Metcalfe v. Colvin, No. 2:2015cv00146 - Document 14 (E.D. Wash. 2016)

Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment ECF No. 12 is DENIED. Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment ECF No. 13 is GRANTED. The file is CLOSED. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas O. Rice. (LLH, Courtroom Deputy)

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Metcalfe v. Colvin Doc. 14 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 7 CRAIG WILLIAM METCALFE, NO: 2:15-CV-0146-TOR Plaintiff, 8 9 10 11 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 12 Defendant. 13 14 BEFORE THE COURT are the parties’ cross-motions for summary 15 judgment. ECF Nos. 12; 13. This matter was submitted for consideration without 16 oral argument. The Court—having reviewed the administrative record and the 17 parties’ completed briefing—is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, 18 the Court grants Defendant’s motion and denies Plaintiff’s motion. 19 // 20 // ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 3 4 JURISDICTION The Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). STANDARD OF REVIEW A district court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social 5 Security is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is 6 limited: the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported 7 by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 8 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence” means relevant evidence that “a 9 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. at 1159 10 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence equates to 11 “more than a mere scintilla[,] but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation and 12 citation omitted). In determining whether this standard has been satisfied, a 13 reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole rather than searching 14 for supporting evidence in isolation. Id. 15 In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its 16 judgment for that of the Commissioner. If the evidence in the record “is susceptible 17 to more than one rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings 18 if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina v. 19 Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). Further, a district court “may not 20 reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless.” Id. at 1111. An ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 2 1 error is harmless “where it is inconsequential to the [ALJ’s] ultimate nondisability 2 determination.” Id. at 1115 (quotation and citation omitted). The party appealing 3 the ALJ’s decision generally bears the burden of establishing that it was harmed. 4 Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409–10 (2009). 5 6 FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” within 7 the meaning of the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to 8 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 9 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 10 has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 11 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the claimant’s impairment must be 12 “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[,] but cannot, 13 considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of 14 substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. 15 § 1382c(a)(3)(B). 16 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to 17 determine whether a claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. 18 § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s 19 work activity. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in “substantial 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 3 1 gainful activity,” the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. Id. 2 § 416.920(b). If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activities, the analysis 3 4 proceeds to step two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the 5 claimant’s impairment. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from “any 6 impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [his or her] 7 physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” the analysis proceeds to step 8 three. Id. § 416.920(c). If the claimant’s impairment does not satisfy this severity 9 threshold, however, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 10 11 Id. At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant’s impairment to 12 several impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to 13 preclude a person from engaging in substantial gainful activity. Id. 14 § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as severe as or more severe than one of 15 the enumerated impairments the Commissioner must find the claimant disabled 16 and award benefits. Id. § 416.920(d). 17 If the severity of the claimant’s impairment does meet or exceed the severity 18 of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess the 19 claimant’s “residual functional capacity.” Residual functional capacity (“RFC”), 20 defined generally as the claimant’s ability to perform physical and mental work ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 4 1 activities on a sustained basis despite his or her limitations, id. § 416.945(a)(1), is 2 relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the analysis. 3 At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s 4 RFC, the claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in 5 the past (“past relevant work”). Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable 6 of performing past relevant work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is 7 not disabled. Id. § 416.920(f). If the claimant is incapable of performing such 8 work, the analysis proceeds to step five. 9 At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s 10 RFC, the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy. 11 Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner must also 12 consider vocational factors such as the claimant’s age, education and work 13 experience. Id. If the claimant is capable of adjusting to other work, the 14 Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 416.920(g)(1). If 15 the claimant is not capable of adjusting to other work, the analysis concludes with 16 a finding that the claimant is disabled and is therefore entitled to benefits. Id. 17 The burden of proof is on claimant at steps one through four above. Bray v. 18 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009). If the analysis 19 proceeds to step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that (1) the 20 claimant is capable of performing other work; and (2) such work “exists in ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 5 1 significant numbers in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2); Beltran 2 v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012). 3 4 ALJ FINDINGS On March 28, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security 5 income, alleging a disability onset date of September 1, 2004. Tr. 224-29. 6 Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially, Tr. 172-75, and upon reconsideration, Tr. 7 179-82. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ, Tr. 183-85, which hearing was 8 held on November 1, 2013, Tr. 46-87. At the hearing, Plaintiff amended his alleged 9 onset date to August 24, 2010. Tr. 52-53. On December 2, 2013, the ALJ rendered 10 11 a decision denying Plaintiff’s claim. Tr. 19-45. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 12 gainful activity since August 24, 2010, the amended alleged onset date. Tr. 24. At 13 step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: left 14 shoulder tendinitis/adhesive capsulitis; left distal humeral metaphyseal fracture 15 status post open reduction, internal fixation (ORIF), stable; left 4th metacarpal 16 fracture, status post ORIF, healed; degenerative disk disease with mild to moderate 17 scoliosis; gout by history; hepatitis C by history; hypertension; major depressive 18 disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; personality disorder; and alcohol 19 dependence. Tr. 24. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 6 1 impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals a listed 2 impairment. Tr. 31. The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC 12 to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c). He can lift no more than 50 pounds at a time and frequently lift or carry 25 pounds. He can stand and/or walk about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday and sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. Pushing/pulling is unlimited within the lifting restrictions cited. He can occasionally climb ramps or stairs but should never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can occasionally balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, or crawl. He should avoid walking on uneven surfaces. He can reach overhead occasionally. With the left upper extremity, he is capable of frequent handling (grasp, hold, tum objects) and fingering (pick, pinch small objects). He should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold or heat, excessive vibration, poorly ventilated areas, irritants such as fumes, odors, dust, chemical, and gases, unprotected heights, and use of moving machinery. He is capable of simple, routine, and repetitive tasks with some well-learned and detailed tasks. He is capable of occasional decision making and occasional changes in the work setting. He is capable of short, superficial contact in the work place as seen in most business settings, with no close cooperation with coworkers. He would benefit from assistance in goals and planning. 13 Tr. 32. At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant 14 work. Tr. 36. At step five, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff’s age, 15 education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs in significant numbers in the 16 national economy that Plaintiff could perform, such as dishwasher, kitchen helper, 17 and production helper. Tr. 37. Alternatively, the ALJ found that considering 18 Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and an RFC for light work, there are 19 also jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could 20 perform, such as electrical assembler, mail clerk, and survey worker. Tr. 37. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 7 1 Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the 2 Social Security Act. Tr. 38. 3 On April 14, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for 4 review, Tr. 1-7, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision for 5 purposes of judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3); 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1481, 6 422.210. 7 ISSUES 8 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying 9 him supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. 10 ECF No. 13. The Court construes Plaintiff as raising the following issues for its 11 review: 12 (1) Whether the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility; 13 (2) Whether the ALJ properly weighed the medical opinion evidence; 1 and 14 (3) Whether the ALJ posed an adequate hypothetical to the vocational expert. 15 16 17 1 18 Plaintiff’s RFC, ECF No. 12 at 9, Plaintiff’s argument discusses the ALJ’s 19 assessment of the medical opinions of Drs. Arnold, Bailey, Chandler, and Hoskins, 20 id. at 11-14. Although Plaintiff presents this issue as the ALJ’s erroneous assessment of ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 8 1 See ECF No. 12. The Court evaluates each issue in turn. 2 DISCUSSION 3 A. 4 First, Plaintiff faults the ALJ for failing to properly evaluate his credibility. Adverse Credibility Finding 5 Id. at 15-16. However, Plaintiff fails to specifically address any of the ALJ’s 6 reasons and explain why they are deficient. See id. 7 An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s 8 testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. “First, the ALJ must 9 determine whether there is objective medical evidence of an underlying 10 impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other 11 symptoms alleged.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 “The claimant is not required to show that her impairment could reasonably be 13 expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show 14 that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom.” Vasquez v. 15 Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 Second, “[i]f the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of 17 malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of 18 the symptoms if she gives ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons’ for the 19 rejection.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 20 Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)). “General findings are ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 9 1 insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what 2 evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Id. (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 3 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 4 2002) (“[T]he ALJ must make a credibility determination with findings sufficiently 5 specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit 6 claimant’s testimony.”). “The clear and convincing [evidence] standard is the most 7 demanding required in Social Security cases.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 8 1015 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 9 924 (9th Cir. 2002)). 10 In making an adverse credibility determination, the ALJ may consider, inter 11 alia, (1) the claimant’s reputation for truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies in the 12 claimant’s testimony or between his testimony and his conduct; (3) the claimant’s 13 daily living activities; (4) the claimant’s work record; and (5) testimony from 14 physicians or third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the 15 claimant’s condition. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59. 16 Even disregarding the evidence in the record regarding Plaintiff’s 17 malingering, this Court finds the ALJ provided several specific, clear, and 18 convincing reasons for finding Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, 19 persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms “not entirely credible.” Tr. 34. 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 10 1 First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff inconsistently reported his alcohol use and 2 cited to over half a dozen instances in the record. Tr. 34. Because the ALJ may 3 employ “ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant’s 4 reputation for lying . . . and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than 5 candid” when assessing the Plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ did not err when he 6 found such contradictory evidence raised questions as to the reliability of 7 Plaintiff’s allegations. See Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 672 (9th Cir. 2012); 8 see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959 (“[T]he ALJ found that [the claimant] had not 9 been a reliable historian, presenting conflicting information about her drug and 10 alcohol usage . . . [T]his lack of candor carries over to her description of physical 11 pain.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 12 Second, the ALJ found the record “replete with drug seeking behavior.” Tr. 13 34. Specifically, the ALJ noted 17 visits in one 8-month period, a broken pain 14 contract due to obtaining pain medications from multiple providers, and repeated 15 calls for pain medications and requests for early refills. Tr. 34. Because this 16 provides a permissible reason for discounting Plaintiff’s statements, the ALJ did 17 not err when he found this evidence raised questions as to the reliability of 18 Plaintiff’s allegations. See Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 19 2001) (holding that the ALJ properly found the claimant’s complaints not credible 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 11 1 where the complaint was exaggerating his complaints in order to receive 2 prescription pain medication to feed his Valium addiction). 3 The ALJ discussed several other reasons for his adverse credibility finding. 4 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had made several inconsistent statements throughout 5 the record regarding his work history and the cause of his hand injury. Tr. 34. The 6 ALJ also found that Plaintiff made incredible statements regarding the frequency 7 of his gout attacks despite medical tests showing normal uric acid levels and non- 8 septic joints. Tr. 34. Finally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s spotty work history may 9 be explained by his jail time rather than his medical issues. Tr. 34 (“[Claimant] has 10 a significant legal history, and Dr. Bailey noted . . . that his spotty work history 11 was mostly due to jail time. He was on work release while jailed in 2011, and it 12 was reported that he ‘does well and likes it’ . . . .). Plaintiff does not challenge any 13 of these findings. 14 In sum, the ALJ provided several specific, clear, and convincing reasons for 15 rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. See Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1163. Again, Plaintiff’s 16 brief section discussing the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding discusses no specific 17 deficiency to explain why the ALJ committed reversible error. See ECF No. 12 at 18 15-16. Accordingly, this Court upholds the ALJ’s credibility finding. 19 // 20 // ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 12 1 B. 2 Second, Plaintiff faults the ALJ for finding that Plaintiff is capable of 3 medium work even though no physician evaluated all of the evidence in existence 4 at the time of the hearing. ECF No. 12 at 11-14. Plaintiff also states that the ALJ 5 failed to acknowledge all of the limitations opined by Drs. Arnold, Bailey, and 6 Chandler. Id. at 11. 7 Medical Opinion Evidence There are three types of physicians: “(1) those who treat the claimant 8 (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant 9 (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant 10 but who review the claimant’s file (nonexamining or reviewing physicians).” 11 Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2001) (brackets omitted). 12 “Generally, a treating physician’s opinion carries more weight than an examining 13 physician’s, and an examining physician’s opinion carries more weight than a 14 reviewing physician’s.” Id. “In addition, the regulations give more weight to 15 opinions that are explained than to those that are not, and to the opinions of 16 specialists concerning matters relating to their specialty over that of 17 nonspecialists.” Id. (citations omitted). 18 If a treating or examining physician’s opinion is uncontradicted, an ALJ may 19 reject it only by offering “clear and convincing reasons that are supported by 20 substantial evidence.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 13 1 “However, the ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a 2 treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory and inadequately supported 3 by clinical findings.” Bray v. Comm’r, 554 F.3d at 1228 (internal quotation marks 4 and brackets omitted). “If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted 5 by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and 6 legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 7 1216 (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31). 8 “Where an ALJ does not explicitly reject a medical opinion or set forth 9 specific, legitimate reasons for crediting one medical opinion over another, he 10 errs.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012. “In other words, an ALJ errs when he rejects a 11 medical opinion or assigns it little weight while doing nothing more than ignoring 12 it, asserting without explanation that another medical opinion is more persuasive, 13 or criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a substantive basis for 14 his conclusion.” Id. at 1012-13. That being said, the ALJ is not required to recite 15 any magic words to properly reject a medical opinion. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 16 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Court may draw reasonable 17 inferences when appropriate). “An ALJ can satisfy the ‘substantial evidence’ 18 requirement by ‘setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and 19 conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 14 1 findings.’” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 2 725 (9th Cir. 1998)). 3 1. Dr. Hoskins 4 This Court finds the ALJ properly weighed the opinion of Dr. Robert 5 Hoskins, a non-examining state agency consultant. Dr. Hoskins opined that 6 Plaintiff was capable of a wide range of medium exertion. See Tr. 140-54. The ALJ 7 afforded this opinion “great weight,” noting that it was consistent with (1) the 8 observations of Dr. Weir in his examination and review of x-rays, (2) the medical 9 evidence showing no functional limitations other than those of a temporary nature 10 related to the claimant’s left hand fracture, and (3) the consultative examination by 11 Dr. Rose. Tr. 24-25. Although Plaintiff cites to medical evidence submitted to the 12 record after Dr. Hoskins’ review, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate why this 13 evidence establishes greater limitations than ultimately included in the RFC. 14 Moreover, the ALJ ultimately found that there were jobs that exist in significant 15 numbers for an individual such as Plaintiff with a light exertion RFC, which 16 Plaintiff has failed to address. Accordingly, this Court finds the ALJ properly 17 weighed the opinion of Dr. Hoskins. 18 2. Drs. Arnold, Bailey, and Chandler 19 This Court also finds the ALJ properly weighed the opinions of Drs. Arnold, 20 Bailey, and Chandler. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 15 1 As to Dr. Bailey, the ALJ afforded “great weight” to Dr. Bailey’s opinion 2 that Plaintiff was capable of at least simple, repetitive tasks and was not as 3 inadequate and helpless as portrayed in examinations. Tr. 35 (citing Tr. 637-42). 4 Plaintiff points to no specific limitation that the ALJ failed to consider when 5 addressing Dr. Bailey’s opinion. See ECF No. 12 at 11. 6 As to Dr. Arnold, the ALJ gave “no weight” to Dr. Arnold’s opinion that 7 Plaintiff had moderate to marked limitations in basic work activities. Tr. 36 (citing 8 Tr. 1123-26). In rejecting Dr. Arnold’s opinion, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s 9 mental status examination was within normal limits. Tr. 36. Such contradictions 10 between a doctor’s opinion and his own medical results provides a permissible 11 basis to reject his opinion. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. Further, the ALJ noted 12 that the testing used revealed “questionable effort” on the part of Plaintiff. Tr. 36. 13 Plaintiff’s lack of full effort renders Dr. Arnold’s testing less accurate and thus 14 provides a permissible basis to discount Dr. Arnold’s opinion. See Thomas, 278 15 F.3d at 958 (holding that the ALJ was entitled to discount a medical opinion where 16 the provider noted that the claimant did not put forth full effort on testing). Again, 17 Plaintiff points to no specific deficiency in the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Arnold’s 18 opinion. 19 20 As to Dr. Chandler, the ALJ gave only “some weight” to the opinion that Plaintiff’s “ability to consistently access and utilize his cognitive abilities may be ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 16 1 affected by his tendency to become easily overwhelmed, difficulty making 2 decisions, and difficulty initiating and completing projects without a lot of 3 advice/reassurance.” Tr. 35 (citing Tr. 516). The ALJ did not fully credit this 4 opinion because of Dr. Chandler’s own mental status examination which 5 demonstrated “some cognitive ability to function appropriately within a work 6 setting and sustain concentration and attention over the course of a traditional 8- 7 hour day/5-day workweek.” See Bayliss, 427 F. 3d at 1216. Further, the ALJ did 8 not fully credit this opinion because it was based on Plaintiff’s non-credible self- 9 reports. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 10 that an ALJ may reject an opinion that is “largely based” on a claimant’s non- 11 credible self-reports). Again, Plaintiff highlights no specific deficiency. 12 In sum, this Court finds the ALJ properly weighed the medical evidence. 13 Plaintiff puts forth no argument as to why the ALJ improperly rejected the 14 opinions of these providers other than to make a conclusory assertion that that ALJ 15 “fail[ed] to acknowledge all of the limitations which the Plaintiff has per the 16 opinions of Drs. Arnold, Bailey and Chandler.” ECF No. 12 at 11. Accordingly, 17 this Court does not find that the ALJ committed reversible error. 18 C. 19 Finally, Plaintiff faults the ALJ for posing an incomplete hypothetical to the 20 Hypothetical Question vocational expert. ECF No. 12 at 14-15. Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 17 1 hypothetical should have included the limitation that Plaintiff would be interrupted 2 up to one-third of the work time due to psychological impairments and would need 3 to miss more than one day of work per month. Id. 4 “An ALJ must propound a hypothetical to a [vocational expert] that is based 5 on medical assumptions supported by substantial evidence in the record that 6 reflects all the claimant’s limitations.” Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165 7 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). “If the assumptions in the hypothetical are not 8 supported by the record, the opinion of the vocational expert that claimant has a 9 residual working capacity has no evidentiary value.” Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 10 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1984). “It is, however, proper for an ALJ to limit a 11 hypothetical to those impairments that are supported by substantial evidence in the 12 record.” Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at 1165. 13 Here, Plaintiff provides no support for the assertion that his alleged 14 psychological impairments would interrupt his work one-third of the time and he 15 would need to miss more than one day of work per month. See ECF No. 12 at 14- 16 15. To the extent Plaintiff is contending Dr. Arnold’s opined limitations should 17 have been included in the hypothetical question to the vocational expert, this Court 18 previously found that the ALJ properly rejected this opinion. Thus, these 19 limitations, unsupported by substantial evidence, were properly excluded from the 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 18 1 hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert. Accordingly, this Court does 2 not find error. 3 IT IS ORDERED: 4 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12) is DENIED. 5 2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 13) is 6 7 8 9 GRANTED. The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order, enter Judgment for Defendant, provide copies to counsel, and CLOSE the file. DATED March 28, 2016. 10 11 THOMAS O. RICE Chief United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 19

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