Schroeder v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 2:2017cv00135 - Document 18 (E.D. Wash. 2018)

Court Description: ORDER GRANTING ECF No. 16 DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; denying ECF No. 12 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. FILE CLOSED. Signed by Senior Judge Robert H. Whaley. (TR, Case Administrator)

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Schroeder v. Commissioner of Social Security Doc. 18 1 2 3 4 FI LED I N THE U.S. DI STRI CT COURT EASTERN DI STRI CT OF WASHI NGTON 5 Jul 30, 2018 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 KEVIN W. S., 8 Plaintiff, No. 2:17-CV-00135-RHW v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 10 11 12 13 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, ECF 14 Nos. 12 & 16. Plaintiff brings this action seeking judicial review, pursuant to 42 15 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the Commissioner’s final decision, which denied his 16 application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II and his application for 17 Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 18 U.S.C §§ 401-434, 1381-1383F. After reviewing the administrative record and 19 briefs filed by the parties, the Court is now fully informed. For the reasons set forth 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and 2 DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 3 I. Jurisdiction 4 Plaintiff filed his application for Disability Insurance Benefits and his 5 application for Supplemental Security Income on April 22, 2013. AR 188-99. His 6 alleged onset date of disability is December 31, 2010. AR 190, 193. Plaintiff’s 7 applications were initially denied on July 18, 2013, AR 142-45, and on 8 reconsideration on September 27, 2013, AR 148-55. 9 A hearing with Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) R. J. Payne occurred on 10 July 21, 2015. AR 39-86. On August 11, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision finding 11 Plaintiff ineligible for disability benefits. AR 11-23. The Appeals Council denied 12 Plaintiff’s request for review on February 13, 2017, AR 1-3, making the ALJ’s 13 ruling the “final decision” of the Commissioner. 14 Plaintiff timely filed the present action challenging the denial of benefits, on 15 April 10, 2017. ECF No. 3. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are properly before this 16 Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 17 18 II. Sequential Evaluation Process The Social Security Act defines disability as the “inability to engage in any 19 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 20 mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 2 1 can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 2 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant shall be determined to be 3 under a disability only if the claimant’s impairments are of such severity that the 4 claimant is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering 5 claimant's age, education, and work experience, engage in any other substantial 6 gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). 7 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 8 for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social 9 Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) & 416.920(a)(4); Lounsburry v. 10 11 Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006). Step one inquires whether the claimant is presently engaged in “substantial 12 gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b) & 416.920(b). Substantial gainful 13 activity is defined as significant physical or mental activities done or usually done 14 for profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572 & 416.972. If the claimant is engaged in 15 substantial activity, he or he is not entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 16 404.1571 & 416.920(b). If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two. 17 Step two asks whether the claimant has a severe impairment, or combination 18 of impairments, that significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to 19 do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) & 416.920(c). A severe 20 impairment is one that has lasted or is expected to last for at least twelve months, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 3 1 and must be proven by objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508-09 & 2 416.908-09. If the claimant does not have a severe impairment, or combination of 3 impairments, the disability claim is denied, and no further evaluative steps are 4 required. Otherwise, the evaluation proceeds to the third step. 5 Step three involves a determination of whether any of the claimant’s severe 6 impairments “meets or equals” one of the listed impairments acknowledged by the 7 Commissioner to be sufficiently severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 8 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526 & 416.920(d), 416.925, 416.926; 9 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P. App. 1 (“the Listings”). If the impairment meets or 10 equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is per se disabled and qualifies 11 for benefits. Id. If the claimant is not per se disabled, the evaluation proceeds to the 12 fourth step. 13 Step four examines whether the claimant’s residual functional capacity 14 enables the claimant to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f) & 15 416.920(e)-(f). If the claimant can still perform past relevant work, the claimant is 16 not entitled to disability benefits and the inquiry ends. Id. 17 Step five shifts the burden to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant is 18 able to perform other work in the national economy, taking into account the 19 claimant’s age, education, and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(f), 20 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c) & 416.912(f), 416.920(g), 416.960(c). To meet this ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 4 1 burden, the Commissioner must establish that (1) the claimant is capable of 2 performing other work; and (2) such work exists in “significant numbers in the 3 national economy.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2); 416.960(c)(2); Beltran v. Astrue, 4 676 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2012). 5 6 III. Standard of Review A district court's review of a final decision of the Commissioner is governed 7 by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is limited, and the 8 Commissioner's decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported by 9 substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1144, 10 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing § 405(g)). Substantial evidence means “more than a 11 mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a 12 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Sandgathe v. 13 Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 14 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining 15 whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, “a 16 reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 17 simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Robbins v. Soc. 18 Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 19 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)). 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 5 1 In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its 2 judgment for that of the ALJ. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 3 1992). If the evidence in the record “is susceptible to more than one rational 4 interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by 5 inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 6 1111 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 7 2002) (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one 8 of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion must be upheld”). Moreover, 9 a district court “may not reverse an ALJ's decision on account of an error that is 10 harmless.” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. An error is harmless “where it is 11 inconsequential to the [ALJ's] ultimate nondisability determination.” Id. at 1115. 12 The burden of showing that an error is harmful generally falls upon the party 13 appealing the ALJ's decision. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409–10 (2009). 14 15 IV. Statement of Facts The facts of the case are set forth in detail in the transcript of proceedings 16 and only briefly summarized here. Plaintiff was 51 years old at the alleged date of 17 onset. AR 18, 190, 193. He has a high school education, three years of college, and 18 two years of vocational training in commercial construction and he is able to 19 communicate in English. AR 18, 61. Plaintiff has past work as a contractor and a 20 cook. AR 22, 223. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 6 1 2 V. The ALJ’s Findings The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not under a disability within the 3 meaning of the Act from December 31, 2010, through the date of the ALJ’s 4 decision. AR 11, 22. 5 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 6 gainful activity since December 31, 2010 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571 et seq., 7 and 416.971 et seq.). AR 13. 8 At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 9 cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease, and hypertension (citing 20 C.F.R. 10 11 §§ 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). AR 13. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or 12 combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 13 the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. AR 17. 14 At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to 15 perform medium work, except: he can lift/carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 16 pounds frequently, stand six hours in and eight-hour workday, walk six hours in an 17 eight-hour workday and sit six hours in and eight-hour workday; he is limited to 18 frequent stooping, crouching, kneeling, crawling, and balancing; frequent climbing 19 of ramps and stairs; occasional climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds; and he 20 should avoid concentrated exposure to industrial-type heavy vibration. AR 17. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 7 1 2 The ALJ found Plaintiff able to perform his past relevant work as a contractor. AR 22. 3 VI. Issues for Review 4 Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s decision is not free of legal error 5 and not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, he argues the ALJ erred 6 by: (1) improperly discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective complaint testimony; (2) 7 improperly evaluating the medical opinion evidence; and (3) improperly assessing 8 Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. 9 10 VII. Discussion A. The ALJ did not err in finding Plaintiff’s subjective complaints not 11 entirely credible. 12 An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether a claimant’s 13 testimony regarding subjective symptoms is credible. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 14 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). First, the claimant must produce objective 15 medical evidence of an underlying impairment or impairments that could 16 reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptoms alleged. Id. 17 Second, if the claimant meets this threshold, and there is no affirmative evidence 18 suggesting malingering, “the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the 19 severity of [her] symptoms only by offering specific, clear, and convincing reasons 20 for doing so.” Id. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 8 1 In weighing a claimant's credibility, the ALJ may consider many factors, 2 including, “(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's 3 reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and 4 other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or 5 inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of 6 treatment; and (3) the claimant's daily activities.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. When 7 evidence reasonably supports either confirming or reversing the ALJ's decision, the 8 Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 9 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir.1999). Here, the ALJ found that the medically 10 determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms 11 Plaintiff alleges; however, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s statements of 12 intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the symptoms were not entirely 13 credible. AR 18. The ALJ provided multiple clear and convincing reasons for 14 discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective complaint testimony. Id. 15 In this case, the ALJ found evidence of malingering. See Benton ex. el. 16 Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir.2003) (finding of affirmative 17 evidence of malingering will support a rejection of a claimant’s testimony). The 18 ALJ stated that Plaintiff demonstrated inconsistent reporting and possible 19 manipulative and exaggerated behavior. AR 19. The ALJ’s decision is supported 20 by the notes of a psychological consultant who noted that Plaintiff’s statements, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 9 1 presentation, and previously unseen gimp and grimace are tell-tale attempts at 2 manipulating the examiner. AR 19, 116. 3 In addition to malingering, the ALJ provided multiple clear and convincing 4 reasons to discount Plaintiff’s credibility that are supported by the record. AR 18- 5 20. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations of complete disability are not 6 supported by the objective medical evidence and contradicted by the generally 7 normal and mild medical findings in the record. AR 15, 18-19. An ALJ may 8 discount a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony that is contradicted by 9 medical evidence. Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 10 (9th Cir. 2008). Inconsistency between a claimant’s allegations and relevant 11 medical evidence is a legally sufficient reason to reject a claimant’s subjective 12 testimony. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff’s 13 mental status examinations were mostly unremarkable, consistently noting that 14 Plaintiff had a normal mood and affect; no anxiety or unusual evidence of 15 depression; normal thought content; normal concentration; normal attention span; 16 no suicidal ideation; and no agitation, mood swings or pressured speech. AR 15, 17 19, 314, 322, 324, 489, 505, 513, 522-24, 551. Nearly the entire record is 18 consistent with generally benign physical findings such as normal lumbar flexion 19 and extension, negative straight leg raises, no tenderness, no joint deformities or 20 abnormalities, normal range of motion in all extremities, and no gait disturbance. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 10 1 AR 18, 306, 502, 506, 508, 522. The diagnostic imaging results also show mostly 2 minimal or mild changes and x-rays and MRI scans of Plaintiff’s neck, back, 3 shoulders, hips, and elbows were mostly unremarkable, with findings that Plaintiff 4 had minor, mild, or moderate degenerative changes. AR 13-14, 19, 329-33. 5 Additionally, Plaintiff’s mental health condition was controlled with 6 medication. AR 15, 19. Impairments that can be controlled with treatment are not 7 disabling. See Warre ex rel. E.T. IV v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 8 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). Treatment notes provide that Plaintiff reported a decrease in 9 his anxiety symptoms/depression symptoms in January 2014. AR 15, 513. And 10 more specifically, Plaintiff reported that Cymbalta helped his depression “a lot.” 11 AR 15, 513. Additionally, Dr. Winfrey noted that Plaintiff’s mental health 12 symptoms were both “stable” and “well controlled with medication.” AR 59. 13 Plaintiff consistently denied any significant mental health issues to his treating 14 providers and reported good improvement in his depression with medication. AR 15 15, 21, 314, 322, 324, 489, 502, 505-06, 508, 513, 522-24, 551. 16 Lastly, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling limitations are 17 belied by his daily activities. AR 19. These include the daily activities of preparing 18 meals, doing light housework, mowing the lawn, gardening, fishing several times a 19 month, and woodworking. AR 19, 245-48, 523, 528, 549. Activities inconsistent 20 with the alleged symptoms are proper grounds for questioning the credibility of an ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 11 1 individual’s subjective allegations. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 (“[e]ven where those 2 activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting 3 the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a totally 4 debilitating impairment”); see also Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th 5 Cir. 2001). The ALJ reasonably found that Plaintiff’s daily activities contradict his 6 allegations of total disability. The record supports the ALJ’s determination that 7 Plaintiff’s conditions are not as limiting as he alleges. 8 9 When the ALJ presents a reasonable interpretation that is supported by the evidence, it is not the role of the courts to second-guess it. Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857. 10 The Court “must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences 11 reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111; see also 12 Thomas, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one 13 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion 14 must be upheld”). The Court does not find the ALJ erred when discounting 15 Plaintiff’s credibility because the ALJ properly provided multiple clear and 16 convincing reasons for doing so. 17 18 19 20 B. The ALJ properly weighed the medical opinion evidence. a. Legal Standard. The Ninth Circuit has distinguished between three classes of medical providers in defining the weight to be given to their opinions: (1) treating ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 12 1 providers, those who actually treat the claimant; (2) examining providers, those 2 who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (3) non-examining providers, those 3 who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th 4 Cir. 1996) (as amended). 5 A treating provider’s opinion is given the most weight, followed by an 6 examining provider, and finally a non-examining provider. Id. at 830-31. In the 7 absence of a contrary opinion, a treating or examining provider’s opinion may not 8 be rejected unless “clear and convincing” reasons are provided. Id. at 830. If a 9 treating or examining provider’s opinion is contradicted, it may only be discounted 10 for “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in 11 the record.” Id. at 830-31. 12 The ALJ may meet the specific and legitimate standard by “setting out a 13 detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, 14 stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 15 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citation omitted). When rejecting a treating 16 provider’s opinion on a psychological impairment, the ALJ must offer more than 17 his or his own conclusions and explain why he or she, as opposed to the provider, 18 is correct. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988). 19 Additionally, “other sources” for opinions include nurse practitioners, 20 physicians' assistants, therapists, teachers, social workers, spouses, and other non- ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 13 1 medical sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d), 416.913(d). An ALJ is required to 2 “consider observations by non-medical sources as to how an impairment affects a 3 claimant's ability to work.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir.1987). 4 Non-medical testimony can never establish a diagnosis or disability absent 5 corroborating competent medical evidence. Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 6 (9th Cir.1996). An ALJ is obligated to give reasons germane to “other source” 7 testimony before discounting it. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.1993). 8 9 b. Mahlon Dalley, Ph.D. Dr. Dalley is an examining psychologist who completed a psychological 10 evaluation for the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services in 11 May 2013. AR 21, 341-46 Dr. Dalley opined that Plaintiff generally had mild or 12 moderate limitations, but also opined that Plaintiff has marked or severe mental 13 limitations in four of the thirteen categories. AR 343-44. Dr. Dalley’s opinion is 14 contradicted by the assessment and testimony of Dr. Winfrey and the opinions of 15 DDS psychological medical consultants, all of whom were given significant weight 16 and are unchallenged by the Plaintiff. See AR 20-21. 17 The ALJ assigned little weight to Dr. Dalley’s opinion for multiple valid 18 reasons. AR 21. First, the ALJ noted that Dr. Dalley’s findings were inconsistent 19 with the longitudinal treatment record, which Dr. Dalley did not review. AR 21, 20 341. The ALJ noted that the evidence of record shows that Plaintiff consistently ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 14 1 denied psychiatric symptoms to his treating providers. AR 21, 502, 506, 508, 524. 2 Additionally, the ALJ noted evidence that demonstrates Plaintiff’s mental status 3 examination were mostly benign, with findings that he had a normal mood and 4 affect; no anxiety or unusual evidence of depression; normal thought content; 5 normal concentration; normal attention span; no suicidal ideation; and no agitation, 6 mood swings or pressured speech. AR 21, 314, 322, 324, 489, 505, 513, 522-24, 7 551. An ALJ may reject a doctor’s opinion when it is inconsistent with other 8 evidence in the record. See Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 9 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). 10 The ALJ also discounted Dr. Dalley’s opinion because it consists of a check- 11 box form without explanation for the basis of the conclusions. AR. 21, 341-45. 12 “[A]n ALJ need not accept the opinion of a doctor if that opinion is brief, 13 conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Id. at 1216. 14 Furthermore, check-box form statements may be given less weight when they are 15 conclusory in nature and lack substantive medical findings to support them or they 16 are inconsistent with the underlying medical records. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. 17 Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 18 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). 19 When the ALJ presents a reasonable interpretation that is supported by the 20 evidence, it is not the role of the courts to second-guess it. Rollins, 261 F.3d 853, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 15 1 857. The Court “must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences 2 reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111; see also 3 Thomas, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one 4 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion 5 must be upheld”). Thus, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in his consideration of 6 Dr. Dalley’s opinion. 7 8 9 c. Robin Gunn, PA-C. Mr. Gunn is a physician’s assistant who provided an opinion on May 3, 2013, following a physical examination. AR 21, 335-37. Mr. Gunn opined that 10 Plaintiff is limited to a sedentary residual functional capacity. Id. Mr. Gunn’s 11 opinion is contradicted by the opinion of testifying medical expert Dr. Vu and the 12 opinions of DDS physical medical consultants, all of whom were given great or 13 significant weight and are unchallenged by the Plaintiff. See AR 20-21. The 14 opinion testimony of Mr. Gunn falls under the category of “other sources,” and the 15 ALJ must give germane reasons for discounting it. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915 16 (9th Cir.1993). 17 The ALJ assigned little weight to Dr. Gunn’s opinion and provided valid 18 reasons for doing so. AR 18, 21-22. First, the ALJ noted that Mr. Gunn’s statement 19 about Plaintiff’s physical impairments was inconsistent with the record evidence, 20 which revealed mostly unremarkable physical examination findings. Id. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 16 1 Inconsistency with medical evidence is a germane reason to discount statements 2 from other sources. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005). 3 An ALJ may reject even a doctor’s opinion when it is inconsistent with other 4 evidence in the record. See Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 5 595, 602-603 (9th Cir. 1999). Specifically, the ALJ noted that examination records 6 in October 2013, five months after Mr. Gunn’ examination and opinion, revealed 7 normal lumbar flexion and extension and negative straight leg raises. AR 18, 508. 8 Additionally, while Plaintiff complained of severe tenderness and decreased range 9 of motion during his examination with Mr. Gunn in May 2013, the ALJ noted that 10 “these complaints are wholly inconsistent with the other treatment records showing 11 no tenderness, no joint deformities or abnormalities, normal range of motion in all 12 four extremities, and no gait disturbance. AR 18, 306, 316, 502, 506, 508, 522. 13 Additionally, the ALJ noted that Mr. Gunn completed his statement without the 14 benefit of reviewing any diagnostic imaging results. AR 21. Mr. Gunn in fact states 15 that he was ordering “x-rays first [then] depending on [those] results [he] may need 16 future MRI and a possible ortho referral.” AR 337. Mr. Gunn’s opinion is actually 17 contradicted by the diagnostic imaging of record, which shows Plaintiff’s 18 complaints of severe chronic shoulder, hip, elbow, and wrist pain were not 19 substantiated by the diagnostic imaging results, and which were mostly 20 unremarkable. AR 19, 329-33. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 17 1 When the ALJ presents a reasonable interpretation that is supported by the 2 evidence, it is not the role of the courts to second-guess it. Rollins, 261 F.3d 853, 3 857. The Court “must uphold the ALJ's findings if they are supported by inferences 4 reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111; see also 5 Thomas, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (if the “evidence is susceptible to more than one 6 rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the conclusion 7 must be upheld”). Thus, the Court finds the ALJ did not err in his consideration of 8 Mr. Gunn’s opinion. 9 10 C. The ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. Plaintiff very briefly reargues that his assessed residual functional capacity 11 and the ultimate determination regarding disability did not account for all of his 12 limitations. ECF No. 12 at 16. The Court disagrees. The ALJ specifically stated 13 that all symptoms consistent with the medical evidence were considered in 14 assessing Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. AR 17. The record shows the 15 ALJ did account for the objective medical limitations, so the Court finds no error. 16 The Court will uphold the ALJ’s findings when a claimant attempts to restate the 17 argument that the residual functional capacity finding did not account for all 18 limitations. See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, 19 the Court finds the ALJ did not err in assessing Plaintiff’s residual functional 20 capacity or in the ultimate determination regarding disability. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 18 1 VIII. Conclusion 2 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court finds the 3 ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error. 4 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: 5 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 12, is DENIED. 6 2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 16, is 7 GRANTED. 8 3. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant and the file shall be 9 CLOSED. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order, 11 forward copies to counsel and close the file. 12 13 14 DATED this 30th day of July, 2018. s/Robert H. Whaley ROBERT H. WHALEY Senior United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 19

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