Cronk v. City of West Richland et al, No. 4:2014cv05041 - Document 95 (E.D. Wash. 2015)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERTS, granting in part and denying in part 55 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 68 Motion to Exclude Experts. Signed by Senior Judge Edward F. Shea. (AY, Case Administrator)
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Cronk v. City of West Richland et al Doc. 95 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 6 7 No. KENNETH LEE CRONK, 8 Plaintiff, 9 10 4:14-CV-5041-EFS ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERTS v. CITY OF WEST RICHLAND, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 Plaintiff, Mr. Kenneth Cronk, is suing the City of West 14 Richland, and many of its governing officers, for alleged civil rights 15 violations resulting from the issuance of two separate notices of 16 trespass by the city barring him from coming on city property. ECF No. 17 1. He claims these actions violated his rights under the First and 18 Fourteenth Amendment and is seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He 19 also claims that certain city officials conspired to deprive him of 20 these rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Finally, he claims that 21 the 22 Defendants respond that Mr. Cronk was given the notices of trespass 23 after he was routinely disruptive at city council meetings and made 24 “threatening statements” to a government staffer. See ECF No. 55. They 25 claim that this was a reasonable restriction that did not deprive Mr. 26 Cronk of his rights. Id. They also claim that they are protected by city itself is liable under a Monell theory of liability. ORDER - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 qualified immunity. Defendants have moved for summary judgment and for 2 exclusion of Plaintiff’s experts. I. 3 FACTUAL HISTORY 4 Mr. Cronk has been a citizen of West Richland for over thirty 5 years and was a regular attendee of the West Richland city council 6 meetings. ECF No. 73 at 2. By his own admission, Mr. Cronk attended 7 eleven city council meetings between April 2008 and November 2013. Id. 8 At each of these meetings, Mr. Cronk spoke during the public comment 9 period. See id. at 3-5. His complaints, however, were always the same. 10 According to Mr. Cronk, in 2006 and 2007, a series of incidents 11 occurred at his home involving his son, a “mentally disabled third 12 party,” and Mr. Cronk’s wife that resulted in the hospitalization of 13 Ms. Cronk and criminal citations being issued to Mr. Cronk’s wife and 14 son. 15 investigation was improper and insufficient. Id. The Chief of Police 16 for the City of West Richland, Brian McElroy, met with Mr. Cronk and 17 personally looked into the matter. ECF No. 58 at 4. Reportedly, Chief 18 McElroy concluded there was nothing to be done. Id. As a result, Mr. 19 Cronk began protesting this “inept” police work both in public and at 20 the city council meetings he attended. ECF Nos. 56 & 73. Every time 21 that Mr. Cronk attended the city council meetings, he would air these 22 same grievances. ECF No. 66 at 3. The city claims that this repeated 23 use 24 disruption 25 however, the record indicates that the city councilors were willing to See of ECF the 26 ORDER - 2 Nos. public of the 56 & 73. comment city Mr. period council Cronk for believes personal proceedings. Id. that the grievances at 4. police was a Generally, 1 let Mr. Cronk air his claims but repeatedly told him that nothing more 2 could be done. See ECF No. 56 at 7. 3 On June 19, 2012, the City of West Richland issued a notice of 4 trespass to Mr. Cronk informing him that he was “not to enter or 5 remain 6 Richland, WA 99353.” ECF No. 51, Ex. A. The notice explained that if 7 he did enter he would be subject to arrest and criminal prosecution 8 for trespass. Id. In this notice, there was no procedure by which Mr. 9 Cronk could enter city hall to conduct business with the city nor by 10 which he could challenge the notice. See id. The property at 3801 West 11 Van Giesen was 12 Department. ECF No. 56 at 16. This notice was issued by Mayor Donna 13 Noski after she had conversations about Mr. Cronk with Police Chief 14 Brian McElroy and City Attorney Bronson Brown. at the properties home to located at West Richland 3801 West Van Giesen, West City Hall and Public Works 15 During June or July of 2012, Mr. Cronk would routinely deliver 16 documents relating to a pending lawsuit against the City to West 17 Richland city hall. ECF No. 67 at 4. On one occasion during that time 18 period, 19 Richland 20 conversation, Mr. Cronk said something to the effect that he “had to 21 take medications so that he doesn’t think about shooting people.” ECF 22 No. 67 at 4. Ms. Richardson reported this statement to her superiors. 23 Id. at 5. Mr. Cronk denies the allegation. ECF No. 78-1 ¶¶ 37-38 24 (denying generally that he ever threatened anyone but not denying that 25 he 26 threatened any governmental employee. Id. He claims that he merely Mr. made ORDER - 3 Cronk City the delivered Clerk. specific Ms. documents Richardson statement). He to Ms. alleges claims Richardson that that the during he has West their never 1 stated his displeasure and that he “had the right to ‘sue’ each of the 2 departments or agencies.” Id. 3 believed that Mr. Cronk had been a Hanford patrol officer, that he is 4 a veteran, and that he suffers from PTSD. ECF No. 56 at 9. These 5 facts, 6 fervent criticisms of the city, led Police Chief McElroy and Major 7 Noski to believe that Mr. Cronk was a public safety concern.1 Id. at 8 10-12. combined with Mr. Ms. Richardson and others at the city Cronk’s statement and his repeated and 9 On August 29, 2012, a second notice of trespass was issued to 10 Mr. Cronk also banning him from 3803 W. Van Giesen Street, which is 11 the public library. ECF Nos. 58-2 & 55 at 16. City council meetings 12 were held at the public library. This notice was also modified to say 13 that if Mr. Cronk needed to access city property or facilities, he 14 should contact the Chief of Police’s office and the Chief would help 15 with whatever he needed. 16 On November 5, 2013, for the first time in over a year after the 17 notice of trespass was issued, Mr. Cronk attended the city council 18 meeting to inquire as to why he was sent the notices of trespass. ECF 19 No. 73 at 8-9. The city council informed him that they would look into 20 it and have an answer at their next meeting. At the next meeting on 21 November 19, 2013, Mr. Cronk again raised the issue. Id. The council 22 referred him to the Chief of Police. Id. Mr. Cronk was not asked to 23 leave either of these city council meetings. However, after the second 24 1 25 26 Defendants dispute this chronology of events. Defendants claim the threatening statement was made prior to issuing the first notice of trespass on June 19, 2012. The only lawsuit the Court is aware of, however, is Cronk v. City of West Richland, 12-CV-5094-TOR, which was filed on July 18, 2012. There may have been a different lawsuit pending in some other court but there are no facts to support that inference. ORDER - 4 1 meeting, Chief McElroy wrote to Mr. Cronk and reiterated that Mr. 2 Cronk was allowed to go to the council meetings but needed to contact 3 the Chief before he did so. ECF Nos. 56 at 21 & 58-3. II. 4 DISCUSSION 5 Mr. Cronk has now sued the City of West Richland claiming that 6 the notices of trespass are a violation of his First and Fourteenth 7 Amendment rights and is suing for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He 8 further claims a conspiracy by government officials to deprive him of 9 said rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Finally, he claims the City of 10 West Richland is liable under a Monell theory of liability. The 11 original complaint also included a number of state law claims but 12 those were previously dismissed via summary judgment. Now, Defendants 13 move for summary judgment on Mr. Cronk’s remaining federal claims. 14 They claim that they are protected by qualified immunity and that they 15 did not violate Mr. Cronk’s rights. 16 Summary judgment is appropriate if the record establishes "no 17 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 18 judgment as a matter of law.@ 19 opposing summary judgment must point to specific facts establishing a 20 genuine dispute of material fact for trial. 21 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 22 Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). 23 make such a showing for any of the elements essential to its case for 24 which it bears the burden of proof, the trial court should grant the 25 summary-judgment motion. 26 ORDER - 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, If the non-moving party fails to Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. The Court 1 must view the facts in light most favorable to the non-moving party. 2 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 3 A. Qualified Immunity 4 The Court must begin by addressing Defendants’ claim of qualified 5 immunity. 6 officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 7 does 8 rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. 9 Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). not “The doctrine violate clearly established statutory of qualified immunity “at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” 13 Id. To overcome a qualified immunity defense, the Plaintiff must show 14 that the Defendants “violated his [] rights, and that this violation 15 was of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of 16 which a reasonable person would have known.” Reza v. Pearce, No. 13- 17 15154, 2015 WL 4899122, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2015). For the 18 reasons 19 genuine disputes as to material facts. Taking those facts in the light 20 most 21 Defendants’ actions violated Mr. Cronk’s clearly established First and 22 Fourteenth 23 protected by qualified immunity. favorable to Mr. Amendment Court Cronk, rights a and, suit constitutional 12 the from or government defense to liability.” Id. Therefore, the Court must resolve the issue below, “immunity protects 11 forth an immunity Qualified set is qualified 10 24 immunity of finds rather that reasonable jury therefore, there than are could Defendants a mere several find are that not B. First Amendment Violation; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 25 Mr. Cronk claims that the notices of trespass, barring him from 26 city property, violated his First Amendment rights. In determining ORDER - 6 1 whether Defendants’ 2 rights, we must begin by determining from what type of forum was Mr. 3 Cronk 4 recognize three types of public fora: (1) traditional public fora; (2) 5 designated public fora; and (3) limited public fora. Perry Educ. Ass'n 6 v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983). Traditional 7 public fora are areas historically used by the public for assembly, 8 such as sidewalks and parks. Id. Designated public fora are those 9 where “the government intentionally opens a nontraditional forum for 10 public discourse.” Reza, __ F.3d at *4 (quoting DiLoreto v. Downey 11 Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 964 (9th Cir. 1999). 12 Limited public fora are public property “limited to use by certain 13 groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects.” 14 Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2010). The 15 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held “that city council meetings, 16 where the public has the opportunity to address officers of a local 17 government or local governmental agency,” like the one Mr. Cronk was 18 barred from attending, “are limited public fora.” Reza, __ F.3d at *4. banned. See actions Reza, __ violated F.3d at Mr. *4. Cronk’s Federal First courts Amendment generally 19 “[I]n order to safeguard the purpose of a limited public forum, 20 the government may restrict speech in that forum.” Reza, __ F.3d at *4 21 (quoting White v. City of Norwalk, 900 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 22 1990). “In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the state 23 may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or 24 otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not 25 an 26 oppose the speaker's view.” Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46. effort ORDER - 7 to suppress expression merely because public officials According 1 to the record before the Court, the restrictions 2 imposed on Mr. Cronk were viewpoint neutral. All of the declarations, 3 affidavits, and other evidence submitted to the Court support the fact 4 that Mayor Noski, Chief McElroy, and Mr. Brown, trespassed Mr. Cronk 5 because he was disruptive and made threatening statements and not 6 because of what he was saying. But even viewpoint neutral restrictions 7 must be reasonable. See Reza, __ F.3d at *4. On this record, the Court 8 finds 9 whether or not the city’s restrictions were reasonable. several material issues as to disputed facts that control 10 First, it is unclear how disruptive Mr. Cronk truly was during 11 the city council meetings. The Mayor, the Chief of Police, the City 12 Attorney, and all of the city councilors each submitted declarations 13 to the Court discussing how disruptive Mr. Cronk was. See ECF Nos. 57- 14 66. However, by the Defendants’ own factual assertions, Mr. Cronk was 15 never violent or threatening during city council meetings, nor did he 16 engage in any minor disruptions such as speaking past the time limit. 17 The most he did, according to Defendants, was that he spoke off topic. 18 ECF No. 56 at 6-7. Each time Mr. Cronk spoke, the city simply told him 19 that they had already looked into the issue and that there was nothing 20 to be done. Id. This would end the “disruption.” See Id. 21 Additionally, it is disputed whether or not Mr. Cronk made any 22 threatening statements to city hall staff. Ms. Julie Richardson claims 23 that Mr. Cronk “made a comment to the effect that he ‘had to take 24 medications so that he doesn’t think about shooting people.’” ECF No. 25 67 at 4. She is the only person who claims to have ever heard any 26 threatening ORDER - 8 statements made by Mr. Cronk. Mr. Cronk, however, 1 generally denies having ever threatened any government employee. See 2 ECF No. 78-1 at ¶¶ 37-38. He does not, however, specifically deny 3 making the specific statement to Ms. Richardson. 4 Finally, as indicated above, there are even disputes as to the 5 basic chronology of events. Mr. Cronk asserts that the first notice of 6 trespass was issued prior to the time when the city claims that Mr. 7 Cronk 8 violate the protective order until he went to the city council meeting 9 in November 2013. But Mr. Cronk contradicts himself when he admits 10 that he delivered documents to the clerk in July 2012. The city also 11 contradicts itself when it claims that the June 19, 2012 notice of 12 trespass was not sent out until after Mr. Cronk made threatening 13 statements while delivering documents relating to Mr. Cronk’s “pending 14 lawsuit” against the city. The only suit the Court is aware of is the 15 one filed in this Court on July 18, 2012. On the record before the 16 Court, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the 17 first notice of trespass was in response to the alleged threat. his Therefore, 18 19 made threatening the Court statement denies and claims Defendants’ that Motion he for did not Summary Judgment as to the First Amendment violations. C. Fourteenth Amendment Violation; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 20 21 Mr. Cronk also claims that the city violated his procedural due 22 process rights, under Fourteenth Amendment, when it banned him from 23 city property.2 The Fourteenth Amendment states, “. . . nor shall any 24 state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 25 2 26 Mr. Cronk did not respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding the Fourteenth Amendment in his briefing. However, it was raised in oral argument and discussed at length. Therefore, the Court finds it appropriate to decide the matter on its merits. ORDER - 9 1 process of law.” “The requirements of procedural due process apply 2 only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth 3 Amendment's protection of liberty and property.” Bd. of Regents of 4 State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). The Supreme Court 5 has not attempted to define “liberty” under the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 but [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 7 8 9 10 11 Id. 12 When a person is deprived of a significant interest, absent 13 extraordinary circumstances where government interests justify waiting 14 until after the deprivation, “the right to some kind of prior hearing 15 is paramount.” Id. See also, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 16 (1971). 17 Here, Mr. Cronk claims that he was deprived of his First 18 Amendment right of free speech and right to petition the government 19 when he was banned from city property. He also claims that he was not 20 given notice and an opportunity to be heard either before or after the 21 notice was sent. Again, how the factual discrepancies highlighted 22 above are resolved will inform what process Mr. Cronk should have been 23 afforded. If it is found that Mr. Cronk was a legitimate safety 24 concern, then a hearing after the deprivation may have been 25 appropriate. What is clear, however, is that some procedure was due to 26 ORDER - 10 1 Mr. Cronk and, based solely on the text of the notices, Mr. Cronk was 2 given none. Neither notice of trespass afforded him an opportunity to 3 challenge the deprivation. See ECF Nos. 57-1 & 57-3. The first notice 4 was a complete, total, and unending bar from city property. ECF No. 5 51-1. 6 7 8 For these reasons, the Court denies the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim. D. Conspiracy Claim; 42 U.S.C. § 1985 9 The Defendants also move to dismiss the conspiracy claim arguing 10 a lack of evidence. “A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or 11 more persons who, by some concerted action, intend to accomplish some 12 unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another which results in 13 damage.” Vieux v. E. Bay Reg'l Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330, 1343 (9th 14 Cir.1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To prove a 15 civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must show that the conspiring parties 16 “reached a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a 17 meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrangement.” Id. (citation and 18 internal quotation marks omitted). “To be liable, each participant in 19 the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each 20 participant 21 conspiracy.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 22 F.2d 1539, 1541 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc). A defendant's knowledge of 23 and participation in a conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial 24 evidence and from evidence of the defendant's actions. See United 25 States v. Calabrese, 825 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1987) (involving a 26 criminal conspiracy). ORDER - 11 must at least share the common objective of the 1 Here, the Defendants argue that there is insufficient evidence 2 to find that a conspiracy to deny Mr. Cronk of his civil rights 3 occurred. ECF No. 55 at 16. Their claim rests largely on the argument 4 that 5 therefore, there could be no conspiracy. As discussed above, there are 6 disputed material facts which could lead a jury to find that Mr. 7 Cronk’s rights were, in fact, violated. Additionally, the Defendants’ 8 declarations repeatedly reflect conversations between the Mayor, the 9 Chief of Police, 10 regarding Mr. 11 support the fact that the three of them agreed that Mr. Cronk should 12 be 13 violated when they trespassed him, there is circumstantial evidence 14 that might support a finding that they conspired to do so. there was trespassed. no constitutional and the City Cronk. If There it is violation to Attorney about were many determined letters that Mr. begin with a course and of action admissions Cronk’s and, rights that were 15 During oral arguments, the parties stipulated to the fact that 16 there was no evidence in the record to show that that the city council 17 members 18 parties agreed to the dismissal of the conspiracy claims as to the 19 city council members. were For 20 the involved reasons in any stated alleged above, conspiracy. the Court Therefore, grants the Defendants’ 21 Motion for Summary Judgement as to the conspiracy claims only as 22 alleged against city council members. The Court denies Defendants’ 23 Motion 24 against Mayor Donna Noski, Chief Brian McElroy, and Mr. Bronson Brown. 25 // 26 // for ORDER - 12 Summary Judgment as to the Conspiracy claims alleged E. Monell Liability 1 Mr. Cronk alleges that the City of Richland is also liable under 2 3 a 4 judgment arguing Mr. Cronk has provided no evidence to show that there 5 is a policy or custom of trespassing citizens. 6 7 Monell theory of liability. Defendants have moved for summary Under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), 11 a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. 12 Defendants are correct in that Mr. Cronk has shown no other incidents 13 where similar alleged violations have occurred. However, this is not 14 the only manner by which a municipality may be found liable under 15 Monell. 8 9 10 16 “[A] local government may be held liable under § 1983 when the 17 individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official with 18 final policy-making authority . . .” Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra 19 Costa, 20 Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992)). “There must . . . be 21 evidence of a conscious, affirmative choice.” Gillette, 979 F.2d at 22 1347. Liability “attaches only where a deliberate choice to follow a 23 course 24 official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with 25 respect to the subject matter in question.” Id. 591 of 26 ORDER - 13 F.3d action 1232, is 1250 made (9th from Cir. among 2010) various (quoting Gillette alternatives by v. the Here, the Mayor of the City of West Richland signed the two 1 2 notices 3 Additionally, by her own admissions, she chose the notice of trespass 4 over various alternatives. ECF No. 66 at 5-6 (“I discussed possible 5 options . . . . the Chief conveyed several possible options to me . . 6 . 7 intrusive on Mr. Cronk.”). . of This trespass option was against selected Mr. Cronk. because it During seemed oral to be argument, the least 8 The Court makes no finding as to whether Mr. Cronk’s rights were 9 violated. But what is undisputed is that the actions taken by the city 10 were taken by Mayor Noski, that 11 authority on the subject, and that she weighed several options before 12 making her decision. As a result, if it is determined that Mr. Cronk’s 13 rights were violated, the city could be held liable under a Monell 14 theory of liability. 15 she was the final policy making F. The City Council Members’ Liability 16 In his complaint, Mr. Cronk alleges all of the above discussed 17 claims against the city council members in their personal capacity. 18 However, no evidence has been provided to show that any of them were 19 involved in the decision to trespass Mr. Cronk. All that is shown is 20 that the city council members were informed of the decision after it 21 was made by the mayor. 22 “In order for a person acting under color of state law to be 23 liable under 24 participation 25 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). See also, Taylor v. List, 26 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Liability under section 1983 ORDER - 14 section in the 1983 there alleged must rights be a showing deprivation . . of .” personal Jones v. 1 arises only upon 2 defendant.”). 3 supervisor “knew of the violations [by the employee] and failed to act 4 to prevent them.” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. A a showing defendant may of also personal be participation liable if he or by she the is a 5 Here, no evidence has been offered to show that the city council 6 members participated in any of the violations alleged by Mr. Cronk. 7 There is also no evidence to show that any of the council members knew 8 that the notices of trespass were being sent. The only evidence in the 9 record shows that the council members were told of the notices after 10 they had been sent. In any event, it is unclear whether the city 11 council would be the “supervisor” of the Mayor with the power to 12 override her authority. However, Plaintiff’s counsel agreed that Mayor 13 Noski was the final policy making authority, subjecting the city to 14 liability, and that the city council was the legislative authority. 15 Unless the city council was the considered the final policy maker, the 16 Court cannot impose liability under §1983 for its inaction. Plaintiff 17 cites no authority to support that proposition. 18 Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary 19 Judgement as to the city council members and dismisses them from this 20 action. 21 G. Motion to Exclude Experts 22 Defendants have also moved to exclude expert testimony offered 23 by Mr. Cronk. ECF No. 68. Mr. Cronk, in both oral argument and in 24 briefing, conceded the motion and informed the Court that he does not 25 intend to offer any expert witnesses. The Court, therefore, grants the 26 Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Experts, ECF No. 68. ORDER - 15 1 H. Mediation 2 The Court believes that the parties would benefit greatly from 3 mediation and orders mediation at a 4 Magistrate Hutton and the parties. Magistrate Judge Hutton will issue 5 a separate order outlining the date (likely late October or early 6 November), requirements, and procedures for the settlement conference. 7 1. mutually convenient for Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 8 time Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 55, as to the 9 city council Gail GRANTED. Brown, Defendants Brent Tony Benegas, 11 Hayden, and Robert Perkes are dismissed from this action. 2. Bloom, is 10 12 Richard members Gerry, Ron Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 55, as to 13 Donna Noski, Brian McElroy, Bronson Brown, and the City of 14 West Richland is DENIED. All claims remain against these 15 Defendants. 16 3. 4. 21 22 to Exclude Experts, ECF No. 68, is The Parties are ordered to participate in a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Hutton. 19 20 Motion GRANTED. 17 18 Defendants’ IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this Order and provide copies to all counsel and Magistrate Judge Hutton. DATED this 10th day of September 2015. 23 s/Edward F. Shea EDWARD F. SHEA Senior United States District Judge 24 25 26 Q:\EFS\Civil\2014\5041.ord.mot.sj.lc2.docx ORDER - 16
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