Adams v. Kijakazi, No. 4:2021cv05037 - Document 31 (E.D. Wash. 2023)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING 25 DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; denying 24 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; File is CLOSED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alexander C Ekstrom. (TNC, Case Administrator)
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Adams v. Kijakazi Doc. 31 1 2 FI LED I N THE U.S. DI STRI CT COURT EASTERN DI STRI CT OF WASHI NGTON 3 Mar 17, 2023 4 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 7 ERICA A., No. 4:21-CV-05037-ACE 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ECF Nos. 24, 25 Defendant. 15 16 BEFORE THE COURT are cross-motions for summary judgment. 17 ECF Nos. 24, 25. Attorney Chad Hatfield represents Erica A. (Plaintiff); Special 18 Assistant United States Attorney Jeffrey Staples represents the Commissioner of 19 Social Security (Defendant). The parties have consented to proceed before a 20 magistrate judge. ECF No. 6. After reviewing the administrative record and the 21 briefs filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary 22 Judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 23 JURISDICTION 24 Plaintiff filed claims for benefits (Period of Disability; Disability Insurance 25 Benefits; and Supplemental Security Income) on September 8, 2017, alleging 26 disability beginning September 1, 2009. The claims were denied initially and upon 27 reconsideration. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Kim held a hearing on February 28 12, 2020, and issued an unfavorable decision on March 6, 2020. Tr. 19-31. The ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Appeals Council denied review on January 7, 2021. Tr. 1-6. Plaintiff appealed 2 this final decision of the Commissioner on March 15, 2021. ECF No. 1. 3 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in 5 medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 6 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s determinations of law are reviewed de novo, with 7 deference to a reasonable interpretation of the applicable statutes. McNatt v. Apfel, 8 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the ALJ may be reversed 9 only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. 10 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is 11 defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. at 12 1098. Put another way, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 13 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. 14 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 15 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 16 interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. 17 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098; Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 18 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or 19 if conflicting evidence supports a finding of either disability or non-disability, the 20 ALJ’s determination is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 21 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will be 22 set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence 23 and making the decision. Brawner v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 839 24 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 2 1 2 SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 3 for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 4 416.920(a); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). In steps one through 5 four, the claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability. 6 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99. This burden is met once a claimant establishes that a 7 physical or mental impairment prevents the claimant from engaging in past 8 relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). If a claimant cannot 9 perform past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to step five, and the burden shifts to 10 the Commissioner to show (1) the claimant can make an adjustment to other work 11 and (2) the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in 12 the national economy. Beltran v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012). If a 13 claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work in the national economy, the 14 claimant will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). 15 16 17 18 19 ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS On March 6, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 1, 2009, the alleged onset date. Tr. 22. 20 At step two, the ALJ determined that prior to the December 31, 2013, date 21 last insured, Plaintiff had no severe impairments. The ALJ determined that since 22 the filing of Plaintiff’s application, Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 23 methamphetamine abuse; cannabis use disorder; bipolar disorder; intermittent 24 explosive disorder; and generalized anxiety disorder. Tr. 22-23. 25 At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s mental impairments, including her 26 substance abuse disorder, meet the criteria of section 12.04 of 20 CFR Part 404, 27 Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ determined, however, if Plaintiff stopped the 28 substance use, she would not have an impairment or combination of impairments ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 3 1 that meets or medically equals any of the impairments listed in 20 CFR Part 404, 2 Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 23-25. 3 The ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) and 4 determined that if Plaintiff stopped the substance use, she could perform work at 5 all exertional levels, except she must avoid all exposure to unprotected heights, 6 subject to the following limitations: performing simple, routine tasks with a 7 reasoning of 3 or less; work involving no interaction with the public although she 8 could be in the presence of the public; and work involving only occasional and 9 superficial interaction with coworkers. Tr. 26. 10 11 12 At step four, the ALJ found if Plaintiff stopped the substance use, she would be unable perform past relevant work. Tr. 29. At step five, the ALJ determined there are jobs that exist in significant 13 numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform if she stopped the 14 substance use. Tr. 30. 15 The ALJ thus concluded Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 31. 16 17 ISSUES The question presented is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 18 decision denying benefits and, if so, whether that decision is based on proper legal 19 standards. 20 Plaintiff raises the following issues for review: (A) whether the ALJ erred by 21 finding no severe impairments at step two for purposes of her DIB application; (B) 22 whether the ALJ properly conducted a step three analysis; (C) whether the ALJ 23 erred by discounting her subjective complaints; and (D) whether the ALJ erred by 24 conducting an improper step five analysis. ECF No. 24 at 8. 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 4 1 2 DISCUSSION A. Step Two 3 For purposes of Plaintiff’s DIB claim, the ALJ found at step two that 4 Plaintiff did not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments prior to 5 the date last insured. Tr. 22. Plaintiff contends this was error, averring that the 6 ALJ erroneously discounted the severity of bipolar disorder, anxiety, and migraine 7 headaches. ECF No. 24 at 10-15. As discussed below, the Court concludes the 8 ALJ did not err at step two. 9 At step two, a claimant must make a threshold showing her medically 10 determinable impairments significantly limit her ability to perform basic work 11 activities. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 145; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). In 12 finding Plaintiff’s mental impairments non-severe, the ALJ relied on the absence 13 of “evidence of mental health treatment prior to the December 31, 2013 date last 14 insured,” noting Plaintiff’s “treatment prior to this date was limited to emergency 15 room visits for short lasting physical complaints, and a pregnancy in early 2012.” 16 Tr. 23. The ALJ thus concluded “[t]he lack of any significant mental health 17 treatment evident in the record prior to the December 31, 2013 date last insured 18 indicates that her mental impairments prior to that time was only a slight 19 abnormality having no more than a minimal effect on her ability to work. As such, 20 the undersigned finds that they were nonsevere impairments prior to the date last 21 insured.” Tr. 23. 22 Substantial evidence supports this finding. Indeed, Plaintiff’s arguments to 23 the contrary are belied by her own admissions and testimony. See Tr. 40 24 (admitting records for mental health treatment post-date the date last insured); Tr. 25 44 (testifying to “little [mental health] symptoms maybe once or twice a month” in 26 2012 and 2013). While Plaintiff points to diagnoses of anxiety and bipolar 27 disorder, and a singular mental status examination in 2014, see ECF No. 24 at 13- 28 14 (citing Tr. 341-42, 446, 628, 691), the medical record evidence on which she ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 5 1 relies is not sufficient to show these mental impairments significantly limited her 2 ability to perform basic work activities. The ALJ accordingly reasonably found 3 Plaintiff’s mental impairments non-severe during the DIB period. Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s rejection of migraine headaches as non- 4 5 severe during the DIB period. ECF No. 24 at 14-15. In support, however, Plaintiff 6 points only to evidence significantly post-dating the date last insured and does not 7 suggest the ALJ overlooked a medical opinion that has retrospective applicability. 8 While the Court is mindful the ALJ does not have the expertise to evaluate what 9 clinical findings are necessary to corroborate Plaintiff’s claims, particularly when 10 the cause of migraines is generally unknown, see Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 11 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975) (recognizing that an ALJ is “not qualified as a medical 12 expert”); Johnson v. Saul, No. 2:18-cv-226-EFC, 2019 WL 4747701, at *4 (E.D. 13 Cal. Sept. 30, 2019) (noting that “the cause of migraine headaches is generally 14 unknown”); Groff v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 7:05-CV-54, 2008 WL 4104689, at 15 *8 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2008) (citing The Merck Manual 1376 (17th ed. 1999)), the 16 medical record evidence on which she relies is not sufficient to show migraine 17 headaches significantly limited her ability to perform basic work activities. The 18 ALJ accordingly did not err by failing to assess Plaintiff’s migraine headaches as 19 non-severe. The ALJ accordingly did not err by finding no severe impairments at step 20 21 two with respect to Plaintiff’s DIB claim. 22 B. 23 Step Three At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “mental impairments, including 24 her substance abuse disorder,” met the requirements of Listing 12.04 and were 25 therefore disabling. Tr. 23-24; 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.04. 26 The ALJ then properly assessed whether Plaintiff would still be found disabled if 27 she stopped the substance abuse, and concluded she would not be. Tr. 24-31; see 28 Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2001). ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 6 1 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by “citing no records outside October 2019” 2 and by failing to perform a longitudinal evaluation. ECF No. 24 at 16. However, 3 as noted by the Commissioner, see ECF No. 25 at 6, the ALJ reasonably relied on, 4 among other things, a self-function report completed in March 2018 – during a 5 period of sobriety. Tr. 25-26; see Tr. 243-50. Plaintiff, who bears of the burden of 6 proving that substance abuse “was not a contributing factor material to [her] 7 disability,” Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 747-48 (9th Cir. 2007), has thus failed 8 to show the ALJ erred by concluding otherwise. 9 C. 10 Subjective Complaints Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by not properly assessing Plaintiff’s 11 symptom complaints. ECF No. 24 at 17-20. Where, as here, the ALJ determines a 12 claimant has presented objective medical evidence establishing underlying 13 impairments that could cause the symptoms alleged, and there is no affirmative 14 evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only discount the claimant’s testimony as to 15 symptom severity by providing “specific, clear, and convincing” reasons supported 16 by substantial evidence. Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). 17 The ALJ indicated Plaintiff testified “experiencing periods of high energy 18 one day and then barricading herself in her room the next” and experiencing “these 19 exacerbations approximately four days per week”; “her mental impairments have 20 caused her to be less social due to difficulty interacting with others”; and “daily 21 activities, such as grocery shopping or interactions with her children, can trigger 22 her anxiety.” Tr. 27. 23 Among other grounds, the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s testimony as 24 inconsistent with her improvement with medication and mental health treatment. 25 Tr. 27-28. Substantial evidence supports this finding. See Tr. 304-307 (October 3, 26 2017, treatment note indicating Plaintiff “is working” and “is well controlled with 27 her medications”); Tr. 300-303 (December 7, 2017, treatment note indicating 28 Plaintiff “is working” and is “well controlled with her medications”); Tr. 356 (June ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 7 1 25, 2018, treatment note indicating Plaintiff has “normal mood and effect” and 2 “speech is normal and behavior is normal”); Tr. 1443 (August 23, 2018, treatment 3 note indicating Plaintiff “is well controlled with her medications”). The ALJ thus 4 reasonably relied on Plaintiff’s response to treatment to discount her testimony. 5 See Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[E]vidence of 6 medical treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim of 7 disability.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(1), 416.920a(c)(1)); Morgan, 169 8 F.3d at 599. Because the ALJ gave at least one valid reason for discounting Plaintiff’s 9 10 testimony, the Court need not address the balance of the ALJ’s stated reasons for 11 discounting Plaintiff’s testimony. Any inclusion of erroneous reasons was 12 inconsequential and therefore harmless. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. 13 Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008). 14 D. 15 Step Five Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred at step five by relying on an incomplete 16 hypothetical to the vocational expert. ECF No. 24 at 20. This argument is 17 foreclosed because, as discussed above, the ALJ properly evaluated the medical 18 evidence and reasonably discounted Plaintiff’s testimony. This restatement of 19 Plaintiff’s argument fails to establish error at step five. Stubbs-Danielson v. 20 Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2008). 21 CONCLUSION 22 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court finds the 23 ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free of error. 24 Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 25 1. 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 24, is DENIED. 2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 25, is GRANTED. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION . . . - 8
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