Anderson v. Russell et al, No. 2:2017cv00412 - Document 21 (E.D. Wash. 2018)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING 9 DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Case is closed. Signed by Judge Rosanna Malouf Peterson. (AY, Case Administrator)**10 PAGES, PRINT ALL**(Kevin Anderson, Prisoner ID: 727189)
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Anderson v. Russell et al Doc. 21 1 FI LED I N THE U.S. DI STRI CT COURT EASTERN DI STRI CT OF WASHI NGTON 2 Aug 20, 2018 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 7 KEVIN ANDERSON, NO: 2:17-CV-412-RMP Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 10 11 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SCOTT RUSSELL; BELINDA STEWART; BRAD SIMPSON; JAMES KEY; JOSEPH LUCE; and JOHN or JANE DOES NO. 1, 12 Defendants. 13 14 BEFORE THE COURT is a motion for summary judgment by Defendants 15 Scott Russell, et al. ECF No. 9. Washington Assistant Attorney General Candie 16 Dibble represents Defendants, and Plaintiff Kevin Anderson represents himself. The 17 Court has reviewed the motion and record, has heard arguments from counsel, and is 18 fully informed. 19 /// 20 /// 21 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 BACKGROUND The Washington State Department of Corrections (the “Department”) spends 3 approximately $2.44 for each standard meal served to inmates. ECF No. 11 at 2. At 4 Passover, the Department offers inmates who practice Judaism the option of meals 5 that do not contain fermented grains. These special meals cost approximately $6.25 6 each. Id. at 3. 7 Chaplains at the Department’s correctional institutions work with inmates and 8 Department employees to process inmates’ religious diet requests. ECF No. 12 at 1– 9 2. Historically, the Passover meal service was available only to inmates who had 10 specified a Jewish Religious Preference and received a kosher diet. Id. at 2. 11 However, in February 2014, the Department separated its process for addressing 12 requests to receive eight days of Passover meal service from its kosher diet list. Id. 13 Following the policy change, the number of inmates participating in the Passover 14 meal service jumped from an average of eight to ten inmates to over 200 inmates by 15 2016, at a cost of over $300,000, without accounting for additional labor costs. Id. 16 at 2–3. Consequently, in 2017, the Department issued new criteria to chaplains to 17 restrict participation in the Passover meal service to a smaller, more specific group 18 of inmates. Id. at 3. To be eligible to receive the Passover meal service after the 19 policy change, an inmate must submit his request to participate in the meal service 20 by an established deadline and either be a current kosher meal participant or be a 21 non-kosher meal participant “with demonstrated participation in Jewish Messianic, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~2 1 Christian or religious programming applicable to the Jewish faith over the past 2 twelve months.” Id. at 3. 3 Plaintiff Kevin Anderson is serving a sentence imposed by a Washington 4 State Court and is currently incarcerated at Airway Heights Corrections Center 5 (“Airway Heights”) in Airway Heights, Washington. ECF No. 12 at 3. Mr. 6 Anderson sought to receive the Passover meals in 2017. A Department chaplain at 7 Airway Heights reviewed Mr. Anderson’s records and found that he was not a 8 kosher meal recipient and did not participate in religious programming applicable to 9 the Jewish faith at the correctional facility’s Religious Activities Center during the 10 twelve months prior to his Passover meal request. ECF No. 12 at 3. Therefore, the 11 chaplain did not approve Mr. Anderson’s meal participation request. Id. Mr. 12 Anderson again requested to receive the Passover meal service in 2018. The Airway 13 Heights chaplain again denied Mr. Anderson’s request, on the same basis as in 2017. 14 Airway Heights also offered Jewish religious programming for Passover, and 15 throughout the year, which Mr. Anderson was “welcomed and encouraged” to 16 attend, regardless of his ineligibility to receive Passover meal service in the Airway 17 Heights dining hall. 18 The Airway Heights chaplain further avers that Mr. Anderson “may also sign 19 up to receive a kosher diet or attend Jewish religious services or activities during the 20 year so that he may meet the criteria for Passover Food Service the following year. 21 Nothing prohibits his attendance at any religious services or programs offered in the ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~3 1 prison chapel.” ECF No. 12 at 5. Specific to Passover, inmates may participate in a 2 Seder and other observances and services related to the holiday, regardless of 3 whether they are approved to participate in the Passover meal service. Id. at 4. 4 Mr. Anderson filed a grievance contesting the chaplain’s denial of Mr. 5 Anderson’s Passover meal service request in 2017. In resolving Mr. Anderson’s 6 appeal of the grievance, Department Corrections Program Administrator Scott 7 Russell (a named Defendant in this action) concurred with the chaplain’s 8 determination and explained in his written decision: 9 The Memo to All Inmates dated December 22, 2016 clearly identified the requirements for participation in Passover: 10 This year preference will be given to kosher meal participants and non-kosher meal participants who have participated in Jewish, Messianic, Christian or religious programming applicable to the Jewish faith over the past twelve (12) months. Those who do not meet these requirements will be approved or denied at the discretion of the facility Chaplain. 11 12 13 14 15 These changes were implemented because [the Department] can no longer afford the expense of individuals participating in Passover who have no desire to participate in any other aspect of the faith. You do not meet the criteria for participation. 16 ECF No. 16-1 at 8. 17 In response to the present motion for summary judgment, Mr. Anderson 18 submitted a declaration in which he indicated that he follows the “United 19 Church of God’s teachings,” and he believes the following with respect to 20 Passover: 21 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~4 1 • “that recognition and celebration of Passover is meant to serve as a 2 reminder that eternal life is only possible through Christ, who in the 3 Bible is identified as the true Passover lamb[,]”; • “that the last supper was a Passover meal, and at that meal, Jesus 4 5 explains the symbolism of the food and drink at Passover meals”; and • “that Christ was sacrificed on Passover, and the observance of Passover 6 7 8 is meant to remind His people of His sacrifice.” ECF No. 16-1 at 2. 9 Plaintiff’s complaint contends the following violations based on 10 Defendants’ denial of the Passover meal service: (1) the Religious Land Use 11 and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”); and (2) the “establishment-of- 12 religion prohibition” of the Washington State Constitution, Article I, Section 13 11. 14 LEGAL STANDARD 15 Summary Judgment 16 Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no 17 genuine dispute as to any material fact that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 18 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 19 317, 322 (1986). A genuine dispute exists where “the evidence is such that a 20 reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. 21 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material if it “might affect ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~5 1 the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. “Factual disputes that are 2 irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. 3 The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a 4 genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party 5 meets this challenge, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set out specific 6 facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324 (internal quotations omitted). “A 7 non-movant’s bald assertions or a mere scintilla of evidence in his favor are both 8 insufficient to withstand summary judgment.” F.T.C. v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 9 929 (9th Cir. 2009). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must 10 construe the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable 11 to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Electric Contractors Ass’n, 12 809 F.2d 626, 631–32 (9th Cir. 1987). 13 Religious Land Use and Incarcerated Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) 14 RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., provides that 15 No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person – (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 16 17 18 19 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). A plaintiff seeking relief under RLUIPA must show that 20 his religious exercise has been burdened and that the burden is substantial. Id. 21 RLUIPA must be “construed broadly in favor of protecting an inmate’s right to ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~6 1 exercise his religious beliefs.” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2 2005). The Ninth Circuit has explained that for a burden on religious exercise to be 3 “substantial,” it “must be ‘oppressive’ to a ‘significantly great’ extent” and must 4 impose a “significantly great restriction or onus” upon the inmate’s religious 5 exercise. San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th 6 Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). If the plaintiff succeeds in making a prima 7 facie showing of a substantial burden on religious exercise, the burden shifts to the 8 government to demonstrate that the challenged practice both furthers a compelling 9 government interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 42 10 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 11 2008). 12 Washington State Constitution 13 The Washington State Constitution’s religious freedom clause protects 14 “freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship.” 15 Wash. Const. art. I, § 11. However, “the liberty of conscience . . . shall not be so 16 construed as to . . . justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the 17 state.” Id. 18 19 20 JURISDICTION Defendants removed Plaintiff’s suit to this Court on federal question jurisdiction, based on Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see ECF No. 1. 21 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~7 1 The Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Washington state 2 constitutional claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 3 DISCUSSION 4 Mr. Anderson argues that Defendant has “unnecessarily burdened” Mr. 5 Anderson’s exercise of religion by denying his requests to receive Passover meal 6 service in 2017 and 2018. ECF No. 16 at 1. Mr. Anderson further argues that 7 observing Passover is related to his “sincerely held religious beliefs” and that Mr. 8 Anderson’s offer to pay for his Passover meals negates additional cost as a 9 justification for denying Mr. Anderson’s Passover meal request. 10 In seeking summary judgment, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s RLUIPA 11 claim fails because Plaintiff does not show, or even allege, that Defendants have 12 placed substantial pressure on him to modify his behavior or violate his beliefs. 13 ECF No. 9 at 5. 14 Mr. Anderson indicates that he believes in observing Passover as a Christian. 15 He does not declare any belief in the Jewish faith, and he does not explain how his 16 beliefs prohibit him from consuming leavened or fermented grain products during 17 the Passover period. There is no indication or allegation that Defendants inhibited 18 Plaintiff in any way from participating in Passover-related religious services or 19 programming other than not providing him with Passover meals. The Court finds 20 that denial of special Passover meals alone, without any indication that Plaintiff’s 21 beliefs compel such a diet, do not substantially burden Plaintiff’s exercise of his ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~8 1 religious beliefs. Moreover, even if Plaintiff had shown a substantial burden, 2 Defendants have shown a compelling state interest in reducing the collective cost of 3 providing specialized Passover meal service to inmates who do not receive a kosher 4 diet nor practice the religion with which the meal service is associated. 5 Defendants refer to the free exercise clause of the First Amendment to the 6 U.S. Constitution in their briefing. See ECF No. 17 at 3. However, the Court does 7 not find any mention of a First Amendment-based claim in Plaintiff’s complaint. 8 See ECF No. 3-1 at 10 (stating causes of action). Moreover, even if the Court were 9 to liberally construe Plaintiff’s complaint to state a First Amendment claim, the 10 standards under RLUIPA are more favorable to plaintiffs than those under the First 11 Amendment. Greene, 513 F.3d at 986. To state a claim for violation of his First 12 Amendment right to free exercise of religion, Plaintiff would need to show that the 13 Defendants burdened his practice of religion without any justification reasonably 14 related to legitimate penological interests. Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 15 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, because the Court already found that Defendants did not 16 burden Plaintiff’s practice of his religion, there also is no burden on Plaintiff’s free 17 exercise for purposes of the First Amendment. 18 Finally, if a court dismisses a plaintiff’s federal claims before trial, there is no 19 justification for adjudicating a pendent state law claim. United Mine Workers v. 20 Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). Therefore, Plaintiff’s supplemental state law 21 claim based on the Washington State Constitution are dismissed without prejudice ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~9 1 upon dismissal of his RLUIPA claim on the same facts. See Les Shockley Racing, 2 Inc. v. Nat’l Hot Rod Ass’n, 884 F.2d 504, 509 (9th Cir. 1989). 3 4 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 9, is 5 GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA 6 claim is dismissed with prejudice, and Plaintiff’s Washington State 7 constitutional claim is dismissed without prejudice. 8 2. The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment for Defendants. 9 3. Any pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT, and all upcoming 10 11 hearings and deadlines are STRICKEN. IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Clerk is directed to enter this 12 Order, enter judgment as directed, provide copies to counsel and to Plaintiff, and 13 close this case. 14 DATED August 20, 2018. 15 16 s/ Rosanna Malouf Peterson ROSANNA MALOUF PETERSON United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~10
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