Matthiesen v. AutoZone Stores Inc, No. 2:2015cv00080 - Document 7 (E.D. Wash. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER denying 4 Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. Signed by Judge Thomas O. Rice. (BF, Judicial Assistant)
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1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 7 STEPHANIE MATTHIESEN, NO: 2:15-CV-0080-TOR 8 9 10 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND v. AUTOZONE STORES, INC., a Nevada Corporation, 11 Defendant. 12 13 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand (ECF No. 4). This 14 matter was submitted for consideration without oral argument. The Court has 15 reviewed the parties’ briefing and the record and files herein, and is fully informed. 16 BACKGROUND 17 On February 11, 2015, Plaintiff Stephanie Matthiesen, a Washington 18 resident, filed and served her Complaint in Chelan County Superior Court against 19 20 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND ~ 1 1 Defendant Autozone Stores, Inc.,1 a Nevada corporation with its principal place of 2 business in Tennessee. ECF No. 1-4 at 9-14. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges several 3 state law claims, including gender discrimination under the Washington Law 4 Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) and emotional distress. Id. Defendant 5 received a Summons and a copy of the complaint on March 6, 2015. ECF No. 1-4 6 at 16. On March 30, 2015, Defendant timely removed the case to this Court 7 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which grants the district court original jurisdiction 8 over matters between diverse citizens. ECF No. 1. 9 Plaintiff now moves to remand this case, agreeing to cap her claimed 10 damages and attorney fees at $75,000 in order to defeat this Court’s jurisdiction. 11 ECF No. 4. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specify a particular amount of damages; 12 rather, it demands only general relief for past and future lost wages and benefits, 13 past and future special and general damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees and 14 costs. ECF No. 1-4 at 13. Defendant’s Notice of Removal asserts that the amount 15 in controversy, considering potential damages and attorney’s fees, is well in excess 16 of the jurisdictional requirement. ECF No. 1-4 at 13. 17 DISCUSSION 18 1 19 20 Defendant has explained that AutoZone Stores, Inc. is now known as “AutoZone Stores, LLC.” ECF No. 2 at 1. ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND ~ 2 1 A defendant may remove a case to federal court if the federal court would 2 have subject-matter jurisdiction over one or more of the plaintiff’s claims pursuant 3 to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) or 1332 (diversity of citizenship). See 28 4 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b). Under diversity jurisdiction, federal district courts have 5 “original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds 6 the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs,” and is between 7 diverse citizens. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 8 9 Where the complaint is silent as to the amount demanded, the burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in 10 controversy exceeds $75,000. Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th 11 Cir. 2005) (quoting Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376 12 (9th Cir. 1997)). The amount in controversy includes the amount of damages in 13 dispute, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees, if mandated or allowed by statute or 14 contract. Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1998) (“We 15 hold that where an underlying statute authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees, either 16 with mandatory or discretionary language, such fees may be included in the 17 amount in controversy.”); see also Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 18 696, 700 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Section 1332(a)’s amount in controversy requirement 19 excludes only ‘interest and costs’ and therefore includes attorneys’ fees.”). In 20 determining the amount in controversy, the court may consider whether it is ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND ~ 3 1 “facially apparent” from the complaint that the demand exceeds $75,000. Abrego 2 Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 690 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Singer, 116 3 F.3d at 377). “If not, the court may consider facts in the removal petition, and may 4 ‘require parties to submit summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount 5 in controversy at the time of removal.” Id. (quoting Singer, 116 F.3d at 377). 6 “[E]vents occurring subsequent to removal which reduce the amount 7 recoverable, whether beyond the plaintiff’s control or the result of his volition, do 8 not oust the district court’s jurisdiction once it has attached.” St. Paul Mercury 9 Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293 (1938). Rather, a district court’s 10 removal jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal or commencement of the 11 suit in federal court. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N. Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 12 428 (1991) (“We have consistently held that if jurisdiction exists at the time an 13 action is commenced, such jurisdiction may not be divested by subsequent 14 events.”); Poore v. Am.-Amicable Life Ins. Co., 218 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 15 2000) (“[E]vents occurring after removal which may reduce the damages 16 recoverable below the amount in controversy requirement do not oust the district 17 court’s jurisdiction.”), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized by Alvarez 18 v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 508 F.3d 639, 641 (11th Cir. 2007); Hill v. Blind Indus. & 19 Servs. of Md., 179 F.3d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[D]iversity jurisdiction is 20 determined at the time the action commences, and a federal court is not divested of ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND ~ 4 1 jurisdiction if a party subsequently moves to another state, or if the amount in 2 controversy subsequently drops below the minimum jurisdictional level.” (citations 3 omitted)). If a plaintiff wishes to stipulate to an amount below the jurisdictional 4 minimum, she must do so before the case is removed. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. 5 at 292 (“And though, as here, the plaintiff after removal, by stipulation, by 6 affidavit or by amendment of his pleadings, reduces the claim below the requisite 7 amount, this does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction.”); Walton v. Bayer 8 Corp., 643 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2011) (“A plaintiff can defeat removal of a 9 diversity case by irrevocably committing (before the case is removed) to accepting 10 no more than $75,000 in damages, Back Doctors Ltd. v. Metropolitan Property & 11 Casualty Ins. Co., 637 F.3d 827, 830–31 (7th Cir. 2011), no matter how great her 12 actual damages.”). 13 Although the Supreme Court, in Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 14 S.Ct. 1345, 1350 (2013), appears to acknowledge, in dicta, that a plaintiff may 15 obtain remand by stipulating to amounts that fall below the federal jurisdictional 16 requirement, its assertion is not supported by the citations provided. First, 17 although the Knowles Court quotes an excerpt from St. Paul Mercury to support its 18 assertion, the full citation in St. Paul Mercury is as follows: 19 20 We think this well established rule is supported by ample reason. If the plaintiff could, no matter how bona fide his original claim in the state court, reduce the amount of his demand to defeat federal jurisdiction the defendant's supposed statutory right of removal would ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND ~ 5 1 4 be subject to the plaintiff's caprice. The claim, whether well or ill founded in fact, fixes the right of the defendant to remove, and the plaintiff ought not to be able to defeat that right and bring the cause back to the state court at his election. If he does not desire to try his case in the federal court he may resort to the expedient of suing for less than the jurisdictional amount, and though he would be justly entitled to more, the defendant cannot remove. 5 St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 294. Second, although the Knowles Court cites to 6 the Wright, Miller, & Cooper Federal Practice and Procedure treatise for the 7 assertion that a federal court can insist on a “binding affidavit or stipulation that 8 the plaintiff will continue to claim less than the jurisdictional amount,” the 9 citations immediately following this statement affirmatively state that such a 2 3 10 stipulation must precede removal. See 14AA Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal 11 Practice and Procedure § 3702.1 (citing Walton, 643 F.3d at 998; Back Doctors 12 Ltd., 637 F.3d at 831). The treatise subsequently cites this same authority when 13 acknowledging that “[s]ome courts have required that these affidavits or 14 stipulations be executed prior to the notice of removal as a sign of their bona fides 15 and cannot await the motion to remand.” Id. Accordingly, this Court follows the 16 well established practice, as announced in the Supreme Court’s opinion in St. Paul 17 and followed by this Circuit. 18 Here, the Defendant has satisfied, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 19 the amount in controversy satisfies the jurisdictional requirement for purposes of 20 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND ~ 6 1 removal.2 When Plaintiff was constructively discharged in June 2014, she earned 2 an hourly rate of $12.50 and was a full-time employee, see ECF No. 1-3 at 2 3 (Declaration of Patrick Johnson, State Income Tax Manager for Defendant); thus, 4 Plaintiff’s annual salary was approximately $26,000. ECF No. 1 at 5. Assuming a 5 trial date no earlier than June 2016, Plaintiff could potentially receive a back-pay 6 claim of approximately $52,000 and a front-pay claim of approximately $26,000 7 per year. ECF No. 1 at 5. Adding these awards to potential emotional distress 8 damages and reasonable attorney fees which a prevailing party is entitled under 9 WLAD,3 it is more likely than not that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 10 Plaintiff’s post-hoc attempt to cap her damages at $75,000 does not divest the 11 Court of its diversity jurisdiction, which attached at the time of removal; rather, 12 13 2 14 Defendant is organized under the laws of Nevada and maintains its principle place 15 of business in Tennessee. ECF No. 1 at 2-3. 16 3 17 18 19 20 Diverse citizenship is not at issue here. Plaintiff is a citizen of Washington; Pursuant to WLAD’s fee-shifting provision, [a]ny person deeming . . . herself injured by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys’ fees or any other appropriate remedy. RCW 49.60.030(2) (emphasis added). ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND ~ 7 1 any attempt to stipulate to less than the jurisdictional amount must have preceded 2 removal. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF No. 4) is DENIED. 3 IT IS ORDERED: 4 Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand (ECF No. 4) is DENIED. 5 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and provide 6 7 copies to counsel. DATED May 29, 2015. 8 9 THOMAS O. RICE United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND ~ 8
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