hearing (Tr. 31, 40), closely approaching retirement 18 age (age 60 or over) at all pertinent times. 20 C.F.R. §§ 19 404.1563(e), 416.963(e). Plaintiff has two bachelor’s degrees 20 (English and Psychology) and one year of graduate school (Tr. 40, 21 201). He has worked as a telemarketer, lumber handler, commercial 22 cleaner, and material handler (Tr. 30, Finding 6; 67-68). It is 23 unclear whether Plaintiff holds a driver’s license but he reported 24 that he takes the bus or his sister gives him rides (Tr. 47). 25 Plaintiff reported on a “Psychosocial Interview” Form that he has 26 had five DWIs. (Tr. 311). He is divorced, lives by himself, and 27 is able to prepare his own meals and eat regularly, bathes 28 regularly and attends to basic hygiene, does his laundry, and ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 - 1 reports no difficulty in doing daily household chores. (Tr. 40, 2 262). He states he has had quite a bit of trouble in the past 3 with alcohol and drinking. (Tr. 49). Plaintiff reports he quit 4 drinking in January of 2008 (Tr. 187). Plaintiff also testified 5 that he used illegal drugs in the past(Tr. 57-58) but reports 6 being abstinent from cocaine since January of 2008 (Tr. 231). He 7 reports he smoked a pack per day for 40 years but quit smoking in 8 May of 2007. (Tr. 187, 213). 9 memory problems. (Tr. 43). He testifies that he has some He also testified he spends a lot of 10 time at the library doing research and learning the computer. 11 (Tr. 43). He states he has experienced anxiety attacks in the 12 past. (Tr. 48). He has decreased his coffee intake to one cup, 13 and has had no panic attacks since October of 1998. (Tr. 48). 14 ALJ’S FINDINGS 15 At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in 16 substantial gainful activity since November 1, 2009, the alleged 17 onset date (Tr. 23, Finding 2). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b). 18 416.920(b). At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following 19 severe impairments: organic mental disorder, alcohol abuse, 20 alcoholic polyneuropathy, polyuria, generalized anxiety disorder, 21 and dementia (Tr. 23, Finding 3). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 22 416.920(c). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s 23 impairments did not meet or equal the requirements of a listed 24 impairment (Tr. 24, Finding 4). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 25 404.1520(d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d). 26 The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional 27 capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, 28 but with the following nonexertional limitations: [he] can perform ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 - 1 simple and some complex tasks; needs to be in an isolated setting 2 to focus on tasks; may need extra time to adapt to changes in work 3 settings; moderate restrictions in the ability to maintain 4 sustained attention, concentration, and persistence for extended 5 periods; and moderate restrictions in the ability to interact 6 appropriately with the public or respond appropriately to changes 7 in the work setting. (Tr. 25, Finding 5). 20 C.F.R. §§ 8 404.1520(e), 404.1545, 416.920(e), 416.946, and 404.1567, 416.967 9 (defining exertional levels of work). In making these findings, 10 the ALJ found that although Plaintiff’s medically determinable 11 impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 12 symptoms, his statements concerning the intensity, persistence, 13 and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible to the 14 extent they are inconsistent with the determined residual 15 functional capacity assessment (Tr. 29). 16 At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff was capable of 17 performing his past relevant work as a lumber handler, commercial 18 cleaner, and material handler as actually performed and as 19 generally performed in the general economy. This work did not 20 require the performance of work-related activities precluded by 21 Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (Tr. 30, Finding 6). 20 22 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). Because Plaintiff 23 was unable to meet his burden of showing that he could not perform 24 his past relevant work, the ALJ was not required to and did not 25 proceed to step five of the sequential process. The ALJ, 26 therefore, found Plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined 27 in the Social Security Act from November 2, 2009, the through the 28 date of the decision (Tr. 30, Finding 7). 20 C.F.R. §§ ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 - 1 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g). ISSUES 2 3 Plaintiff alleges that there was not substantial evidence to 4 support the ALJ's conclusions. More specifically, Plaintiff 5 believes that he is more limited from a psychological standpoint 6 than what was determined by the ALJ. Plaintiff further believes 7 that the ALJ did not properly consider nor reject the opinions of 8 Dr. Dalley, and, based on this error, the ALJ 's decision must be 9 reversed. 10 The Commissioner disagrees, asserting the ALJ’s decision is 11 supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. The 12 Commissioner specifically argues that the ALJ properly considered 13 the medical reports and opinions. The Commissioner asks the Court 14 to affirm the Agency’s final decision that Plaintiff was not 15 disabled under the Social Security Act (ECF No. 19 at 16). DISCUSSION 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 A. Psychological Evidence: Mahlon Dalley, Ph.D.’s Opinions and James Bailey, Ph.D.’s Opinion Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ did not properly consider or reject the opinions of psychologist Mahlon Dalley, Ph.D., made in two psychological evaluations. (ECF No. 17 at 6-10). Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ gave too much weight, or incorrectly “relied primarily on” the non-examining, non-treating opinion of reviewing psychologist, James Bailey, Ph.D. On underwent March a 21, 2008 and March 28, (ECF No. 17 at 8). 2008, Plaintiff psychological evaluation (TR 221-232). Dawn Wilcox, BA, MS Candidate, Brooke Sjostrom, MS, LMHC, and Mahlon Dalley, PhD, completed the evaluation (TR 232). The examiners conducted a 28 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5 - 1 background history, a mini-mental status examination, and 2 psychological testing (Tr. 225-26) and Plaintiff was diagnosed 3 with alcohol dependence; cocaine dependence in early, full 4 remission; cognitive disorder, NOS; and a rule-out diagnosis of 5 alcohol-induced persisting dementia (TR 230). 6 Plaintiff scored 29 out of 30 points on the mini-mental 7 status examination, with 24 being the cut-off to be classified in 8 the impairment range (Tr. 226). Plaintiff appeared to exhibit 9 average mental control and demonstrated a good fund of general 10 information, and an ability to think abstractly (Tr. 226). Trails 11 A and B testing, used for visual-conceptual and visual-motor 12 tracking, were in the normal limits range (Tr. 22). Plaintiff’s 13 scores on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-3 (WAIS-3) were: 14 verbal IQ of 122 (93rd percentile), performance IQ of 99 (47th 15 percentile), and full scale IQ of 112 (79th percentile). His 16 overall performance was classified in the high average range (Tr. 17 228). Wechsler Memory Scale-III (WMS-III) results suggested 18 significant cognitive impairments in immediate, visual, delayed, 19 and general memory abilities (Tr. 229). The examiners administered 20 the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2), which 21 measures emotional adjustment. People with similar scores to 22 Plaintiff’s, report difficulties in concentration and attention, 23 as well as memory deficits (Tr. 230). 24 The master’s level therapists, working under the supervision 25 of Dr. Dalley, assessed Plaintiff's ability to do work activities, 26 concluding that Plaintiff would have several moderate and marked 27 work-related limitations (TR 223). Plaintiff asserts that even 28 though the ALJ had given little weight to these opinions because ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6 - 1 Dr. Dalley signed off as the releasing authority and did not 2 examine Plaintiff, it is Plaintiff’s position that the opinion of 3 a master's level therapist, who works in conjunction with a 4 psychologist, should constitute that of an acceptable medical 5 source. 6 On January 26, 2009, Ms. Wilcox again evaluated Plaintiff, 7 under the supervision of Dr. Dalley (Tr. 260-64). Ms. Wilcox 8 reviewed prior records, and conducted a mini-mental status 9 examination and psychological testing (Tr. 261). The mini-mental 10 status examinations results were virtually identical to the March 11 2008 results (Tr. 261). The Trails A testing result was in the 12 normal range, and the Trails B result was in the mild impairment 13 range, likely related to performance anxiety (Tr. 261-62). MMPI-II 14 testing again showed scores similar to others who reported 15 difficulties in concentration and attention, as well as memory 16 deficits (Tr. 262). Ms. Wilcox and Dr. Dalley diagnosed cognitive 17 disorder, NOS; generalized anxiety disorder; alcohol dependence, 18 early full remission (by his report); cocaine dependence, 19 sustained full remission (by his report); and rule/out 20 alcohol-induced persisting dementia (Tr. 262). They assigned a GAF 21 score of 47 (Tr. 263). A GAF score of 41 to 50 indicate serious 22 symptoms or (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, 23 frequent shoplifting) or any serious impairment in social, 24 occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to 25 keep a job). DSM-IV-TR at 32-34. Plaintiff’s current cognitive 26 deficits were likely to interfere with his ability to maintain 27 employment (Tr. 263-64). 28 Ms. Wilcox completed a DSHS Psychological/Psychiatric ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7 - 1 Evaluation form, also signed by Dr. Dalley (Tr. 265-68). They 2 opined Plaintiff had marked limitations in the ability to relate 3 appropriately to co-workers and supervisors; and the ability to 4 respond appropriately and tolerate the pressures and expectations 5 of a normal work setting (Tr. 267). They found moderate 6 limitations in three other cognitive and social factors (Tr. 267). 7 Plaintiff argues that if Dr. Dalley’s opinions were properly 8 credited, the ALJ would have to determine that Plaintiff was much 9 more limited from a psychological standpoint and disabled 10 based on vocational expert testimony, wherein the vocational 11 expert testified that there would be no work in the national 12 economy Plaintiff was capable of performing with the limitations 13 set forth by Dr. Dalley. ECF No. 21 at 3. 14 The Commissioner in its motion for summary judgment, asserts 15 that an ALJ is responsible for judging the medical evidence. The 16 Commissioner asserts that the ALJ is “the final arbiter” who 17 resolves medical evidence ambiguities. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 18 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). So long as there is more than a 19 scintilla of evidence to support the interpretation of the medical 20 evidence the ALJ provides, and that interpretation is based on the 21 correct legal standards, it should not be overturned. Valentine v. 22 Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). The 23 Commissioner states that the ALJ found that although Dr. Dalley 24 signed the evaluation reports, there is no indication that he ever 25 examined the claimant (Tr. 29). Further, the Commissioner argues 26 that the ALJ found the opinions inconsistent with the examiners’ 27 recommendations for treatment, or more specifically, the lack 28 thereof (Tr. 29). The ALJ reasonably interpreted the examination ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8 - 1 findings as inconsistent with the opinions on limitations because 2 either treatment or abstinence from alcohol and drug use would 3 likely improve Plaintiff’s symptoms. 4 Second, the Commissioner argues, the ALJ found the opinions 5 without substantial support from other evidence of record (Tr. 6 29). An opinion that is conclusory and inconsistent with the rest 7 of the evidence is properly rejected. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 8 1111, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 1999). 9 Third, the Commissioner asserts the ALJ properly relied on 10 the findings of State agency reviewing psychologist, James Bailey, 11 Ph.D. (Tr. 29). State agency medical consultants are experts in 12 the evaluation of medical issues in disability claims under the 13 Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f), 416.927(f), and SSR 14 96-6p, available at 1996 WL 374180. Dr. Bailey reviewed the 15 medical evidence and completed a Mental Residual Functional 16 Capacity Assessment in June 2008 (Tr. 248-51). It was Dr. Bailey's 17 opinion that Plaintiff was capable of at least simple and some 18 complex tasks; his concentration may be interrupted at times; he 19 would do best in a more isolated work setting to help him stay 20 focused; and he may need extra time to adapt to changes in the 21 workplace (Tr. 250). In August 2008, State agency psychologist 22 Edward Beatty, Ph. D., affirmed Dr. Bailey's assessment (Tr. 259). 23 B. Analysis 24 This Court finds that Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ did 25 not properly consider the medical reports and opinions is 26 unfounded. The ALJ’s decision has considered the opinions of Dr. 27 Dalley, however he accorded them less weight than Plaintiff would 28 like. The ALJ explained his reasons for giving the opinions of Dr. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9 - 1 Dalley little weight (Tr. 29). 2 The ALJ first noted that Ms. Sjostrom and Ms. Wilcox were 3 working under Dr. Dalley’s supervision, and Dr. Dalley adopted 4 their findings and conclusions as his own (Tr. 232, 264). The ALJ 5 concluded that there was no indication Dr. Dalley ever examined 6 the Plaintiff (Tr. 29). Plaintiff’s argument, however, that the 7 therapists working in conjunction with Dr. Dalley constitutes an 8 acceptable medical source, has merit. See Gomez v. Chater, 74 9 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 1996). It appears the ALJ did review and 10 fully consider Dr. Dalley’s opinions, but accorded them little 11 weight. The Court finds that the ALJ interpreted the medical 12 evidence, as legally empowered to do, and gave clear reasons for 13 his findings. The ALJ found that the opinions were inconsistent 14 with the examiners’ recommendations for treatment, or lack 15 thereof. (Tr. 29). 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 In this regard, the ALJ found: While both examiners opined the claimant has marked limitations in his ability to relate appropriately with co-workers and supervisors, as well as respond appropriately to and tolerate the pressures and expectations of a normal work setting, such findings are inconsistent with their recommendations of treatment or lack thereof (Exhibit 5F/4 & 13F/6). Although both examiners noted that mental health intervention is not likely to restore or substantially improve the individual's ability to work for pay in a regular and predictable manner, they also noted that he does not currently receive mental health services and there is no indication that Ms. Sjosrom [sic] or Ms. Wilcox actually treated the claimant outside of these evaluations (Id. at 5 & 9). Both examiners opined the claimant's current cognitive deficits are likely to interfere with his ability to successfully initiate or maintain regular employment; yet both examiner's also recommended he be re-assessed after he is able to maintain an extended period of abstinence in order to evaluate whether his cognitive ability has improved or ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 10 - declined further, which suggests that both examiners are unsure as to how abstinence and/or treatment will affect his ability to initiate or sustain employment. Additionally, the opinions are without substantial support from the other evidence of record, which obviously renders it less persuasive. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Tr. 29. The Court finds that the ALJ reasonably interpreted the examination findings as inconsistent with the opinions on limitations because either treatment or abstinence would likely improve Plaintiff’s symptoms. It is noted that Ms. Sjostrom found marked limitations in two social factors, where alleviation of depression and anxiety would be more likely to have a positive effect, rather than in cognitive factors, where the effect would likely be less. (Tr. 222-23). Similarly, Ms. Wilcox indicated that abstinence would likely alleviate some anxiety symptoms (Tr. 266), and that alcohol or drug abuse may exacerbate Plaintiff’s cognitive symptoms (Tr. 267). These clinical findings clearly support the ALJ’s findings. An impairment that can be controlled effectively is not disabling for social security purposes. Warre v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir.2006). Next, the ALJ properly considered the abnormal test results administered by the examiners working under the supervision of Dr. Dalley. More specifically, the WMS-II and MMPI-2 results indicated concentration and memory deficits. The ALJ then considered and compared these results to the limitations shown on the DSHS forms for cognitive factors. The limitations shown on the DSHS forms were moderate (significant), rather than marked (very significant). The ALJ’s RFC finding incorporated these limitations by concluding Plaintiff could perform simple and some complex tasks, needed an isolated setting to focus on tasks, may ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 11 - 1 need extra time to adapt to changes, and had moderate restrictions 2 in the ability to maintain sustained attention, concentration, and 3 persistence (Tr. 25). 4 Lastly, the Court finds that the ALJ’s reliance on the 5 findings of State Agency reviewing psychologist, James Bailey, 6 Ph.D. was not in error. The ALJ noted that although State agency 7 physicians are non-examining, such opinions are entitled to some 8 weight particularly when there are other reasons to reach similar 9 conclusions (Tr. 29). Dr. Bailey reviewed the medical evidence 10 and completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment in 11 June 2008 (Tr. 248-51). It was Dr. Bailey’s assessment, which was 12 affirmed by Dr. Beatty, Ph.D., that Plaintiff was capable of at 13 least simple and some complex tasks; his concentration may be 14 interrupted at times; he would do best in a more isolated work 15 setting to help him stay focused; and he may need extra time to 16 adapt to changes in the workplace (Tr. 250). The Court finds that 17 the ALJ’s findings regarding the examining source opinions are 18 rational conclusions based on all of the evidence. The evidence 19 here is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one 20 of which supports the ALJ’s decision. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 21 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). 22 C. Standard of Review 23 "The [Commissioner's] determination that a claimant is not 24 disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are supported by 25 substantial evidence, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)...." 26 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983). Delgado v. Heckler, Substantial evidence is more 27 than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 28 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a preponderance. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT McAllister - 12 - 1 v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-602 (9th Cir. 1989); Desrosiers v. 2 Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th 3 Cir. 1988). "It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 4 might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 5 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Richardson v. "[S]uch inferences and 6 conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw from the 7 evidence" will also be upheld. Beane v. Richardson, 457 F.2d 758, 8 759 (9th Cir. 1972); Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th 9 Cir. 1965). On review, the court considers the record as a whole, 10 not just the evidence supporting the decision of the Commissioner. 11 Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989), quoting 12 Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1980); Thompson v. 13 Schweiker, 665 F.2d 936, 939 (9th Cir. 1982). 14 It is the role of the trier of fact, not this court to 15 resolve conflicts in evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If 16 evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the court 17 must uphold the decision of the ALJ. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 18 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). 19 A decision supported by substantial evidence will still be 20 set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in 21 weighing the evidence and making the decision. Brawner v. 22 Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th 23 Cir. 1987). 24 D. Conclusion 25 The ALJ applied correct legal standards and cited substantial 26 evidence in finding that Plaintiff was capable of performing his 27 past relevant work as a lumber handler, commercial cleaner, and 28 material handler, as actually performed, and as generally ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 13 - 1 performed, in the national economy. 2 IT IS ORDERED: 3 1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 18, is 4 GRANTED. 5 2. Plaintiff’s Motion for summary Judgment, ECF No. 16, is 6 DENIED. 7 The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order, 8 provide copies to counsel, enter judgment in favor of defendant, 9 and CLOSE this file. 10 DATED this 16th day of October, 2013. 11 s/Lonny R. Suko ___________________________________ LONNY R. SUKO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 14 -
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