Blumer v. Colvin, No. 2:2014cv00147 - Document 17 (E.D. Wash. 2015)

Court Description: DECISION AND ORDER granting ECF No. 13 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and denying ECF No. 15 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. CLOSE FILE. Signed by Magistrate Judge Victor E. Bianchini. (PH, Case Administrator)

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Blumer v. Colvin Doc. 17 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 8 9 Case No. 2:14-CV-00147-VEB JASON RAY BLUMER, 10 Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER 11 vs. 12 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 13 Defendant. 14 15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 In August of 2012, Plaintiff Jason Ray Blumer applied for Disability 17 Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act. He applied for 18 supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits in October of 2013. 19 Commissioner of Social Security consolidated and denied the applications. 20 The 1 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB Dockets.Justia.com 1 Plaintiff, represented by Dana Chris Madsen, Esq., commenced this action 2 seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits pursuant to 42 3 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3). The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a 4 United States Magistrate Judge. (Docket No. 8). 5 On October 30, 2014, the Honorable Rosanna Malouf Peterson, Chief United 6 States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 7 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). (Docket No. 14). 8 9 II. BACKGROUND 10 The procedural history may be summarized as follows: 11 Plaintiff alleges disability beginning August 15, 2010. (T at 12). 1 12 applications were denied initially and on reconsideration and Plaintiff requested a 13 hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). On January 10, 2014, a 14 hearing was held before ALJ Moira Ausems. (T at 29). Plaintiff appeared with an 15 attorney and testified. (T at 42-65). The ALJ also received testimony from Dr. 16 Richard Hutson, a medical expert (T at 34-41), and K. Diane Kramer, a vocational 17 expert. (T at 65-74). 18 19 20 1 Citations to (“T”) refer to the administrative record at Docket No. 11. 2 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB His 1 On February 18, 2014, the ALJ issued a written decision denying the 2 applications for benefits and finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the 3 meaning of the Social Security Act. (T at 9-28). The ALJ’s decision became the 4 Commissioner’s final decision on March 25, 2014, when the Social Security 5 Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (T at 1-6). 6 On May 19, 2014, Plaintiff, acting by and through his counsel, timely 7 commenced this action by filing a Complaint in the United States District Court for 8 the Eastern District of Washington. (Docket No. 4). The Commissioner interposed 9 an Answer on July 21, 2014. (Docket No. 11). 10 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on October 8, 2014. (Docket 11 No. 13). The Commissioner moved for summary judgment on November 21, 2014. 12 (Docket No. 15). Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum of law on December 12, 2014. 13 (Docket No. 16). 14 15 For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s motion is denied, Plaintiff’s motion is granted, and this case is remanded for further proceedings. 16 17 18 19 20 3 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 2 III. DISCUSSION A. Sequential Evaluation Process 3 The Social Security Act (“the Act”) defines disability as the “inability to 4 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 5 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 6 lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 7 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a 8 plaintiff shall be determined to be under a disability only if any impairments are of 9 such severity that a plaintiff is not only unable to do previous work but cannot, 10 considering plaintiff’s age, education and work experiences, engage in any other 11 substantial work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 12 1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability consists of both medical and 13 vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). 14 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 15 for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step 16 one determines if the person is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If so, 17 benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404. 1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If not, the 18 decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether plaintiff has a 19 medially severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 20 4 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). 2 If plaintiff does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, 3 the disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to 4 the third step, which compares plaintiff’s impairment with a number of listed 5 impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude 6 substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 7 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed 8 impairments, plaintiff is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is 9 not one conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth 10 step, which determines whether the impairment prevents plaintiff from performing 11 work which was performed in the past. If a plaintiff is able to perform previous work 12 that plaintiff is deemed not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 13 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At this step, plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC) is 14 considered. If plaintiff cannot perform past relevant work, the fifth and final step in 15 the process determines whether plaintiff is able to perform other work in the national 16 economy in view of plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, age, education and past 17 work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Bowen v. 18 Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). 19 20 5 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 The initial burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to establish a prima facie case 2 of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 3 1971); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). The initial burden is 4 met once plaintiff establishes that a mental or physical impairment prevents the 5 performance of previous work. The burden then shifts, at step five, to the 6 Commissioner to show that (1) plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful 7 activity and (2) a “significant number of jobs exist in the national economy” that 8 plaintiff can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984). 9 B. Standard of Review 10 Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner’s 11 decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A Court must uphold a Commissioner’s decision, 12 made through an ALJ, when the determination is not based on legal error and is 13 supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 14 1985); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). “The [Commissioner’s] 15 determination that a plaintiff is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are 16 supported by substantial evidence.” Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 17 1983)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, 18 Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n 10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a 19 preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1989). 20 6 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 Substantial evidence “means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 2 adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 3 (1971)(citations omitted). “[S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] 4 may reasonably draw from the evidence” will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebreeze, 5 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On review, the Court considers the record as a 6 whole, not just the evidence supporting the decision of the Commissioner. Weetman 7 v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989)(quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 8 526 (9th Cir. 1980)). 9 It is the role of the Commissioner, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in 10 evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational 11 interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 12 Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th 13 Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be 14 set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and 15 making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 16 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support the 17 administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding 18 of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. 19 Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 20 7 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 C. Commissioner’s Decision 2 The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social 3 Security Act through December 31, 2015, and had not engaged in substantial gainful 4 activity since August 15, 2010, the alleged onset date. (T at 14). The ALJ 5 determined that Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease and degenerative joint disease 6 of the lumbar spine; degenerative disc disease of the cervical region of the spine; 7 right shoulder strain; and methamphetamine abuse were “severe” impairments under 8 the Act. (Tr. 14-16). 9 However, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 10 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the impairments 11 set forth in the Listings. (T at 16). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the 12 residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a limited range of light work as 13 defined in 20 CFR § 416.967 (b). The ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform work 14 that did not involve lifting/carrying more than 10 pounds frequently or 20 pounds 15 occasionally; could sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour work day with normal breaks; could 16 stand/walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour work day with normal breaks; could not perform 17 work involving overhead lifting with the right upper extremity; and needed to avoid 18 concentrated exposure to temperature extremes, vibration, and hazards. The ALJ 19 also concluded that Plaintiff was limited to semi-skilled work that did not involve 20 8 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 more than superficial contact with the general public or cooperative teamwork. (T at 2 16-23). 3 The ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work as a 4 construction worker, cabinet assembler, or shipping clerk. (T at 23). However, 5 considering Plaintiff’s age (31 on the alleged onset date), education (GED), work 6 experience, and RFC (limited light work), the ALJ determined that there were jobs 7 that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. 8 (T at 23-25). 9 As such, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been disabled, as defined 10 under the Act, from August 15, 2010 (the alleged onset date), through February 18, 11 2014 (the date of the ALJ’s decision) and was therefore not entitled to benefits. (Tr. 12 25). As noted above, the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision 13 when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Tr. 1-6). 14 D. 15 Plaintiff’s Arguments Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed. He 16 offers two (2) principal arguments in support of this position. 17 challenges the ALJ’s credibility determination. Second, Plaintiff contends that the 18 ALJ did not properly evaluate the medical evidence. This Court will address both 19 arguments in turn. 20 First, Plaintiff 9 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 1. 2 A claimant’s subjective complaints concerning his or her limitations are an 3 important part of a disability claim. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 4 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004)(citation omitted). The ALJ’s findings with regard to the 5 claimant’s credibility must be supported by specific cogent reasons. Rashad v. 6 Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). Absent affirmative evidence of 7 malingering, the ALJ’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be “clear 8 and convincing.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). “General 9 findings are insufficient: rather the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible 10 and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; 11 Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). Credibility 12 In this case, Plaintiff testified as follows: He attended school through the ninth 13 grade, but received a GED. (T at 43). He injured his back and neck on the job in 14 2010. (T at 44-45). He experiences constant right shoulder pain and spasms. (T at 15 45-46). Chiropractic treatment has not provided any relief. (T at 48). He can walk 16 for limited periods, but has pain. (T at 48-49). He can stand for perhaps 30 minutes 17 at a time. (T at 49). He has numbness in his lower extremities. (T at 49). Stomach 18 pain is also an issue. (T at 49). Bending, squatting, and climbing stairs all cause 19 pain. (T at 50). Back pain limits his ability to lift to 10 pounds. (T at 51). At the 20 10 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 time of the hearing, Plaintiff was living with his mother. (T at 52). He helps with 2 grocery shopping and does light cleaning and laundry. (T at 52, 54-55). He can sit 3 for about 15-20 minutes. (T at 53). He has difficulty sleeping. (T at 53). Mild ankle 4 pain is a frequent concern. (T at 55-56). His back, neck, and shoulder pain are more 5 severe. (T at 56, 61). He spends the majority of each day laying down to relieve 6 pain. (T at 57). He admitted using methamphetamine until 2011, but was unclear 7 precisely when he quit. (T at 58-59). He was also unclear about how often he was 8 using meth. (T at 61-62). 9 The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 10 reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, but that his statements 11 concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms were not 12 entirely credible. (T at 18). 13 This Court finds the ALJ’s decision flawed and not supported by substantial 14 evidence. First, the ALJ placed great emphasis on Plaintiff’s “limited treatment 15 history,” finding it inconsistent with his allegations of disabling pain. (T at 18). 16 However, the ALJ did not adequately consider alternative explanations for 17 Plaintiff’s failure to seek treatment. 18 This was error under SSR 96-7p. Under that ruling, an ALJ must not draw an 19 adverse inference from a claimant's failure to seek or pursue treatment “without first 20 11 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 considering any explanations that the individual may provide, or other information 2 in the case record, that may explain infrequent or irregular medical visits or failure to 3 seek medical treatment.” Id.; see also Dean v. Astrue, No. CV-08-3042, 2009 U.S. 4 Dist. LEXIS 62789, at *14-15 (E.D. Wash. July 22, 2009)(noting that “the SSR 5 regulations direct the ALJ to question a claimant at the administrative hearing to 6 determine whether there are good reasons for not pursuing medical treatment in a 7 consistent manner”). 8 An ALJ’s duty to develop the record in this regard is significant because there 9 are valid reasons why a claimant might not follow a treatment recommendation. For 10 example, “financial concerns [might] prevent the claimant from seeking treatment 11 [or] . . . . the claimant [may] structure[] his daily activities so as to minimize 12 symptoms to a tolerable level or eliminate them entirely.” Id. 13 In this case, Plaintiff testified that he had been homeless for three (3) years. (T 14 at 47). He reported that the Spokane “spine team” would not accept him for surgery 15 because he lacked insurance. (T at 47). He had not attempted to acquire coverage 16 through Washington State’s insurance exchange. (T at 47). The ALJ commented 17 that “access to treatment” was “an issue in your case.” (T at 47-48). Oddly, the ALJ 18 then discounted Plaintiff’s credibility for failing to seek treatment without 19 (apparently) considering the access to treatment concerns. (T at 18). The ALJ also 20 12 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 found that Plaintiff’s pattern of seeking treatment in the emergency room and then 2 not following up with a primary care doctor was suggestive of less than disabling 3 limitations. (T at 18). However, such a pattern of treatment is, in fact, an all too 4 common occurrence among individuals who lack health insurance, i.e. they are 5 forced to seek emergency care (which cannot legally be denied to them), but then 6 have difficulty accessing preventative and follow-up care from a primary care 7 physician because they have no insurance. 8 accounted for this possible explanation when assessing Plaintiff’s credibility. The ALJ does not appear to have 9 The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living contradicted his 10 allegations. (T at 18). For example, the ALJ noted reports that Plaintiff had been 11 “working on a car” and “pushing a car.” (T at 18). However, these reports also 12 indicated that engaging in these activities caused Plaintiff to seek medical attention, 13 which supports (rather than contradicts) his allegations. (T at 18). The ALJ also 14 noted that Plaintiff engaged in other basic activities of daily living, such as light 15 cleaning and using public transportation. (T at 18). 16 However, the Ninth Circuit “has repeatedly asserted that the mere fact that a 17 plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities ... does not in any way detract from 18 her credibility as to her overall disability.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th 19 Cir. 2007) (quoting Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001)). “The 20 13 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 Social Security Act does not require that claimants be utterly incapacitated to be 2 eligible for benefits, and many home activities are not easily transferable to what 3 may be the more grueling environment of the workplace, where it might be 4 impossible to periodically rest or take medication.” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 5 603 (9th Cir. 1989). 6 The ALJ also discounted Plaintiff’s credibility based on his reluctance to 7 provide details of his past drug abuse. (T at 21). It is true that, while Plaintiff 8 acknowledged his past use of methamphetamine, he would not (or could not) say 9 precisely when he quit and was unclear about how often he used meth. (T at 58-59, 10 61-62). 11 Plaintiff (while being candid about drug use in general) was reluctant to discuss his 12 past criminal activity in detail based on a legitimate fear that such admissions would 13 subject him to criminal liability. See McClesky v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 351, 353 (7th Cir. 14 2010)(“[The ALJ] said that ‘[claimaint’s] lack of candor about her substance use 15 decreases the credibility of her statements,’ without considering the possibility that 16 she had been afraid to admit to an official that she had been until recently (and 17 perhaps still is) committing crimes.”). However, the ALJ appears not to have considered the possibility that 18 Lastly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations were not credible because 19 they were not supported by the medical evidence. For the reasons outlined below, 20 14 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 this Court finds the ALJ’s assessment of the medical evidence flawed. Thus, this 2 portion of the ALJ’s credibility determination relating to the medical evidence 3 likewise cannot be sustained. 4 2. 5 In disability proceedings, a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight 6 than an examining physician’s opinion, and an examining physician’s opinion is 7 given more weight than that of a non-examining physician. Benecke v. Barnhart, 8 379 F.3d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 2004); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 9 1995). If the treating or examining physician’s opinions are not contradicted, they 10 can be rejected only with clear and convincing reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. If 11 contradicted, the opinion can only be rejected for “specific” and “legitimate” reasons 12 that are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 13 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995). Medical Evidence 14 In this case, Bill Cunningham, a treating physician’s assistant, noted that 15 Plaintiff had been cleared to return to light duty work, but had experienced 16 worsening pain. (T at 343). Mr. Cunningham recommended that Plaintiff be “put on 17 full restriction in order to avoid any further injury.” (T at 343). 2 18 19 The ALJ must consider evidence from the claimant’s medical sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 416.912. Medical sources are divided into two categories: “acceptable” and “not acceptable.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. Medical sources classified as “not acceptable” (also known as “other sources”) 20 15 2 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 In November of 2012, Dr. Kevin Weeks, a consultative examiner, opined that 2 Plaintiff could stand/walk for about 2 hours in an 8-hour workday, sit for 6 hours in 3 an 8-hour workday, and lift 10 pounds frequently. (T at 305). 4 In October of 2013, Dr. William Shanks, an examining orthopedist, diagnosed 5 degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine (with MRI evidence of significant 6 disc changes and disc bulge) and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine (with 7 MRI evidence of mild posterior disc bulge). (T at 346). Dr. Shanks opined that 8 Plaintiff would be “significantly limited in his activity level” and would “most likely 9 be restricted to sedentary work.” (T at 347). 10 The ALJ discounted these opinions, in large measure, because he found them 11 based on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (T at 22-23). It is reasonable for an ALJ 12 to discount a physician’s opinion predicated on subjective complaints found to be 13 less than credible. Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009). 14 However, in this case, the ALJ’s decision to discount Plaintiff’s credibility was 15 flawed for the reasons outlined above. Moreover, the ALJ did not adequately 16 account for (1) the fact that the opinions of Dr. Shanks and Dr. Weeks were 17 supported by detailed examination notes and reference to medical records (2) the 18 19 20 include physician’s assistants. SSR 06-03p. The ALJ must give “germane reasons” before discounting an “other source” opinion. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993). 16 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 fact that the medical opinions were consistent with each other (and consistent with 2 Plaintiff’s allegations) was, itself, a reason for affording Plaintiff’s credibility (and 3 the opinions) greater weight. Accordingly, the ALJ’s assessment of the opinion 4 evidence should be revisited on remand. 5 E. Remand 6 In a case where the ALJ's determination is not supported by substantial 7 evidence or is tainted by legal error, the court may remand the matter for additional 8 proceedings or an immediate award of benefits. Remand for additional proceedings 9 is proper where (1) outstanding issues must be resolved, and (2) it is not clear from 10 the record before the court that a claimant is disabled. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 11 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, Plaintiff’s credibility needs to be reassessed on 12 remand and the medical evidence reviewed again in light of the revised credibility 13 assessment. It is not clear from the record that Plaintiff is disabled, as there are 14 indications of an ability to perform sedentary work or limited light duty work. On 15 remand, the ALJ should reconsider Plaintiff’s credibility, giving particular attention 16 to explanations in the record both for Plaintiff’s failure to seek treatment and 17 reluctance to provide details regarding his past drug use. Regarding the latter point, 18 this Court is not suggesting that a lack of forthrightness cannot be considered when 19 assessing Plaintiff’s credibility; rather, any omissions concerning details of past drug 20 17 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 use should be viewed in context and with an understanding of possible alternative 2 explanations. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 After carefully reviewing the administrative record, this Court finds 5 substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, including the objective 6 medical evidence and supported medical opinions. It is clear that the ALJ thoroughly 7 examined the record, afforded appropriate weight to the medical evidence, including 8 the assessments of the examining medical providers and the non-examining 9 consultants, and afforded the subjective claims of symptoms and limitations an 10 appropriate weight when rendering a decision that Plaintiff is not disabled. This 11 Court finds no reversible error and because substantial evidence supports the 12 Commissioner’s decision, the Commissioner is GRANTED summary judgment and 13 that Plaintiff’s motion for judgment summary judgment is DENIED. 14 15 16 IV. ORDERS IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 17 Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Docket No. 13, is GRANTED. 18 The Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, Docket No. 15, is 19 20 DENIED. 18 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB 1 2 3 4 5 This case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Decision and Order. The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order, provide copies to counsel, enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and close this case. DATED this 9th day of February, 2015. 6 7 8 /s/Victor E. Bianchini VICTOR E. BIANCHINI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 19 DECISION AND ORDER – BLUMER v COLVIN 14-CV-00147-VEB

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