Vaster v. Hudgins et al, No. 2:2013cv05031 - Document 55 (E.D. Wash. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT granting 38 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Edward F. Shea. (AY, Case Administrator)
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Vaster v. Hudgins et al Doc. 55 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 6 7 Plaintiff, 8 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. 9 10 CASE NO. CV-13-5031-EFS MAURICE VASTER, CHARLES HUDGINS, LAMAR NELSON, CARLOS SABALA, and WAYNE RUSSELL, 11 Defendants. 12 13 Defendants Charles Hudgins, Lamar Nelson, Wayne Russell, and 14 Carlos Sabala ask the Court to enter summary judgment in their favor 15 because 1) Plaintiff Maurice Vaster fails to establish a plausible 16 claim of retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) the official-capacity 17 claims against the Defendants are barred under the Eleventh Amendment; 18 and 3) each Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 38. 19 Mr. Vaster opposes the motion, submitting that triable issues of fact 20 exist for trial. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants 21 each Defendant summary judgment. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 // 26 / ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 A. Background1 Mr. 2 Vaster is an inmate at Coyote Ridge Corrections Center 3 (“Coyote Ridge”). While at Coyote Ridge, Mr. Vaster worked at the 4 Correctional Industries (CI) Laundry from August 2010 to May 2011. ECF 5 No. 46 at 1; ECF No. 41 at 9. When he was hired for this Laundry 6 position, 7 Infractable Offenses, and Shop Rules and Regulations. ECF No. 40, 8 Attach. B. Mr. Vaster signed the employee documents: Pay Levels, 9 These documents advised Mr. Vaster, in pertinent part, that he 10 would be subject to an infraction and/or termination for stealing 11 goods or materials, a violation of the employment rules, and any 12 abusive or distracting behavior. ECF No. 40, Attach. B at 22, 28 & 29; 13 ECF 14 Supervisors have the “authority to suspend or terminate an offender 15 who 16 environment, 17 permanently.”). He was warned that if he was terminated that he would 18 be ineligible for CI work for at least six months. ECF No. 40, Attach. 19 B at 23. No. 40, poses a Attach. threat A to either at 20 (Facility security or temporarily is staff and disruptive pending CI to Class II the work investigation or 20 1 When considering this motion and creating this factual section, the Court 21 1) believed the undisputed facts and the non-moving party’s evidence, 2) 22 23 drew all justifiable inferences therefrom in the non-moving party’s favor, 3) did not weigh the evidence or assess credibility, and 4) did not accept assertions made by the non-moving party that were flatly 24 25 contradicted by the record. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). 26 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2 1 In 2010 and early 2011, Mr. Vaster received positive performance 2 evaluations from his CI Supervisor Louise Byng. ECF No. 19, Attach. C. 3 at 4 Assistant General Manager and the Site Manager for all CI shops at 5 Coyote Ridge, signed Mr. Vaster’s 2011 evaluation in February 2011. 6 Id. at 60. 59-60 & 67-68. Notwithstanding 7 Charles his Hudgins, good who employment was at that record, Mr. time the Vaster CI was 8 accused of stealing a pair of thermals from the Laundry on May 31, 9 2011. At approximately 7:50 a.m. on May 31, Officer Lamar Nelson 10 observed Mr. Vaster wearing a new thermal top and bottom as he entered 11 the CI screening station. ECF No. 41 ¶ 10; ECF No. 47, Ex. 3. This 12 caught Officer Nelson’s attention because Mr. Vaster had previously 13 worn 14 regarding his observations and sent it to Officer Carlos Sabala, who 15 also worked at the CI entry screening station. ECF No. 41 ¶ 2; ECF No. 16 47, Ex. 3. old thermals. Officer Nelson completed an Incident Report 17 Officer Sabala observed Mr. Vaster and shared Officer Nelson’s 18 concern that Mr. Vaster was wearing different thermals than he had 19 previously worn. ECF No. 41 ¶ 10 & Attach. D. Officer Sabala and 20 Sergeant Wayne Russell, who was also working at the CI entry screening 21 station, reviewed Mr. Vaster’s clothing inventory report; each inmate 22 has a clothing report, or matrix. ECF No. 41 ¶ 5 & Attach. A at 15. 23 Mr. Vaster’s clothing report indicates that Mr. Vaster was issued one 24 thermal shirt and one thermal bottom on October 14, 2010, and that his 25 “balance” for each of those items was “1.” ECF No. 41 ¶ 12 & Attach. 26 C. However, Mr. Vaster, who was in custody before October 14, 2010, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 3 1 did not sign for this particular clothing transaction, as is required 2 by the prison policies. ECF No. 41, Attach. C at 16 (“The offender 3 will be permitted to review the completed [form] before signing. The 4 designated 5 Officer 6 indicate that Mr. Vaster had only been issued one thermal top and one 7 thermal bottom. ECF No. 47, Ex. 5. staff Nelson, will and witness Sergeant the signature.”). Russell read the Officer clothing Sabala, record to 8 Officer Sabala contacted Officer Calcado, who was stationed in 9 Mr. Vaster’s living unit, and requested that Officer Calcado inspect 10 Mr. Vaster’s cell to determine if there were other thermals present. 11 ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 57; ECF No. 41 ¶ 10. Officer Calcado found a 12 pair of thermals in Mr. Vaster’s cell; he advised Officer Sabala of 13 his finding. ECF No. 47, Ex. 1. 14 Officer Sabala and Sergeant Russell then escorted Mr. Vaster to 15 the Laundry staff restroom and required Mr. Vaster to remove his 16 thermals 17 whether the thermals had an inmate number. ECF No. 47 ¶¶ 4 & 5 & Ex. 18 1; ECF No. 46 at 2. Pursuant to Coyote Ridge policy, each item of an 19 inmate’s personal property is to be marked with his offender number in 20 permanent ink. ECF No. 41 ¶ 6. It is the offender’s responsibility to 21 ensure his number is legible on his state-issued clothing; therefore, 22 before 23 clothing room to have his DOC number re-stamped on the clothing item. 24 ECF No. 41, Attach. B at 31-32. Neither thermal that Mr. Vaster was 25 wearing had his inmate number. ECF No. 41 ¶ 11. Mr. Vaster informed 26 them that the thermals were his, they were not new, and they were not a so that number they, becomes along with illegible, Officer the Nelson, offender could must ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 4 inspect contact the 1 stolen but rather his inmate number had simply washed out. ECF No. 47 2 ¶ 5. 3 At the direction of Sergeant Russell, Officer Sabala escorted 4 Mr. Vaster to his cell. ECF No. 41 ¶ 13; ECF No. 47 ¶ 6. Mr. Vaster 5 produced a receipt for the older pair of thermals in his cell but did 6 not produce a receipt for the newer thermals he was wearing. ECF No. 7 41 ¶ 13. 8 Mr. Vaster told Officer Sabala that he was being harassed and 9 therefore he was going to file a staff misconduct grievance against 10 Officers Sabala and Nelson and Sergeant Russell. ECF No. 47 ¶ 8. 11 Officer Sabala informed Mr. Vaster that he would be infracted for 12 theft of the newer thermals, and later that day, Officer Sabala did 13 file a disciplinary infraction against Mr. Vaster for theft of the 14 newer thermals. ECF No. 41 ¶ 14 & Attach. D; ECF No. 47 ¶ 3. Officer 15 Sabala placed the newer pair of thermals into evidence. ECF No. 41 ¶ 16 14. Sergeant Russell and Officer Nelson also filed incident reports. 17 ECF No. 47, Exs. 2 & 3. CI Manager Hudgins was informed later that day 18 that Mr. Vaster was issued an infraction for theft while working at CI 19 Laundry. ECF No. 40 ¶ 11. 20 Mr. Vaster was terminated of his Laundry employment as a result 21 of the infraction. ECF No. 47 ¶ 11; ECF No. 40 ¶ 5. Because an 22 infraction was filed, Mr. Vaster was unable to grieve the incident 23 pursuant to Coyote Ridge policy. ECF No. 47 ¶ 10. 24 A disciplinary hearing regarding the infraction was held on June 25 9, 2011. ECF No. 47 ¶ 12; ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 50. Mr. Vaster 26 participated and told the hearing officer that he had been issued his ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 5 1 “newer” thermals on May 17, 2010, at another facility and that his 2 offender number came out in the wash. ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 50 & 3 57; 4 infraction determining there was no evidence to support a finding that 5 Mr. Vaster stole the newer thermals, but rather confirmed that the 6 clothing matrix indicated that he was issued two thermals and that the 7 “new” shirt was not new as it had stains. Id.; ECF No. 47 ¶ 12. ECF No. 47 ¶ 12. The hearing officer dismissed the theft 8 Later that day, Mr. Vaster filed a grievance, claiming that 9 Officers Sabala and Nelson and Sergeant Russell conspired to accuse 10 him of theft. ECF No. 46 at 1; ECF No. 47 ¶ 13; ECF No. 19, Attach. C 11 at 48. The response to his grievance advised that the issue was a non- 12 grieveable 13 Correctional Program Manager. ECF No. 19, Attach. C. work-assignment issue, which must be addressed by the 14 Because the infraction had been dismissed, Mr. Vaster sought to 15 return to work. ECF No. 47 ¶ 13. In his complaint, Mr. Vaster alleges 16 that Sergeant Russell and Officers Sabala and Nelson contacted CI 17 Manager 18 permitted to continue working at Laundry even though the infraction 19 had been dismissed. ECF No. 47 ¶ 13 (citing ECF No. 6 ¶ 4.13). 20 However, in response to the summary-judgment motion, Mr. Vaster did 21 not produce any evidence indicating that Sergeant Russell or Officers 22 Sabala or Nelson contacted Manager Hudgins in regard to Mr. Vaster’s 23 employment. And Manager Hudgins declares that he was not requested by 24 Officers 25 Vaster’s Laundry employment. ECF No. 40 ¶ 15. Officer Sabala declares 26 similarly. ECF No. 41 ¶ 15. Hudgins Sabala and or advised Nelson or him that Sergeant Mr. Vaster Russell to should not terminate ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 6 be Mr. 1 Nonetheless, Mr. Vaster was not permitted to return to work at 2 CI Laundry. ECF No. 47 ¶¶ 15, 21, & 28. Mr. Vaster sought help from 3 his counselor in order to return to work. And on June 14, 2011, 4 Counselor Robideau emailed Laundry Supervisor Byng on Mr. Vaster’s 5 behalf to advise her that Mr. Vaster’s infraction had been dismissed 6 and that he wanted to return to work. ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 63. 7 The same day, Supervisor Byng responded that Mr. Vaster would 8 not return to the Laundry until an investigation regarding a suspected 9 clothing theft ring was complete; Manager Hudgins was copied in on the 10 email. ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 63. Manager Hudgins responded by email 11 to both Counselor Robideau and Supervisor Byng, stating that offenders 12 have reported that Mr. Vaster had been forcing other inmates to steal 13 laundry and that with Mr. Vaster’s absence from the laundry, the 14 laundry was more peaceful. Manager Hudgins concludes with a statement 15 that Mr. Vaster was not performing to CI standards. ECF No. 19, 16 Attach. C at 63. Manager Hudgins declares that it was June 14, 2011— 17 the same date as these emails—that he learned that Mr. Vaster was 18 requesting to return to the Laundry. ECF No. 40 ¶ 6. 19 No documentation, emails, or declarations were provided to the 20 Court that specified the type of investigation conducted, when it 21 ended, or the findings made. The most detailed information as provided 22 by Manager Hudgins is: 23 24 25 26 Over the prior couple of months [before June 2011], I had received complaints from the clothing room that new clothing items that had been received in CI Laundry were missing when the clothing room received new clothes from CI Laundry. At the time of Offender Vaster’s infraction, Correctional Industries Supervisor Louise Byng and Laundry Officer Linda Smith had been conducting an investigation ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 7 for approximately one month trying to determine where and how the new clothes “went missing.” Supervisor Byng and Officer Smith kept me updated concerning their investigation. 1 2 3 ECF No. 40 ¶ 12. Yet, Manager Hudgins also admitted that he did not 4 hear about or believe that Mr. Vaster was stealing clothes from 5 Laundry before his disciplinary infraction. ECF No. 47, Ex. 8, RFA 6 Nos. 6 & 8. Manager Hudgins reports that he stopped receiving 7 complaints from the clothing room that clothing was missing after Mr. 8 Vaster was no longer working at CI Laundry. ECF No. 40 ¶ 18. Whether 9 the reported theft of clothing stopped because Mr. Vaster no longer 10 had access to Laundry clothing or because the other CI Laundry workers 11 were now aware that CI management was taking a closer look at the 12 activity in the Laundry is unknown by the Court. Mr. Vaster maintains 13 he was not involved in any clothing theft ring. ECF No. 47 ¶ 16. 14 On June 16, 2011, Mr. Vaster filed another grievance regarding 15 the May 31, 2011 incident and asking that Sergeant Russell and 16 Officers Sabala and Nelson attend a retraining course on governing 17 policies and to have a misconduct notation added to their employment 18 file. ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 53. The Grievance Coordinator responded 19 that formal grievance paperwork was being prepared. ECF No. 19, 20 Attach. C at 53. 21 On June 20, 2011, Mr. Vaster contacted Counselor Nichoel Rickard 22 to assist him with returning to work. ECF No. 47 ¶ 18. Counselor 23 Rickard had not received any termination paperwork as would be typical 24 under the prison’s policies following a termination. ECF No. 47 ¶ 18; 25 see ECF No. 19-3 at 59 & 60. Therefore, Counselor Rickard emailed 26 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 8 1 Manager Hudgins to inform him that Mr. Vaster was found not guilty of 2 the infraction and requested that Mr. Vaster be returned to work in 3 the Laundry. ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 59 & 61. In response, Manager 4 Hudgins stated that the Laundry was a 5 offenders without Mr. Vaster working there as he was reported to be 6 leading a clothing theft ring. ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 61. Manager 7 Hudgins 8 previously sent to the other counselor and Supervisor Byng on June 14. 9 ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 62. In 10 also his forwarded to declaration in Counselor support safer place for staff and Rickard of the summary email he judgment, had Manager 11 Hudgins stated that Supervisor Byng and Officer Smith expressed that 12 they 13 permitted to return to work at CI Laundry. ECF No. 40 ¶ 14. In CI 14 Laundry, 15 approximately thirty-five offender workers. Id. The laundry carts, 16 when full, weigh approximately 500-600 pounds. Id. There are blind 17 spots within CI Laundry that surveillance cameras do not cover. Id. 18 Because the safety and security of the staff and offenders is the 19 “most important fact in all decisions related to CI,” and CI has a 20 zero-tolerance 21 Vaster was not permitted to return to work at Laundry. ECF No. 40 ¶¶ 22 1, 5, & 6. were concerned there is for one policy their staff for physical member theft, and Manager safety one if Mr. officer Hudgins Vaster to states was supervise that Mr. 23 On June 22, 2011, Supervisor Byng sent an email to DOC employees 24 Amy McCabe and Eileen Sawyer, and copied in Manager Hudgins, asking 25 that Mr. Vaster be removed from the Laundry worker list. ECF No. 19, 26 Attach. C at 64. Ms. McCabe, who works in the Assignments Office, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 9 1 indicated 2 Supervisor Byng that she would send a copy to Mr. Vaster’s counselor. 3 Id. 4 paperwork. ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 59. And neither did Manager 5 Hudgins, as he states in his declaration that he did not review the 6 termination paperwork at the time it was processed.2 ECF No. 40 ¶ 17 & 7 Attach. D. The termination paperwork was signed by Supervisor Byng on 8 October 24, 2011. See ECF No. 40, Attach. A at 20 (“Site Manager 9 approval 10 that Counselor when she Rickard and signature receives did is not the obtain required termination a for copy of temporary paperwork the from termination suspension or termination.”). 11 Mr. Vaster filed a second grievance on July 21, 2011, asking 12 that his initial June 16, 2011-filed grievance be refiled. ECF No. 49, 13 Attach. C at 52. Mr. Vaster filed a third grievance on August 1, 2011, 14 claiming that Officers Nelson and Sabala and Sergeant Russell falsely 15 2 When he reviewed the paperwork in preparation of his 16 declaration, Manager Hudgins observed the following errors on the 17 termination paperwork: 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 The “effective date” section contains a typographical error, as the termination effective date should been backdated to“5/31/11” which was the date Offender Vaster’s suspension began. In addition, the reason for termination does not accurately reflect the basis for my decision. While Offender Vaster was suspended for receiving the infraction, neither the infraction nor the result of the disciplinary hearing had anything to do with my decision to terminate Offender Vaster. Offender Vaster was terminated based on the theft ring investigation by Supervisor Byng and Officer Smith, as well as safety and security concerns related to Offender Vaster returning to work in CI Laundry. ECF No. 40 ¶ 17. 26 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 10 1 accused him of stealing thermals and asking, in part, that he be 2 reinstated to his employment and receive back pay for the days missed. 3 ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 51; ECF No. 47 ¶¶ 13 & 26. In response, on 4 August 1, 2011, the Grievance Coordinator stated: 5 6 7 8 9 Staff members, like all people are human and at times will make wrong decisions or errors in judgement [sic]. The fact that you were exonerated from the infractions is proof that the system has the proper checks and balances installed to correct such errors. The grievance office would like to extend an apology for troubles and time lost that this incident has caused. The fact that you have been cleared of the infraction charges allows you the right to contact job assignments to begin the process to regain your employment status that you had before the infraction was levied. 10 ECF No. 19, Attach. C. at 51. On August 2, 2011, Mr. Vaster appealed 11 the initial grievance decision because the defamation of his character 12 was not addressed as part of the suggested remedy. ECF No. 19 at 69. 13 On August 3, 2011, Ms. Sawyer emailed Steven Salsbury, advising 14 that she was going to put Mr. Vaster back on CI Laundry duty. ECF No. 15 65, Attach. C at 65. Mr. Salsbury forwarded this email to Manager 16 Hudgins, asking, “She can’t do this, can she? He was caught stealing 17 out of the laundry I don’t want him back.” Id. Manager Hudgins then 18 emailed Mr. Salsbury, Ms. Sawyer, and three other DOC employees, 19 stating that Mr. Vaster: 20 21 22 23 [i]s not welcome back in the CI shops, As the site Manager for CI at CRCC. the policy 710.400 states that the Site Manger can Suspend a Offender if the Offender does Not meet the goals of the CI shop in performance of the job. The Laundry Officer has requested as well as the Laundry Staff that Offender Vaster not be allowed back into CI. Please follow this request. 24 ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 65 (punctuation and spelling errors in 25 original). 26 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 11 On 1 August 8, 2011, Counselor Robideau was assigned to 2 investigate Mr. Vaster’s grieved matter. ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 56. 3 On August 12, 2011, Counselor Harmon sent an email to the work- 4 assignment division requesting that Mr. Vaster be put back on CI 5 Laundry duty. ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 59. There is no information in 6 the record as to what response, if any, this email received. Following 7 investigation, 10 Vaster by Staff. I recommend that offender Vaster be given his job 11 back and because of the length of time of his termination that he be 12 given his incentive pay up to this point. I have no documentation that 13 would indicate that he was part of any clothing ring; furthermore he 14 was adjudicated from his infraction.” ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 60. that the 2011, ECF an No. Appeal Level II at was 18 earlier grievance. ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 54. On September 30, 2011, 19 the 20 investigated 21 investigation, there is no documentation to support the allegation of 22 biased behavior from staff towards you. The proper procedures were 23 followed by staff. You have the choice to reapply for a CI job. 24 Contact 25 process.” ECF No. 19, Attach. C at 54. your [Counselor] counselor for Robideau. the CI level In II Mr. prepared, character was not addressed as part of the suggested remedy to his “Your of 59-60. 17 by defamation C contending responded: and to Attach. 16 Superintendent falsification 19, a Counselor Robideau concluded, “There is some bias against offender 27, 2011. prepared 9 September 24, Robideau report On August Counselor 8 15 dated his grievance conclusion application and Vaster’s the 26 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 12 of was the referral 1 On October 4, 2011, Mr. Vaster appealed the Level II grievance 2 decision as the defamation of his character was not included as part 3 of the Level I and II suggested remedies. ECF No. 19 at 70, 71, & 73. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 On November 3, 2011, DOC Investigator Katelyn Daughterty responded to Mr. Vaster: There was no information to support your allegation that Sergeant Russell and Officers Sabala and Nelson “conspired to falsely accuse you of theft, nor that they acted with intentional “malice” toward you. Staff were within their job responsibilities to question you when you were found in possession of clothing without your DOC number on the. Additionally, the investigation indicates that your closing matrix was incomplete and appears to have been misinterpreted as a result. Your frustration over having been infracted is understandable; however, it appears the proper procedures were followed and you were subsequently found not guilty and the infraction was dismissed. You were offered an apology for the inconvenience this caused you. In regard to the additional issues you raised at Level III regarding your job assignment, Classification issues have a separate appeal process and I cannot respond to those concerns here. ECF No. 19, Ex. C. at 74. On November 14, 2011, the Deputy Secretary responded to Mr. 17 Vaster’s Level III grievance, advising that he agreed with 18 Investigator Daugherty’s response. ECF No. 19, Ex. C at 72 (signature 19 illegible). 20 In January 2012, Manager Hudgins advised Mr. Vaster’s counselor 21 that Mr. Vaster was eligible to reapply for CI employment. ECF No. 40 22 ¶ 20. At some date thereafter but before October 2012, Mr. Vaster 23 obtained CI employment as a barber. 24 Mr. Vaster filed this lawsuit in 2013, alleging that Defendants 25 Hudgins, Russell, Nelson, and Sabala violated his First Amendment 26 rights by retaliating against him for filing grievances against them. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 13 1 Manager Hudgins and Officer Sabala state that until they received a 2 copy of this lawsuit they were unaware of any grievances filed by Mr. 3 Vaster against them regarding his termination from CI Laundry. ECF No. 4 40 ¶ 19; ECF No. 41 ¶ 15. Defendants filed the instant summary- 5 judgment motion, and briefing ensued. 6 B. Standard 7 Summary judgment is appropriate if the record establishes “no 8 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 9 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Mr. Vaster, as 10 the party opposing summary judgment, must point to specific facts 11 establishing a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. See Celotex 12 Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. 13 Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). If the non- 14 moving party fails to make such a showing for any of the elements 15 essential to his case for which he bears the burden of proof, the 16 court will grant the summary-judgment motion. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 17 at 322. 18 C. 19 Analysis Defendants argue that 1) the Eleventh Amendment bars any claim 20 against them in their individual capacity, 2) Mr. 21 retaliation-based 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim fails to survive summary 22 judgment because he cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact 23 that his grievances were the cause of any adverse action taken against 24 him and because any adverse action taken against him was not caused by 25 Defendants Nelson, Russell, and Sabala, and 3) the Defendants are 26 entitled to qualified immunity. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 14 Vaster’s 1 1. Official Capacity: Eleventh Amendment 2 To the extent that Mr. Vaster asserts Defendants acted in their 3 official capacity, the Court agrees that such a claim under § 1983 is 4 barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State 5 Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (ruling that the state, its agencies, 6 and state officials sued in their official capacities are not persons 7 subject 8 retrospective relief). Accordingly, consistent with Will, the Court 9 dismisses Mr. Vaster’s claims asserted against each of the Defendants 10 in their official capacity. Defendants’ motion is granted in this 11 regard. 12 2. 13 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Vaster asserts that Defendants, 14 acting in their individual capacity, violated his First Amendment 15 right to file a prison grievance, by retaliating against him for 16 filing prison grievances against them. To survive summary judgment, 17 Mr. Vaster must establish a triable issue of fact as to whether his 18 First Amendment right to file grievances was violated by Defendants 19 when they were acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 19833; to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages or Individual Capacity: Retaliation Claim 20 21 22 23 24 3 other Section 1983 provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 25 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 26 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 15 1 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Defendants do not dispute that 2 they were acting under color of law; accordingly, the focus is on 3 whether Mr. Vaster presented sufficient evidence that Manager Hudgins, 4 Sergeant Russell, and/or Officers Nelson and Sabala violated his First 5 Amendment right to file a prison grievance. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 6 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a prisoner has a 7 First Amendment right to file a prison grievance free from retaliatory 8 action by a prison official). 9 To prove this § 1983-based retaliation claim, Mr. Vaster must 10 establish (1) a state-actor Defendant took adverse action against him 11 (2) because of (3) Mr. Vaster’s protected conduct, and that such 12 action 13 rights. 14 termination of employment for six months was an adverse action. See 15 Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that 16 a threat of discipline or transfer is an adverse action). The “because 17 of” 18 protected conduct was the substantial or motivating factor behind the 19 Defendant’s 20 participated or set in motion a series of acts by others, which the 21 Defendant knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to 22 inflict the constitutional injury. Id. at 1271; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 23 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1980). An objective standard is used 24 determine whether the adverse action would chill the desire of a 25 person 26 activities. (4) chilled See Rhodes, causation of Mr. 408 element conduct, ordinary Vaster’s is F.3d firmness 584 at that to F.3d if a Mr. It his is Vaster Defendant engage at of 567-68. satisfied i.e., Brodheim, exercise 1271; in Amendment undisputed shows either future Rhodes, First First 408 that his personally to Amendment F.3d ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 16 that at 568 1 (recognizing 2 silenced). A successful retaliation claim also requires Mr. Vaster to 3 establish that “the prison authorities’ retaliatory action did not 4 advance legitimate goals of the correctional institution or was not 5 tailored narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 6 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). The district court is to “‘afford 7 appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison officials in the 8 evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct 9 alleged to be retaliatory.” Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th 10 that speech can be chilled even when not completely Cir. 1995) (quoting Sandlin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). 11 After closing scrutinizing the file and viewing the evidence in 12 the light most favorable to Mr. Vaster, the Court concludes that Mr. 13 Vaster failed to establish a triable issue of fact that Sergeant 14 Russell and Officers Sabala and Nelson retaliated against him. These 15 individuals were involved in the May 31, 2011 incident, wherein they 16 believed, based on their observations, the misleading notations on the 17 clothing report, the lack of marking on the thermals worn by Mr. 18 Vaster, and the other information they possessed that day, that Mr. 19 Vaster was wearing a pair of thermals that had not been issued to him. 20 After Officer Sabala wrote the infraction against Mr. Vaster on May 31 21 for wearing thermals that Officers Sabala and Nelson and Sergeant 22 Russell believed had not been issued to Mr. Vaster by the Department 23 of Corrections (DOC), there is no information in the record that 24 Officers 25 either Manager Hudgins, Supervisor Byng, or Officer Smith that they 26 desired Mr. Vaster’s suspension from CI Laundry. Instead, Mr. Vaster’s Sabala and Nelson or Sergeant Russell communicated ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 17 with 1 initial suspension from the Laundry was simply because of DOC policy 2 that requires a worker against whom an infraction is brought to be 3 suspended. Following the June 9 dismissal of the infraction, these 4 Defendants did not physically permit Mr. Vaster to return to the 5 Laundry. However, the decision to prohibit Mr. Vaster from returning 6 to the Laundry was made by Manager Hudgins. Officers Sabala and Nelson 7 and Sergeant Russell did not have the authority to permit Mr. Vaster 8 to enter the Laundry without Manager Hudgins’ approval. Mr. Vaster 9 failed to establish action a 13 returning to the Laundry following the dismissal of the infraction, 14 was because of Mr. Vaster’s statement to Officer Sabala that he would 15 file a grievance pertaining to his May 31, 2011 treatment or his 16 later-filed grievances. 2) and the the and Nelson that 12 infraction, and fact Russell, i.e., 1) providing information and documentation to support theft Sabala material 11 2011 Officers of adverse 31, by dispute 10 May taken genuine preventing Sergeant him from 17 In regard to Manager Hudgins, the Court is concerned about the 18 lack of documentation provided to the Court regarding the purported 19 investigation 20 theft ring. Manager Hudgins declares that he received complaints that 21 clothing items were being stolen from the Laundry a couple of months 22 before May 2011. However, there is no documentation, emails, or other 23 correspondence 24 involvement in the loss, or an investigation into the loss, before May 25 31, 2011. that was hinting conducted at the regarding loss of the suspected clothing, Mr. 26 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 18 clothing Vaster’s 1 DOC’s employment policy granted Manager Hudgins, as the Site 2 Manager, the authority to suspend or terminate any offender who posed 3 a 4 Manager Hudgins received word from Supervisor Byrd that Mr. Vaster was 5 a security threat and a disruptive force given the stolen clothing. 6 Yet, 7 substandard performance prior to a decision to terminate” so that the 8 worker had an opportunity to correct his performance, ECF No. 40, 9 Attach. A at 19. This policy was not followed in regard to Mr. Vaster. 10 And he reasonably was upset with this course of conduct, especially 11 since the reason for his termination was not reported to him or his 12 counselors in a timely and proper manner, such as on termination 13 paperwork. threat the The 14 to security employment Laundry or was policy Supervisor disruptive required and staff to a the work supervisor were environment. to reasonable “document in their 15 purported concern for safety in light of the recent murder of a DOC 16 employee in another facility by an inmate, the heaviness of the carts, 17 the ratio of offenders to staff in the Laundry, and the blind spots 18 not covered by cameras in the Laundry. Cf. Mt. Healthy City Bd. Of 19 Educ., 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (placing burden on the state to show 20 that it would have taken the same adverse action even in the absence 21 of 22 (inquiring as to whether the state’s challenged action reasonably 23 advanced 24 documentation indicating that a clothing-theft concern existed, and a 25 related investigation was conducted, before May 31, 2011, or 2) an 26 employee review indicating that Mr. Vaster’s work and behavior were the protected a conduct); legitimate Rhodes v. correctional Robinson, goal). 408 F.3d Yet, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 19 at without 568 1) 1 substandard, the Court is unable to conclude as a matter of law that 2 Manager Hudgins’ decision to terminate Mr. Vaster’s Laundry employment 3 advanced Coyote Ridge’s legitimate safety goal. 4 Nonetheless, there is no evidence to support a finding that 5 Manager Hudgins’ directive that Mr. Vaster not return to work at the 6 Laundry was based on Mr. Vaster’s exercise of his First Amendment 7 right to file grievances. There is no hint in the record that Manager 8 Hudgins was aware that Mr. Vaster filed the grievances until this 9 lawsuit was filed. See Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806 (highlighting the 10 defendants’ sworn statements that they were unaware of the plaintiff’s 11 protected 12 sufficient evidence to establish a triable issue of fact as to all of 13 the retaliation elements. Accordingly, Mr. Vaster fails to present For the above-reasons, each of the Defendants is granted summary 14 15 conduct). judgment on Mr. Vaster’s § 1983 retaliation claim. 16 3. Qualified Immunity 17 Defendants also argue that summary judgment is appropriate 18 because they are entitled to qualified immunity. A state actor is 19 protected from § 1983 liability, i.e., he is entitled to qualified 20 immunity, 21 established statutory or Constitutional rights of which a reasonable 22 person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 23 (1982). if he shows his “conduct does not violate clearly As mentioned above, Mr. Vaster’s constitutional right to be free 24 25 from retaliation for filing a prison grievance was 26 established. And, based on the record before the Court, the Court ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 20 clearly 1 finds 2 entitled to qualified immunity as they acted objectively reasonable 3 under the circumstances. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (utilizing an 4 objectively reasonable test under the totality of the circumstances). 5 Before issuing an infraction for theft (or filing reports in support 6 of 7 Russell spoke to Mr. Vaster, examined his thermals for his inmate 8 number, 9 thermals, and reviewed the clothing report, which erroneously stated 10 that Mr. Vaster’s balance was one thermal top and bottom. Based on the 11 information they possessed, it was objectively reasonable for them to 12 infract Mr. Vaster for theft and to prevent him from returning to the 13 Laundry once Manager Hudgins decided to change the suspension to a 14 termination. 15 a that theft had Officers Nelson infraction), another and Officers officer Sabala and Nelson inspect Mr. Sergeant and Sabala Vaster’s Russell and cell are Sergeant for other In regard to Manager Hudgins, the better course may have been to 16 require Supervisor 17 Vaster’s suspected theft of clothing before deciding that Mr. Vaster 18 was terminated from working at the Laundry, especially since there is 19 no documentation in the record regarding the nature and scope of the 20 investigation into the suspected clothing theft ring before June 9, 21 2011. Accordingly, the Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that 22 Manager 23 Mr. Vaster’s Laundry position. Therefore, if Mr. Vaster had provided 24 evidence that Manager Hudgins’ decision to terminate Mr. Vaster was 25 motivated by Mr. Vaster’s exercise of his First Amendment right to 26 file grievances, Mr. Vaster’s claim against Manager Hudgins would have Hudgins Byng acted to document reasonably in her his concerns decision regarding to ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 21 Mr. terminate 1 survived summary judgment; however, for the reasons above, Mr. Vaster 2 did 3 Manager 4 qualified immunity is resolved in Mr. Vaster’s favor. 5 D. not provide Hudgins’ such favor evidence is and therefore appropriate even summary though judgment the matter in of Conclusion 6 For the above-given reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 7 1. GRANTED. 8 9 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 38, is 2. Judgment is to be entered in Defendants’ favor with prejudice. 10 11 3. All pending dates and deadlines are STRICKEN. 12 4. This file shall be CLOSED. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 15 The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this Order and provide copies to Mr. Vaster and counsel. DATED this 18th day of February 2016. 16 17 s/Edward F. Shea EDWARD F. SHEA Senior United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Q:\EFS\Civil\2013\5031.msj.lc1.docx ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 22
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