Keyes v. Leland et al, No. 2:2016cv00048 - Document 8 (E.D. Wash. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER granting 3 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The file is CLOSED. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas O. Rice. (BF, Paralegal)
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1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 7 8 JIM KEYES, individually and as a representative of a class of similarly situated persons, 9 Plaintiff, 10 11 12 13 NO: 2:16-CV-0048-TOR ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS v. RICHARD LELAND, SHERRI HANSEN, CHRISTINA WENTZ, individually and in their official capacities; SPOKANE COUNTY DISTICT COURT; SPOKANE COUNTY, 14 Defendants. 15 16 BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 17 State a Claim (ECF No. 3). This matter was submitted without oral argument. 18 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Defendants are represented by James H. Kaufman. 19 The Court has reviewed the record and files herein, and is fully informed. 20 // ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 1 1 2 BACKGROUND On February 29, 2016, Plaintiff initiated this putative class action under 42 3 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, alleging deprivation of his civil rights. ECF 4 No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff claims Defendants’ alleged misconduct violated his 5 “right to fully access the courts, the right to petition for redress of grievances, and 6 the right to due process.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff seeks appointment of counsel to 7 represent the putative class; declaratory and injunctive relief; damages; costs; and 8 for this Court to “[a]ssume continuing oversight over the operations of the Spokane 9 County District Court for a period of time set at the court’s discretion to ensure that 10 11 12 these Constitutional violations do not recur.” Id. at 7. On May 9, 2016, Defendants filed the instant motion seeking to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. ECF No. 3. 13 14 FACTS The following facts are principally drawn from Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF 15 No. 1), and are accepted as true for the instant motion. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. 16 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 17 At an unspecified time, a Mr. Robert Saraceno initiated a small claims action 18 in Spokane County District Court against “Don Hall dba Wholesale Motors,” in 19 Cause No. 1546953. ECF No. 1 at 2-3. While Plaintiff does not appear to be a 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 2 1 named party in this action, he does allege to be an owner of Wholesale Motors, 2 LLC (“Wholesale Motors”). Id. at 3. 3 At some point, judgment was entered in favor of Wholesale Motors in the 4 amount of $1200. Id. at 2. Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges Mr. Saraceno, rather than 5 appeal the judgment, “made ex parte contact with the judge through letters” and 6 “the judge vacated the judgment and held a new trial.” Id. at 2-3. Sometime 7 before the start of the “second trial,” Plaintiff attempted to file an answer to the 8 complaint with affirmative defenses and counterclaims, but alleges that Defendant 9 Christina Wentz, a Deputy to the Spokane County District Court Clerk, refused to 10 accept the filing and “insisted on enforcing the ‘rule’ that is not a rule.” Id. at 3. 11 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wentz refused the filing “because the 12 counterclaim portion was not on a yellow papered template the court had available 13 for use by small claims litigants.” Id. 14 Later, Plaintiff claims a “second trial” took place, and judgment was entered 15 in favor of Wholesale Motors for $1500. Plaintiff alleges Mr. Saraceno again did 16 not appeal the judgment, but rather, “wrote ex parte letters to the court complaining 17 and demanding not only a new trial but a new judge.” Id. 18 As a result, a new judge, Defendant Richard Leland, was assigned to the 19 case, and, soon after, Plaintiff alleges Judge Leland vacated the $1500 judgment. 20 Id. Plaintiff further alleges that Judge Leland “refused to hear or address” a ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 3 1 complaint regarding Mr. Saraceno’s “repeated ex-parte contacts with the court and 2 his practice of filing documents and photographs into the court file without ever 3 serving copies on any other parties,” and “allowed” Mr. Saraceno to make “false 4 and defamatory statements” in court. Id. at 3-4. In response to Mr. Saraceno’s 5 alleged perjury, Plaintiff claims a “Citizen’s Petition for Prosecution” was “raised 6 with the District Court” but the court “refused to even assign the matter a case 7 number when it was attempted to be filed.” Id. at 4. Following Judge Leland’s decision to vacate the $1500 judgment, Plaintiff 8 9 attempted to a file a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court. Id. at 4. However, 10 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Wentz refused the filing due to noncompliance with 11 “made-up rules.” Id. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that these rules include 12 that (85 year old, legally blind, legally deaf, glaucomic, gout-ridden diabetic, cancer stricken) Don Hall had to personally file any documents from ‘Don Hall dba Wholesale Motors’ or he had to draft and have notarized ‘permission slips’ to allow any other person, specifically the Plaintiff, to deliver documents to the court for filing; that civil rule 11 no longer applied and signatures on documents had to be notarized; and demanding that the same large bond ($7000) be posted as would have had to be posted by someone appealing a trial judgment (which was contrary to the wording of the statute and the statute only required a $100 bond). 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Id. On a different day, Plaintiff alleges he returned to again attempt to file his appeal documents, “this time with copies of the court rules and the statutes to show ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 4 1 that the Notice of Appeal was proper.” Id. Plaintiff met with Defendant Sherri 2 Hansen, Acting Court Clerk, who also refused the documents for filing. Id. 3 Plaintiff alleges he “requested of both of these defendants that they put their 4 refusals in writing citing the new rules they had made up. They refused that 5 request also.” Id. Further, Plaintiff alleges the court clerks refusal to accept 6 documents for filing is in violation of their established statutory duties, described 7 in RCW 2.32.050, and constitutes official misconduct and a gross misdemeanor 8 pursuant to RCW 9A80.010(1)(b); 9A.80.010(2). Id. at 5-6. 9 Approximately one week later, Plaintiff alleges he received a letter from 10 Judge Leland, which “affirmed the clerks’ refusals to accept the filing of the 11 Notice of Appeal, though he cited the bond to be $3000[.]” Id. at 4-5. 12 In support of a putative class action, Plaintiff alleges the “back-door 13 bargaining through ex-parte contact and deliberate interference with the filing of 14 documents and the prevention of review of [] inappropriate decisions … is 15 undoubtedly happening in other cases to other litigants as well.” Id. at 5. Defendants represent that there is a “third trial” of the initial claim now 16 17 pending in smalls claim court. ECF No. 3 at 16. 18 // 19 // 20 // ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 5 1 2 3 DISCUSSION a. Standards of Review A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of 4 the plaintiff’s claims. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). To 5 withstand dismissal, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to 6 relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 7 (2007). “Naked assertion[s],” “labels and conclusions,” or “formulaic recitation[s] 8 of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Id. at 555, 557. “A claim has 9 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 10 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 11 alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While a plaintiff need not 12 establish a probability of success on the merits, he or she must demonstrate “more 13 than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 14 A complaint must also contain a “short and plain statement of the claim 15 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 16 standard “does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an 17 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 18 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In assessing whether Rule 8(a)(2) has 19 been satisfied, a court must first identify the elements of the plaintiff’s claim(s) and 20 then determine whether those elements could be proven on the facts pled. See id. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 6 1 at 675. The court should generally draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's 2 favor, see Sheppard v. David Evans & Assocs., 694 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 3 2012), but it need not accept “naked assertions devoid of further factual 4 enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 5 Generally, in ruling upon a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual 6 allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most 7 favorable to the party opposing the motion. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 8 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 9 In contrast, when addressing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 10 jurisdiction, the court is not bound by the plaintiff’s factual allegations. Pursuant 11 to Rule 12(b)(1), the Court “may ‘hear evidence regarding jurisdiction’ and 12 ‘resolv[e] factual disputes where necessary.’” Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 13 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 14 (9th Cir. 1983)). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may be either facial, where the court’s 15 inquiry is limited to the allegations in the complaint; or factual, where the court 16 may look beyond the complaint to consider extrinsic evidence. Safe Air for 17 Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “If the moving party 18 converts ‘the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or 19 other evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the motion 20 must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 7 1 establishing subject matter jurisdiction.’” Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 2 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039). Accordingly, in 3 deciding jurisdictional issues, the court is not bound by the factual allegations 4 within the complaint. Augustine, 704 F.2d at 1077. 5 b. Analysis 6 Defendants argue this Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for a lack 7 of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 8 be granted. ECF No. 3. In support, Defendants argue (1) immunity; (2) that 9 Spokane County District Court is not a proper defendant; (3) that Plaintiff’s 10 pleading does not establish municipal liability; (4) Plaintiff failed to properly serve 11 all defendants; and (5) Plaintiff’s suit is frivolous. Id. Defendants also argue, as a 12 pro se litigant, Plaintiff is not capable of representing a “class.” Id. at 13-14. 13 14 15 16 17 The Court will address each point in turn. i. Immunity First, Defendants argue Judge Leland and Clerks Hansen and Wentz are entitled to immunity against all claims. Id. at 9-11. “Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for their 18 judicial acts.” See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 19 1388 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. §1983 (providing for 20 judicial immunity from § 1983 cases seeking injunctive relief). This immunity is ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 8 1 construed broadly, as “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the 2 action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his 3 authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear 4 absence of all jurisdiction,” or performs an act that is not judicial in nature. Stump 5 v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (internal quotations and citations 6 omitted). Though, “absolute judicial immunity does not apply to non-judicial acts, 7 i.e. the administrative, legislative, and executive functions that judges may on 8 occasion be assigned to perform.” Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 9 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 10 Moreover, “[j]udicial immunity is extended to certain others who perform 11 functions closely associated with the judicial process.” Id. (internal quotation and 12 citation omitted). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “the lynchpin of both the 13 judicial and quasi-judicial immunities” is that the acts in question are “an integral 14 part of the judicial process.” See Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. 15 Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 1987) (quotation and citation omitted); see 16 also Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390 (“Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity 17 from damages for civil rights violations when they perform tasks that are an 18 integral part of the judicial process.”). 19 20 Here, the Court finds the allegations against Judge Leland involve judicial acts. Plaintiff alleges Judge Leland violated his rights to fully access the courts, to ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 9 1 petition for redress of grievance, and to due process by his “refusal[] to accept 2 documents for filing.” ECF No. 1 at 5. Such allegations rest on Judge Leland’s 3 affirmation of the clerks’ refusals to accept Plaintiff’s filing for noncompliance 4 with court rules. However, in the context of these allegations Judge Leland was 5 acting in a judicial capacity by interpreting and applying the court rules to 6 Plaintiff’s submitted documents. Indeed, such an act constitutes quintessential 7 judicial decision-making. While Plaintiff asserts that the court rules at issue are 8 incorrect or “made up,” a judicial act allegedly done in error does not deprive 9 Judge Leland of immunity. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. 10 Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks redress for his allegations 11 concerning Judge Leland’s decisions to vacate the $1500 judgment, to “allow” Mr. 12 Saraceno to make allegedly false statements in court, and to refuse to hear 13 Plaintiff’s complaints concerning Mr. Saraceno’s ex-parte communications, the 14 Court finds such actions also constitute judicial acts. Issuing rulings and 15 exercising control over courtroom proceedings and the court’s docket are normal 16 judicial functions. As such, Plaintiff’s allegations that Judge Leland performed 17 these acts in error and with improper motive do not bar immunity. Id. Thus, Judge 18 Leland is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from Plaintiff’s claims for 19 damages, see Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390, and injunctive relief, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 10 1 As for Defendants Wentz and Hansen, as court clerks performing acts 2 closely associated with the judicial process, this Court finds they are entitled to 3 quasi-judicial immunity. See Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1133. Plaintiff’s allegations 4 against Defendants Wentz and Hansen rest on their alleged refusal to file 5 Plaintiff’s submitted court documents. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, the 6 filing of court documents is a “basic and integral part of the judicial process … 7 [t]he clerk of court and deputy clerks are the officials through whom such filing is 8 done.” Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390. Hence, Defendants Wentz and Hansen are within 9 their judicial jurisdiction and even “a mistake or an act in excess of jurisdiction 10 does not abrogate judicial immunity, even if it results in ‘grave procedural errors.’” 11 Id. (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 359). Therefore, even if Plaintiff’s allegations that 12 Defendants Wentz and Hansen acted in violation of Washington statutory law are 13 true, such conduct does not remove their immunity from suit. 14 Accordingly, because Judge Leland is entitled to judicial immunity, and 15 Defendants Wentz and Hansen are both entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, all of 16 Plaintiff’s claims against these defendants are DISMISSED. 17 ii. Spokane County District Court 18 Next, Defendants argue that Spokane County District Court is not a proper 19 defendant in this action as it is not a legal entity subject to suit. ECF No. 3 at 11- 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 11 1 13. In support, Defendants assert that Spokane County itself is the only legal 2 entity capable of suing and being sued. Id. 3 The Court agrees. The capacity of an entity to sue or be sued is determined 4 by the law of the state where the court is located. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3). 5 Here, Washington law has established that “in a legal action involving a county, 6 the county itself is the only legal entity capable of suing and being sued.” Nolan v. 7 Snohomish Cnty., 59 Wash. App. 876, 883 (1990); see also Broyles v. Thurston 8 Cnty., 147 Wash. App. 409, 427-28 (2008). Accordingly, because the Spokane 9 County District Court is not a legal entity subject to suit under Washington law, 10 11 Plaintiff’s claims against this defendant must be DISMISSED. iii. Spokane County 12 As for the remaining defendant, Spokane County, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s 13 “broad, generalized allegations” are insufficient to establish municipal liability 14 under § 1983. ECF No. 3 at 14. 15 The Supreme Court has held that local governments are “persons” who may 16 be subject to suits under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 17 690 (1978). However, a municipality may only be held liable for constitutional 18 violations resulting from actions undertaken pursuant to an “official municipal 19 policy.” Id. at 691. As the Supreme Court articulated in Monell, the purpose of 20 the “official municipal policy” requirement is to prevent municipalities from being ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 12 1 held vicariously liable for unconstitutional acts of their employees under the 2 doctrine of respondeat superior. Id.; see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 3 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). 4 The Ninth Circuit recognizes four categories of “official municipal policy” 5 sufficient to establish municipal liability under Monell: (1) action pursuant to an 6 express policy or longstanding practice or custom; (2) action by a final 7 policymaker acting in his or her official policymaking capacity; (3) ratification of 8 an employee’s action by a final policymaker; and (4) failure to adequately train 9 employees with deliberate indifference to the consequences. Christie v. Iopa, 176 10 F.3d 1231, 1235-40 (9th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff asserting municipal liability must 11 plead “sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the 12 opposing party to defend itself” as well as “factual allegations that … plausibly 13 suggest an entitlement to relief ….” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 14 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, a 15 plaintiff must also establish the requisite causal link between this “policy” and the 16 alleged constitutional deprivation. See Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 17 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court articulated the causation 18 requirement as follows: 19 20 [I]t is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the “moving force” behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 13 1 2 show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights. 3 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 404. “Where a plaintiff claims that the 4 municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an 5 employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied 6 to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its 7 employee.” Id. at 405. 8 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges his denial of his rights to fully access the 9 courts, to petition for redress of grievances, and to due process (1) “was the direct 10 results of Spokane County failing to adequately hire, train, supervise and discipline 11 court personnel” and (2) that Spokane County has a “policy, practice and custom to 12 allow such deviances in the proper conduct of the court to occur.” ECF No. 1 at 6. 13 Plaintiff further complains that the alleged violations were brought to the attention 14 of Spokane County through documents filed in the District Court and the Superior 15 Court, and Spokane County’s alleged failure to act “demonstrated that its policy, 16 practice and custom was to find ways to protect court personnel from any 17 accountability,” and consequently, “Court personnel can reasonably conclude that 18 they are free to make up and enforce rules[.]” Id. at 6-7. 19 Even assuming a constitutional violation did occur, the Court finds Plaintiff 20 has failed to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983 against Spokane County. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 14 1 The complaint makes only conclusory and formulaic allegations of a county custom 2 or policy and fails to allege any supporting facts linking Plaintiff’s alleged 3 constitutional deprivation to some deliberate municipal policy or action. Moreover, 4 the complaint is devoid of any allegations and underlying facts regarding a specific 5 government policy, practice or custom that was the “moving force” behind the 6 alleged constitutional violations. Indeed, rather than allege facts concerning a 7 specific policy, Plaintiff presents amorphous allegations of court personnel “running 8 wild” and argues there is a “culture of abuse and corruption” at the courthouse. 9 However, such unsubstantiated allegations are not sufficient “factual allegations that 10 … plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief ….” Hernandez, 666 F.3d at 637 (9th 11 Cir. 2012) (quotations and citations omitted). 12 The Court concludes Plaintiff’s broad assertions that the county failed to train, 13 supervise or discipline court personnel or finds ways to “protect” court personnel 14 from accountability are merely conclusory allegations that fail to satisfy Iqbal. Thus, 15 Plaintiff has not alleged a cognizable claim of municipal liability and the Court 16 DISMISSES Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Spokane County. 17 Moreover, while Plaintiff has not requested leave to amend his complaint, 18 the Court finds that amendment as to municipal liability would be futile. Federal 19 Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend should be “freely 20 give[n] ... when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit has ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 15 1 directed that this policy be applied with “extreme liberality.” Eminence Capital, 2 LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir.2003). However, in deciding 3 whether leave to amend is appropriate, a court must consider, inter alia, whether 4 an amendment would be futile. United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 5 995 (9th Cir.2011). Here, given Plaintiff’s reliance on unsubstantiated, nebulous 6 allegations of corruption, this Court finds amendment concerning municipal 7 liability would be futile. 8 In sum, Defendants Leland, Hansen and Wentz are entitled to immunity from 9 this action, Spokane County District Court is not a legal entity subject to suit, and 10 Plaintiff has not alleged a cognizable claim of municipal liability against Spokane 11 County, and therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted on these bases. 12 ACCORDINGLY, IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED. 14 2. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. 15 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and Judgment 16 17 accordingly, provide copies to the parties, and CLOSE this case. DATED August 3, 2016. 18 19 THOMAS O. RICE Chief United States District Judge 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 16
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