Farmer v. City of Spokane et al, No. 2:2015cv00047 - Document 12 (E.D. Wash. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE - granting in part and denying in part 8 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Chief Judge Rosanna Malouf Peterson. (CC, Case Administrator)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Farmer v. City of Spokane et al Doc. 12 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 7 JASON BELKNAP FARMER, NO: 2:15-CV-47-RMP Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 10 11 CITY OF SPOKANE, and RHIAN WILKINSON, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Defendants. 12 13 Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a 14 Claim and Motion for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 8. The Court has reviewed the 15 motions, all relevant filings, and is fully informed. 16 BACKGROUND 17 Plaintiff Jason B. Farmer asserts that in September 2013 that he found a lost 18 dog in a Spokane Valley neighborhood. ECF No. 1 at 2. Mr. Farmer allegedly 19 discovered an online posting requesting return of the dog, and contacted, via text 20 message, the individuals who created that post indicating his possession of the ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 animal. ECF No. 1 at 2. After various failed attempts to return the dog, including 2 a dispute over whether or not Mr. Farmer should receive compensation for his care 3 of the animal, Mr. Farmer and the true owner, Ms. Amanda Watson, succeeded in 4 transferring possession of the dog on November 23, 2013. ECF No. 1 at 2-4, ECF 5 No. 8 at 3. Shortly thereafter, Spokane Police Officer Rhian Wilkinson arrested 6 Mr. Farmer. ECF No. 1 at 4, ECF No. 8 at 3. Mr. Farmer alleges that Officer 7 Wilkinson arrested him on suspicion of extortion and theft. ECF No. 1 at 4. 8 At the time of Mr. Farmer’s arrest, there was an outstanding bench warrant 9 for his arrest on Third Degree Driving With License Suspended (“DWLS”). ECF 10 No. 9 at 2. Once in custody, Mr. Farmer pleaded guilty to DWLS and was 11 sentenced to ten days imprisonment, from November 23, 2013, to December 3, 12 2013. ECF No. 9 at 7. Mr. Farmer was held at the Spokane County Jail from 13 December 3, 2013, to December 24, 2013, until he posted bond. ECF No. 1 at 4. 14 Mr. Farmer alleges three causes of action against Defendants: (1) that 15 Officer Wilkinson’s arrest of him was unlawful; (2) that the City of Spokane is 16 liable for the unlawful arrest under the doctrine of respondeat superior; and (3) that 17 Officer Wilkinson committed the tort of false imprisonment when he unlawfully 18 arrested and imprisoned Mr. Farmer. ECF No. 1. The unlawful arrest claim is 19 brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and false imprisonment is a supplemental 20 claim under Washington state law. ECF No. 1. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 2 1 Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on several bases: (1) that Mr. 2 Farmer has failed to state a claim of unlawful arrest upon which relief may be 3 granted because Officer Wilkinson had probable cause to arrest him; (2) that 4 Officer Wilkinson is entitled to qualified immunity because he had probable cause 5 to arrest; (3) that Heck v. Humphrey bars Mr. Farmer’s claim of unlawful arrest; 6 (4) that the City of Spokane cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat 7 superior because a municipality has no respondeat superior liability under § 1983; 8 (5) that Mr. Farmer has failed to state a claim of false imprisonment because he 9 was lawfully imprisoned on another charge; and (6) that Heck v. Humphrey bars 10 Mr. Farmer’s claim of false imprisonment. 11 12 13 DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review A defendant must file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a 14 claim before filing a responsive pleading. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 15 375 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2004). When a party has answered the complaint prior 16 to filing a motion to dismiss, the court construes the motion as a motion for 17 judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Aldabe v. 18 Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980). 19 20 In reviewing a defendant’s motion under Rule 12(c), the district court views the facts as presented in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 3 1 accepting as true all the allegations in their complaint and treating as false those 2 allegations in the answer that contradict the plaintiff’s allegations. Hoeft v. Tucson 3 Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1301, n.2 (9th Cir. 1992); accord Hal Roach 4 Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). 5 Additionally, the court views plain errors within the complaint in the light most 6 favorable to the plaintiff as “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice.” 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). 8 9 Judgment on the pleadings is proper when there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 10 Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). “Analysis under Rule 11 12(c) is ‘substantially identical’ to analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under 12 both rules, ‘a court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, 13 taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.’” Chavez v. United States, 683 14 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Brooks v. Dunlop Mfg. Inc., No. C 10- 15 04341 CRB, 2011 WL 6140912, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011)). Thus, “a court 16 must assess whether a complaint ‘contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as 17 true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. 18 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). 19 20 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint after they filed an answer. See generally ECF Nos. 3 and 8. The Court therefore construes the motion as a motion ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 4 1 for judgment on the pleadings. The Court will accept as true all allegations in Mr. 2 Farmer’s complaint, ECF No. 1, and assume as false those allegations in the 3 answer, ECF No. 3, that contradict Mr. Farmer’s allegations. Additionally, since 4 the Court is treating the motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and not 5 a motion for summary judgment, the Court may not consider any extrinsic 6 evidence provided by the parties. 7 B. 8 9 Judicial Notice Defendants move this Court to take judicial notice of the following certified exhibits attached to their motion: a bench warrant issued on November 6, 2013, 10 for Mr. Farmer’s arrest; a Spokane County Municipal Court Judgment and 11 Sentencing Order dated December 3, 2013; and a Statement of Defendant on Plea 12 of Guilty dated December 3, 2013. ECF No. 9. 13 Rule 12(d) provides: 14 If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion. 15 16 17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, the Ninth Circuit has recognized two exceptions 18 to the rule precluding a court from considering evidence outside the pleadings on a 19 Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss or a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the 20 pleadings. The first exception to the rule permits a court to “consider material ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 5 1 which is properly submitted as part of the complaint on a motion to dismiss 2 without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” 3 Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and 4 citation omitted). “If the documents are not physically attached to the complaint, 5 they may be considered if the documents’ authenticity . . . is not contested and the 6 plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies on them.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 7 The second exception permits “a court [to] take judicial notice of matters of public 8 record.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 9 Mr. Farmer makes no mention in his complaint of the documents of which 10 Defendants move the Court to take judicial notice. Therefore, the first exception to 11 Rule 12(d) does not apply here. However, all three documents are matters of 12 public record. Accordingly, the Court properly may take judicial notice of the 13 bench warrant, the Judgment and Sentence Order, and the Statement of Plea. 14 Defendants’ motion for judicial notice is granted. 15 C. 16 17 18 Judgment on the Pleadings 1. Unlawful Arrest a. Failure to State a Claim Mr. Farmer argues that his arrest for extortion and theft was unlawful 19 because no reasonable officer would have believed there was probable cause to 20 arrest him for extortion or theft based on the facts and circumstances known at the ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 6 1 time. ECF No. 1 at 4. Defendants argue that Officer Wilkinson had probable 2 cause to arrest Mr. Farmer. ECF No. 3 at 4, 6. 3 To successfully bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 4 “allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United 5 States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person 6 acting under color of state law.” W. v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). An arrest 7 does not violate the Fourth Amendment if probable cause exists as “defined in 8 terms of facts and circumstances ‘sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing 9 that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense.’” Gerstein v. 10 Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1975) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 11 (1964)). Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion 12 drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest. 13 Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 14 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)). 15 In Devenpeck, a defendant was pulled over by Washington state troopers 16 who had reason to suspect that he was impersonating a police officer by using 17 flashing headlights. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 148-49. During the stop, the officers 18 noticed the defendant was recording their encounter. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 149. 19 The officers arrested the defendant for making an unlawful recording in violation 20 of Washington’s Privacy Act and issued a citation for his flashing headlights. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 7 1 Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 150-51. Eventually, the state dismissed all charges 2 because the officer was mistaken that recording the police violated Washington 3 law. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 151. 4 The defendant filed a § 1983 action against the arresting officers for 5 unlawful arrest and false imprisonment, alleging the officers arrested him without 6 probable cause. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that although the stated reason 7 for arresting the defendant was violation of the Privacy Act, his arrest did not 8 violate the Fourth Amendment because the officers also were aware of facts 9 providing them probable cause to arrest him for impersonating a police officer. Id. 10 11 at 152–55 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996)). Defendants argue that Officer Wilkinson had probable cause to arrest Mr. 12 Farmer because there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Mr. Farmer for DWLS. 13 ECF No. 3 at 7. However, unlike the officers in Devenpeck who were aware of 14 two reasons to arrest the defendant but only articulated one reason when arresting 15 him, there is no evidence in the record that Officer Wilkinson personally was 16 aware of the existence of the outstanding warrant for DWLS when he arrested Mr. 17 Farmer. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Farmer, the 18 outstanding warrant for DWLS did not provide Officer Wilkinson with probable 19 cause to arrest Mr. Farmer, because there is nothing in the record before the Court 20 of Officer Wilkinson’s knowledge of the warrant. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 8 1 Defendants also allege in their Answer that Officer Wilkinson had seen 2 several text messages that Mr. Farmer allegedly sent to the dog owners, attempting 3 to extort them. ECF No. 3 at 3. However, the Court may not consider these 4 allegations on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings because they are not 5 supported by Mr. Farmer’s allegations in the complaint. Hoeft v. Tucson Unified 6 Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1301, n.2 (9th Cir. 1992). There is no evidence in the 7 record that the Court may properly consider on a motion for judgment on the 8 pleadings that Officer Wilkinson was personally aware of facts sufficient to 9 constitute probable cause to arrest Mr. Farmer for extortion and theft. Therefore, 10 Defendants have failed to show that Officer Wilkinson had personal knowledge of 11 facts sufficient to constitute probable cause to arrest Mr. Farmer. 12 The Court infers that Defendants may be relying on the collective 13 knowledge doctrine for their assertion that the existing DWLS warrant provided 14 probable cause for Officer Wilkinson to arrest Mr. Farmer. The collective 15 knowledge doctrine “allows courts to impute police officers’ collective knowledge 16 to the officer conducting a stop, search, or arrest.” United States v. Villasenor, 608 17 F.3d 467, 475 (9th Cir. 2010). It generally applies in two situations, both of which 18 require officers working in tandem and sharing information. The first situation is 19 “where law enforcement agents are working together in an investigation but have 20 not explicitly communicated the facts each has independently learned.” ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 9 1 Villasenor, 608 F.3d at 475 (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 2 1032 (9th Cir. 2007)). The second situation is “where an officer with direct 3 personal knowledge of all the facts necessary to give rise to reasonable suspicion 4 directs or requests that another officer conduct a stop, search or arrest.” Id. at 475. 5 If either scenario is present, the court may impute one officer’s knowledge 6 constituting probable cause to another officer who conducted the arrest. 7 There is no evidence in the record that Officer Wilkinson was either directed 8 to arrest Mr. Farmer by another officer with knowledge sufficient to constitute 9 probable cause, or that Officer Wilkinson was part of an investigative team which 10 together had knowledge of and communicated the necessary facts supporting 11 probable cause. Therefore, the collective knowledge doctrine does not apply. 12 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Farmer, the Court finds 13 that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Officer Wilkinson 14 had probable cause to arrest Mr. Farmer. On the face of the complaint, Mr. Farmer 15 has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. 16 b. Qualified Immunity 17 Defendants contend that Officer Wilkinson is entitled to qualified immunity 18 because he had probable cause to arrest Mr. Farmer and therefore acted within the 19 law. ECF No. 3 at 4, 6. 20 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 10 1 Qualified immunity protects a police officer whose “conduct does not 2 violate clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 3 would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982). The 4 question of qualified immunity should be resolved in the defendant’s favor if the 5 plaintiff fails to allege the violation of a clearly established constitutional right. 6 Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232–33 (1991). For a constitutional right to be 7 established so that qualified immunity does not apply, “[t]he contours of the right 8 must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he 9 is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 10 Having determined that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding 11 whether Officer Wilkinson had probable cause to arrest Mr. Farmer, the Court 12 finds that there is no basis on which to grant Officer Wilkinson qualified immunity 13 from this suit on the current record. 14 15 c. Heck v. Humphrey Defendants move to dismiss Mr. Farmer’s § 1983 unlawful arrest claim 16 under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which held that a plaintiff may not 17 bring a federal civil rights claim if a finding in his favor on that claim would 18 necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal sentence. The Supreme Court 19 stated: 20 [I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional convictions or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 11 1 2 3 4 5 unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a §1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. In Heck, the Supreme Court effectively created a rule of abstention. If the 6 court determines that “the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not 7 demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the 8 plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar 9 to the suit.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court must 10 determine whether judgment in favor of Mr. Farmer would imply that his 11 conviction for DWLS or resulting sentence is invalid. 12 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Farmer, the Court 13 presumes that Mr. Farmer was arrested for extortion and theft. There is no 14 evidence in the record properly before the Court showing that Officer Wilkinson 15 arrested Mr. Farmer for DWLS or that Officer Wilkinson was even aware of the 16 existence of the outstanding bench warrant for DWLS. Although the evidence 17 shows that Mr. Farmer eventually pleaded guilty and was sentenced to DWLS, 18 Officer Wilkinson may have discovered the existence of the outstanding bench 19 warrant, and thus the basis for probable cause to arrest Mr. Farmer for DWLS, 20 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 12 1 sometime after arresting him for extortion and theft. The timeline of these events 2 is unclear. 3 At this time, with the information available to this Court, the Court finds that 4 Heck does not bar Mr. Farmer’s unlawful arrest claim. It is not clear that a finding 5 in Mr. Farmer’s favor would render invalid his sentence or conviction for DWLS. 6 On the face of the pleadings, it appears that Mr. Farmer has stated a valid 7 claim to relief and that there are genuine issues of material fact yet to be resolved. 8 Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Mr. 9 Farmer’s claim of unlawful arrest. 10 2. 11 Mr. Farmer claims that Spokane is liable for Officer Wilkinson’s actions 12 13 Respondeat Superior under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Municipalities are “persons” subject to suit under § 1983, Monell v. N.Y.C. 14 Dept. of Soc. Serv’s, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), but neither municipalities nor 15 individuals may be subject to liability under § 1983 based on respondeat superior. 16 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Government officials may not be held liable for the 17 unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat 18 superior.”); Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[V]icarious 19 liability may not be imposed on a state or municipal official for acts of lower 20 officials in the absence of a state law imposing such liability.”). Mr. Farmer has ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 13 1 cited no Washington statute creating an exception to this rule. See generally ECF 2 No. 1 at 4. Regardless, “liability may attach if an employee commits an alleged 3 constitutional violation pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a longstanding 4 practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure.” Hervey v. 5 Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 Respondeat superior is not a cognizable legal theory against Spokane absent 7 an allegation that Officer Wilkinson acted in compliance with a formal policy, 8 practice, or custom. Mr. Farmer has not pleaded that Officer Wilkinson’s actions 9 were taken in accordance with an official policy or practice. See generally ECF 10 No. 1. Therefore, Mr. Farmer has failed to plead sufficient facts forming a facially 11 plausible claim under §1983 against Spokane. Mr. Farmer’s allegations against the 12 City of Spokane fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and 13 therefore are dismissed. 14 15 3. False Imprisonment a. Supplemental Jurisdiction 16 A federal district court shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other 17 claims that are part of the same case or controversy as the claims over which the 18 court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). If a state law claim arises out 19 of a “common nucleus of operative fact,” the court may exercise supplemental 20 jurisdiction over that state law claim. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 14 1 (1966). When determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a court 2 should consider the “concerns of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and 3 comity.” If a district court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, it must 4 explain how declining jurisdiction serves these concerns. Smith v. K-Mart Corp., 5 899 F. Supp. 503, 505 (E.D. Wash. 1995). 6 All of Mr. Farmer’s claims arise out of a “common nucleus of operative 7 fact.” Therefore, this Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state 8 law claim of false imprisonment. United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 725. 9 b. Heck v. Humphrey 10 Defendants argue that Heck v. Humphrey bars Mr. Farmer’s false 11 imprisonment claim because a finding in his favor would necessarily imply the 12 invalidity of his DWLS sentence. 13 Mr. Farmer seeks redress for the twenty-one days he was imprisoned in 14 Spokane County Jail. ECF No. 1 at 4. Although evidence in the record shows the 15 existence of an outstanding warrant for DWLS at the time of Mr. Farmer’s arrest, 16 Defendants have failed to provide any evidence that Officer Wilkinson was aware 17 of the existence of this warrant when he arrested Mr. Farmer. Evidence in the 18 record also shows that Mr. Farmer eventually pleaded guilty to DWLS, and at 19 some unknown time, was charged with extortion and theft. However, the timeline 20 of these events is unclear. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 15 1 At this time, with the information available to this Court, the Court finds that 2 Heck does not bar Mr. Farmer’s false imprisonment claim. It is not clear that a 3 finding in Mr. Farmer’s favor would render invalid his sentence, conviction, or 4 imprisonment for DWLS. 5 6 7 8 c. Failure to State a Claim Mr. Farmer alleges that Officer Wilkinson is responsible for Mr. Farmer’s false imprisonment in Spokane County Jail. To bring a claim of false imprisonment, the plaintiff must “show that the 9 defendant intentionally confined him without justification.” Dunn v. Hyra, 676 F. 10 Supp. 2d 1172, 1195 (W.D. Wash. 2009). Generally, in Washington, a defendant 11 law enforcement officer may raise “probable cause [as] a complete defense to an 12 action for false arrest [or] false imprisonment.” McBride v. Walla Walla County, 13 95 Wn. App. 33 (1999). 14 However, lawful arrest does not eliminate consideration of the 15 circumstances surrounding the subsequent imprisonment to determine whether it 16 was unlawful. Stalter v. State, 113 Wn. App. 1, 15 (2002) aff'd in part, rev'd in 17 part on other grounds, 151 Wn. 2d 148 (2004). In Washington, if an arrestee is 18 detained in jail “for more than a reasonable time, the detaining [agency] is liable in 19 an action for damages.” Kellogg v. State, 94 Wn. 2d 851, 854 (1980) (quoting 20 Housman v. Byrne, 9 Wn. 2d 560, 561 (1941)). Finally, the filing of criminal ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 16 1 charges is “a superseding intervening cause that would limit any liability for . . . 2 false imprisonment to damages accruing before criminal charges were filed by a 3 fully informed prosecutor.” Youker v. Douglas Cnty., 162 Wn. App. 448, 467 4 (2011). Timely filed charges eliminate the basis for a plaintiff’s argument of false 5 imprisonment. See Youker, 162 Wn. App. at 466. 6 Mr. Farmer’s claim for false imprisonment is based on his arrest and 7 subsequent imprisonment for extortion and theft. Mr. Farmer was held from 8 December 3, 2013, to December 24, 2013. See ECF No. 1 at 4. Charging Mr. 9 Farmer with extortion and theft would constitute an intervening event that limits 10 any liability to only those potential damages accruing prior to the charging event. 11 See Youker, 162 Wn. App. at 467. However, the record is unclear as to when Mr. 12 Farmer was charged with extortion and theft. 13 Therefore, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Farmer, there 14 is no intervening event that cuts off liability. Mr. Farmer has pleaded a claim for 15 false imprisonment that may entitle him to relief. Officer Wilkinson has failed to 16 establish on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be 17 resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 18 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for 19 Failure to State a Claim and Motion for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 8, is 20 GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The City of Spokane is ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 17 1 DISMISSED with prejudice. The District Court Clerk is directed to enter this 2 Order and provide copies to counsel. 3 4 5 DATED this 30th day of July, 2015. s/ Rosanna Malouf Peterson ROSANNA MALOUF PETERSON Chief United States District Court Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM ~ 18
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
