Hawkins v. Douglas County et al, No. 2:2015cv00283 - Document 33 (E.D. Wash. 2016)
Court Description: SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTIONS TO DISMISS. Defendant Douglas Countys 12(b) Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint ECF No. 23 is GRANTED. Chelan County Defendants Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint ECF No. 24 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the entry of this order. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas O. Rice. (LLH, Courtroom Deputy)
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Hawkins v. Douglas County et al Doc. 33 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 7 EDWIN TROY HAWKINS, NO: 2:15-CV-0283-TOR Plaintiffs, 8 v. 9 10 SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS DOUGLAS COUNTY, a municipal corporation, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 BEFORE THE COURT are Defendant Douglas County’s 12(b) Motion to 14 Dismiss Amended Complaint (ECF No. 23) and Chelan County Defendants’ 15 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 24). These 16 matters were submitted for consideration without oral argument. The Court— 17 having reviewed the briefing, files, and record therein—is fully informed. 18 // 19 // 20 // SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 BACKGROUND 2 This action arises out of the underlying criminal conviction of Plaintiff 3 Edwin Troy Hawkins. In his First Amended Complaint, Hawkins asserts, pursuant 4 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Chelan and Douglas County entities and officers 5 maliciously pursued charges and a conviction against him in violation of his Fourth 6 and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ECF No. 22. Defendants previously moved to 7 dismiss the other federal and state law claims in Hawkins’ original Complaint, 8 which motion this Court granted. ECF No. 21 (finding all claims, save for his 9 malicious prosecution claims, 1 barred by the statute of limitations). In the instant motion, Defendants again move to dismiss. ECF Nos. 23; 24. 10 11 FACTS 12 The following facts are drawn from the First Amended Complaint and 13 accepted as true for the instant motion. 2 14 15 16 1 17 prosecution claim. 18 2 19 documents from the underlying criminal proceeding—a Washington Supreme 20 Court decision, Hawkins’ briefing in support of a new trial, and a witness Hawkins First Amended Complaint does not reassert his state malicious The Court declines Hawkins’ request to take judicial notice of state court SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 2 1 This action concerns the events leading up to and concerning Hawkins’ 2 underlying criminal conviction in state court. In short, Hawkins was charged with 3 and convicted of first degree attempted possession of stolen property and first 4 degree possession of stolen property, but the charges were ultimately dismissed in 5 December 2014 after Hawkins successfully appealed and obtained a right to a new 6 trial. 7 Hawkins is an orchardist in Eastern Washington. In early 2006, Bob 8 Morrison, manager of Beebe River Orchard, offered to have Hawkins lease the 9 orchard. Hawkins had several agents investigate the equipment on the orchard and 10 ultimately declined the lease offer. As a result, Morrison and Charlie Myers, the 11 orchard’s irrigator, lost their full-time employment, 12 Later in the spring of 2006, Morrison reported to the Douglas County 13 Sheriff’s Office that two sprayers, a Kubota tractor, and a Landini tractor were 14 missing. Morrison subsequently received a call from Len England, who said he 15 knew where the missing sprayers were and had pictures but requested that 16 Morrison not tell the police he had provided the information. Hawkins has a long- 17 18 19 declaration—for purposes of the instant motion to dismiss as they do not add to the 20 allegations within the First Amended Complaint. SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 3 1 standing feud with his in-laws, including Len, Doug, and Dale England.3 Morrison 2 reported to the Douglas County Sherriff’s Office that the missing equipment was 3 located on property Hawkins leased from Sandcastle Orchard. 4 Bill Black, an officer with the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office visited 5 Sandcastle Orchard, along with Charlie Myers. Although it is unclear when the 6 sprayers were found on Hawkins’ property, Myers pointed out their location to the 7 Douglas County Sheriff’s Office. 8 After answering Deputy Black’s questions, Hawkins visited the neighbors of 9 Sandcastle Orchard, Don and Gloria Bailey. Ms. Bailey told Hawkins that, several 10 days before the sprayers were found, she witnessed a blue Ford pickup—Morrison 11 drives a blue Ford Ranger—with a loaded trailer drive on to the Sandcastle 12 Orchard property and then drive away with an empty trailer. Hawkins relayed this 13 information to Deputy Black, but Deputy Black declined to speak directly to the 14 Baileys. 15 In late October 2006, Deputy Randy Lake of the Chelan County Sheriff’s 16 Office visited Hawkins’ home and inspected Hawkins’ farm equipment. Deputy 17 Lake did not find any signs of the missing Kubota and Landini tractors. 18 19 3 20 contributed to the investigation of the stolen farm equipment. Dale England, a Chelan County Sheriff’s Deputy, is named in this suit and SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 4 1 The day after this search, tools, equipment, and equipment records were 2 stolen from one of Hawkins’ shops. Morrison was seen the day before the break-in 3 driving past the shop numerous times, at a slow speed, while dressed in 4 camouflage clothing. Subsequently, based on a report by Morrison that the tractor 5 was stolen, Chelan County Sheriff’s Office took a Kubota weed spray tractor from 6 Hawkins’ orchard. 7 In the spring of 2007, a white flatbed truck arrived at one of Hawkins’ 8 orchards, carrying an orange Kubota tractor. The driver unloaded the tractor and, a 9 short time later, left the property with an orange Kubota tractor. 10 Subsequently, Hawkins brought his Kubota tractor to East Wenatchee for 11 repair. The mechanics noticed that the serial number on the tractor had been 12 ground off and the identification plate was missing. The mechanics determined 13 that this Kubota tractor was one of the pieces of equipment previously reported 14 missing and contacted the police. 15 Over a three day period in June 2007, Hawkins was arrested twice by the 16 Douglas County Sheriff’s Office, both times for possession of this Kubota tractor. 17 First, on June 8, 2007, Hawkins was arrested for possession of stolen 18 property when he went to pick up the tractor from the mechanics. The tractor 19 remained at the repair shop. After he was released on bail following his first arrest, 20 Hawkins returned to the mechanic to pick up the tractor. While driving home with SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 5 1 the tractor, Hawkins was pulled over by a Chelan County Sheriff’s deputy who had 2 been in communication with the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office. There was 3 confusion over whether this tractor was the missing tractor. Ultimately, deputies 4 from both Douglas and Chelan County took pictures of the tractor and then helped 5 Hawkins lock the tractor in his shed. 6 Second, on June 11, 2007, several Douglas and Chelan County deputies 7 arrived at Hawkins’ home and arrested him for possession of stolen property, the 8 stolen property being the Kubota tractor Hawkins brought home three days earlier. 9 Hawkins was ultimately charged with four counts related to the stolen farm 10 equipment: one count of first degree possession of stolen property for the sprayers; 11 one count of first degree possession of stolen property for the Landini tractor 4; one 12 13 4 14 led to this charge. In September 2007, Hawkins’ employee was twice pulled over 15 by a Douglas County Sheriff’s deputy for transporting the allegedly stolen Landini 16 tractor; although, it is unclear if this was the missing tractor. Deputy England was 17 present for the second stop. Deputy England, along with Deputy Bo Allen, 18 threatened one of Hawkins’ employees with deportation if he did not tell them who 19 stole the tractors. It is unclear, based on the allegations within the First Amended Complaint what 20 SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 6 1 count of first degree attempted possession of stolen property based on Hawkins’ 2 attempt to pick up the Kubota tractor from the mechanic; and one count of first 3 degree possession of stolen property based on when Hawkins obtained possession 4 of the Kubota tractor from the mechanic. 5 Hawkins was convicted on the two counts related to the Kubota tractor. 6 Hawkins appealed the conviction, and while the appeal was pending, successfully 7 moved the trial court for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The 8 state appealed the trial court’s grant of a new trial, and the Washington State 9 Supreme Court ultimately ruled in Hawkins’ favor. 10 11 12 On December 19, 2014, the Douglas County Superior Court entered a stipulated order of dismissal with prejudice as to the charges against Hawkins. On September 16, 2015, Hawkins initiated the present action. 13 DISCUSSION 14 A. Standard of Review 15 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(2), a party may raise a 16 Rule 12(b)(6) defense, after a responsive pleading has been filed, in a motion for 17 judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2)(B) 18 (“Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . may be raised . . . by 19 a motion under Rule 12(c)). That being said, a pre-answer motion made pursuant 20 to 12(b)(6) and a post-answer motion to dismiss made under 12(c) are SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 7 1 “functionally identical,” the actual difference merely being the time of filing. 2 Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). Under 3 either provision, “[a] complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond 4 doubt that that the plaintiff can prove no sets of facts in support of the claim that 5 would entitle it to relief.” Berg v. Popham, 412 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) 6 (citation omitted). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must allege “sufficient factual 7 matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 8 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard “does not require ‘detailed factual 9 allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully- 10 harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 11 544, 555 (2007)). In conducting its review, the court “must accept the factual 12 allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable 13 to the plaintiff.” AE ex rel Hernandez v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th 14 Cir. 2012). 15 B. Malicious Prosecution 16 To establish a section 1983 claim, a claimant must prove “(1) that a person 17 acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the 18 conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by 19 the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 20 632–33 (9th Cir. 1988). “A person deprives another ‘of a constitutional right, SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 8 1 within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in 2 another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to 3 do that ‘causes’ the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains.’” Id. at 633 4 (brackets omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). 5 Hawkins asserts that Defendants instituted or continued legal proceedings 6 against him with malice for the purpose of denying him his rights under the Fourth 7 and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Defendants do not appear to 8 dispute that they were acting under color of state law; however, they do dispute 9 whether Hawkins has sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation. 10 “To maintain a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must 11 show that the defendants prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, 12 and that they did so for the purpose of denying her a specific constitutional right.”5 13 Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and 14 15 5 16 process is available within the state judicial systems to provide a remedy . . .”; 17 however, “an exception exists when a malicious prosecution is conducted with the 18 intent to subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights.” Lacey v. Maricopa 19 County, 693 F.3d 896, 919 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and 20 alterations omitted). “In general, a claim a malicious prosecution is not cognizable under § 1983 if SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 9 1 brackets omitted). The claim also “requires ‘the institution of criminal proceedings 2 against another who is not guilty of the offense charged’ and that ‘the proceedings 3 have terminated in favor of the accused.’” Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 4 896, 919 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653 5 (1977)). “A criminal defendant may maintain a malicious prosecution claim not 6 only against prosecutors but also against others—including police officers and 7 investigators—who wrongfully caused his prosecution.” Smith, 640 F.3d at 938. 8 9 1. Municipal Entities Defendants contend that Hawkins has failed to adequately plead municipal 10 liability as he has provided no facts supporting even an inference that any conduct 11 directed at Hawkins was pursuant to an official municipal policy. ECF Nos. 23 at 12 5-6; 24 at 11-14. Hawkins does not address this issue in his response briefing. 13 The Supreme Court has held that local governments are “persons” who may 14 be subject to suits under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 15 690 (1978). However, a municipality may only be held liable for constitutional 16 violations resulting from actions undertaken pursuant to an “official municipal 17 policy.” Id. at 691. As the Supreme Court articulated in Monell, the purpose of 18 the “official municipal policy” requirement is to prevent municipalities from being 19 held vicariously liable for unconstitutional acts of their employees under the 20 doctrine of respondeat superior. Id.; see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 10 1 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478-79 (1986). 2 Thus, the “official municipal policy” requirement “distinguish[es] acts of the 3 municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make[s] clear 4 that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually 5 responsible.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 479-80 (emphasis in original) (footnote 6 omitted). 7 The Ninth Circuit recognizes four categories of “official municipal policy” 8 sufficient to establish municipal liability under Monell: (1) action pursuant to an 9 express policy or longstanding practice or custom; (2) action by a final 10 policymaker acting in his or her official policymaking capacity; (3) ratification of 11 an employee’s action by a final policymaker; and (4) failure to adequately train 12 employees with deliberate indifference to the consequences. Christie v. Iopa, 176 13 F.3d 1231, 1235-40 (9th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff must also establish the requisite 14 causal link between this “policy” and the alleged constitutional deprivation. See 15 Harper v. City of L.A., 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court 16 articulated the causation requirement as follows: 17 18 19 20 [I]t is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct casual link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights. SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 11 1 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 404. “Where a plaintiff claims that the 2 municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an 3 employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied 4 to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its 5 employees.” Id. at 405. 6 Here, this Court finds Hawkins has failed to adequately plead Monell 7 liability. While Hawkins is attempting to sue several Douglas and Chelan County 8 entities, he fails to provide any allegations linking his alleged constitutional 9 deprivation to some municipal policy or action. His First Amended Complaint 10 contains the single assertion that that Defendants’ actions were “in accordance with 11 the official policy of the Douglas County Sheriff’s Department and the Chelan 12 County Sheriff’s Department,” but it remains otherwise unclear what “official 13 municipal policy” is at issue. ECF No. 22 at 18. Such a conclusory allegation is 14 insufficient to survive dismissal. Accordingly, Douglas County, Chelan County, 15 and the municipal entities are dismissed. 16 2. Prosecuting Attorneys 17 The Douglas County Defendants argue that the Douglas County Prosecuting 18 Attorney’s Office Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity and should be 19 dismissed on this basis. ECF No. 23 at 6-10. In support, Defendants highlight that 20 there are no allegations within the First Amended Complaint that Steve Clem or SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 12 1 Does 19-25 acted outside of their prosecutorial role such that any of their conduct 2 is unprotected by absolute immunity. Id. Hawkins does not respond to this 3 argument. 4 Under federal law, “[p]rosecutors performing their official prosecutorial 5 functions are entitled to absolute immunity against constitutional torts.” Lacey, 6 693 F.3d at 912. “Immunity attaches to ‘the nature of the function performed, not 7 the identity of the actor who performed it.” Id. The party asserting immunity 8 “bears the burden of showing that immunity is justified for the function in 9 question.” Id. (ellipses omitted). 10 “A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from a civil action for 11 damages when he or she performs a function that is ‘intimately associated with the 12 judicial phase of the criminal process.’” KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1110-11 13 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). This 14 includes initiating a prosecution and presenting the State’s case, appearing at a 15 probable cause hearing to support an application for a search warrant, and 16 preparing and filing an arrest warrant. Id.; see also Lacey, 693 F.3d at 912 17 (“Absolute immunity also protects those functions in which the prosecutor acts as 18 an ‘advocate for the State,’ even if they ‘involve actions preliminary to the 19 initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.’” (quoting Burns 20 v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)). SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 13 1 On the other hand, absolute immunity “may not apply when a prosecutor is 2 not acting as ‘an officer of the court,’ but is instead engaged in other tasks, say 3 investigative or administrative tasks.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 4 342 (2009) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33). Such unprotected activities 5 include giving advice to police during a criminal investigation, making statements 6 to the press, or acting as a complaining witness in support of a warrant application. 7 Id. at 343. 8 9 Here, even assuming Hawkins sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of a malicious prosecution claim against the Douglas County prosecuting attorneys, 6 10 they are absolutely immune from suit. Accepting the factual allegations of the 11 First Amended Complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in 12 Hawkins’ favor, this Court finds Defendants Steve Clem and Does 19-25 should be 13 dismissed. While the First Amended Complaint details the events leading to 14 Hawkins’ arrest and the involvement of various deputies, Hawkins makes no 15 allegations as to Steve Clem, the other unnamed prosecuting attorneys, or the 16 17 6 18 pursued charges against Hawkins, there are no allegations supporting the elements 19 of a malicious prosecution claim—namely, that Defendants pursued charges with 20 malice and without probable cause. See Smith, 640 F.3d at 938. To be clear, he did not. Other than the fact that these defendants may have SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 14 1 prosecutor’s office more generally. It merely asserts that Mr. Clem was employed 2 by the Douglas County Prosecuting Attorney and that the Does 19-25 “were at all 3 pertinent times employed by the Douglas County Prosecuting Attorney as deputy 4 prosecuting attorneys and are individuals who may be liable for malicious 5 prosecution of the Plaintiff in their investigative or administrative tasks, but are as 6 yet unknown.” ECF No. 22 at 3-4. Besides this half-hearted, conclusory 7 allegation that some of the Douglas County prosecuting attorneys may be liable for 8 malicious prosecution in their investigative or administrative tasks, there are 9 otherwise no allegations in the First Amended Complaint that the prosecuting 10 attorneys acted outside their prosecutorial capacity, let alone allegations regarding 11 any conduct on the part of these Defendants. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[T]he 12 tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint 13 is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). While Hawkins maintains that discovery 14 will lead to greater specificity in the allegations against Defendants, Rule 8 “does 15 not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than 16 conclusions.” Id. at 678-69. Accordingly, Steve Clem and Does 19-25 are 17 dismissed. 18 19 20 3. Sheriff’s Deputies Both the Douglas and Chelan County Defendants argue that Hawkins has failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution against the individual officers, SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 15 1 namely because of the existence of probable cause as alleged in the pleading. 7 2 ECF Nos. 23 at 11-14; 24 at 9-11. While Hawkins generally objects to dismissal, 3 he fails to argue that the First Amended Complaint demonstrates that probable 4 cause is lacking. See ECF No. 25. 5 Here, this Court finds dismissal is proper for failure to state a claim. 6 Accepting the factual allegations within the First Amended Complaint as true and 7 drawing all reasonable inferences in Hawkins’ favor, this Court finds Hawkins has 8 failed to sufficiently allege malice and lack of probable cause. Hawkins’ response 9 brief paints the narrative of a conspiracy between the sheriffs’ deputies—including 10 Dale England, with whom Hawkins has a long-standing family feud—Morrison, 11 and the other England family members wherein Morrison and the Englands framed 12 Hawkins, and the deputies were aware but nonetheless helped pursue the arrest, 13 14 7 15 the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, “the presumption of independent 16 prosecutorial judgment in the charging decision is an evidentiary presumption 17 applicable at the summary judgment stage . . . it is not a pleading requirement to be 18 applied to a motion to dismiss.” Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 19 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, at this stage of the proceedings, this 20 Court declines to consider the doctrine of prosecutorial independence. While Defendants also argue that the officers are shielded from liability based on SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 16 1 prosecution, and conviction of Hawkins. However, the allegations within 2 Hawkins’ First Amended Complaint do not go so far. 3 As it currently reads, the First Amended Complaint alleges, or at least 4 alludes to, the following: (1) Hawkins has a long-standing feud with his in-laws, 5 the Englands, and more recent issues with Bob Morrison and Charlie Meyers; (2) 6 someone—possibly Bob Morrison, Charlie Meyers, or Len England—planted farm 7 equipment that was reported as stolen on Hawkins’ property; (3) a Douglas County 8 deputy found the missing sprayers on Hawkins’ property after a tip from Len 9 England, and both Chelan and Douglas County deputies found the missing Kubota 10 tractor in Hawkins’ possession; (4) following Hawkins’ two arrests for the Kubota 11 tractor and the encounter with Hawkins’ employee regarding the Landini tractor, 12 Douglas County Sheriff’s Office deputies visited one of Hawkins’ orchards and 13 inspected the tractors and other equipment; (5) Hawkins was charged with four 14 counts related to the stolen farm equipment and convicted on two; and (6) Douglas 15 County ultimately dismissed the charges with prejudice after Hawkins appealed 16 and was granted a new trial. 17 Importantly, the First Amended Complaint contains no allegations that the 18 Chelan or Douglas County sheriff’s deputies were aware that Hawkins did not steal 19 the missing orchard equipment—thus destroying any probable cause—and 20 nonetheless helped cause the prosecution against Hawkins. Quite the opposite, the SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 17 1 pleading demonstrates that the officers discovered Hawkins in possession of the 2 stolen farm equipment, which allegations demonstrate the existence of probable 3 cause rather than the lack thereof.8 And regarding the element of malice, while it 4 is clear Hawkins has a long-standing dispute with his in-laws, including Deputy 5 Dale England, as well as with other members of the orchardist community, these 6 allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that the conduct of Chelan and Douglas 7 County officers was motivated by malice. Accordingly, the individually-named 8 Defendants and remaining Doe Defendants are dismissed. 9 C. Leave to Amend 10 Even when a complaint fails to state a claim for relief, “[d]ismissal without 11 leave to amend is improper unless it is clear that the complaint could not be saved 12 by an amendment.” Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009). The 13 standard for granting leave to amend is generous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) 14 (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). The court 15 considers five factors in assessing the propriety of leave to amend—bad faith, 16 undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether 17 18 19 8 20 Hawkins was charged with possession of the stolen Landini tractor. It is unclear based on the allegations in the First Amended Complaint why SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 18 1 the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint. United States v. Corinthian 2 Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011). 3 This Court finds amendment is, once again, proper. First, the Court finds no 4 indication of bad faith or undue delay. Second, this Court finds no prejudice to the 5 opposing party at this early stage in the proceedings. Third, Hawkins has amended 6 his pleading only once. Finally, this Court finds amendment may not be futile. The 7 Court can conceive of additional allegations that could provide support for 8 Hawkins’ malicious prosecution claim otherwise dismissed by this Order. 9 Accordingly, because the factors weigh in favor of amendment, Hawkins request 10 for leave to amend his First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 25 at 13, is granted. 11 // 12 // 13 // 14 // 15 // 16 // 17 // 18 // 19 // 20 // SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 19 1 ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED: 2 1. Defendant Douglas County’s 12(b) Motion to Dismiss Amended 3 4 5 6 Complaint (ECF No. 23) is GRANTED. 2. Chelan County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED. 3. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff is 7 GRANTED leave to file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days of 8 the entry of this order. 9 10 11 4. The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and provide copies to counsel. DATED May 17, 2016. 12 13 THOMAS O. RICE Chief United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 SECOND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS ~ 20
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