Thomas E. Glover v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: THOMAS E. GLOVER, PRO SE Bunkerhill, Indiana STEVE CARTER Attorney General of Indiana JUSTIN F. ROEBEL Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA THOMAS E. GLOVER, Appellant-Petitioner, vs. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 84A05-0605-PC-271 APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Michael H. Eldred, Judge Cause No. 84D01-9904-CF-113 December 7, 2006 MEMORANDUM DECISION NOT FOR PUBLICATION MATHIAS, Judge Thomas Glover ( Glover ) filed a petition in Vigo Superior Court for educational credit time. His petition was denied and Glover appeals. Concluding that Glover failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in the Department of Correction, and therefore, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case, we dismiss Glover s appeal. Facts and Procedural History On July 30, 1999, Glover pled guilty to Class B felony dealing in cocaine and Class D felony resisting law enforcement. He was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of ten years with four years suspended for the dealing in cocaine conviction and eighteen months for the resisting law enforcement conviction. On November 19, 2002, the court found that Glover had violated his probation and ordered him to serve the previously suspended four-year sentence. Glover was ordered to serve that sentence consecutive to a sentence imposed in a separate cause. On April 18, 2006, Glover filed a petition for additional credit time. In the petition, Glover stated that he had received his high school diploma and was therefore entitled to educational credit time pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-6-3.3. Glover alleged that the Department of Correction erroneously denied his request for additional credit time because he did not receive his diploma from a school accredited by the State of Indiana. The trial court denied his petition and Glover now appeals. Discussion and Decision The State contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Glover s petition because Glover failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with the 2 Department of Correction. [T]he question of subject matter jurisdiction entails a determination of whether a court has jurisdiction over the general class of actions to which a particular case belongs. Samuels v. State, 849 N.E.2d 689, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. The only inquiry relevant to a determination of whether the postconviction court had subject matter jurisdiction is whether the kind of claim advanced by a petitioner in the post-conviction court falls within the general scope of authority conferred upon that court by constitution or statute. Id. at 690-91. Moreover, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Id. Post-conviction relief is entirely defined in scope by the post-conviction rules our supreme court has adopted. Id. Post-conviction Rule 1(1)(a) (2006) provides that postconviction relief is only available if the petitioner claims: (1) that the conviction or sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state; (2) that the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; (3) that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise erroneous; (4) that there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice; (5) that his sentence has expired, his probation, parole or conditional release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; [or] (6) that the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy[.] 3 Glover is not challenging his conviction or the sentence that was imposed. Furthermore, he does not claim he is entitled to immediate release from prison and does not assert that his sentence exceeds the authorized sentence. Rather, his sole argument on appeal is that he was improperly denied educational credit time for earning his high school diploma. In Members v. State, 851 N.E.2d 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), our court made the following observations concerning educational credit time: [T]he legislative intent behind the educational credit time statute is to enhance rehabilitation by providing offenders with the incentive to further their education while incarcerated. While the trial court determines the initial credit time when an offender is sentenced, modification to that credit time -which includes modification because of educational credit- is the responsibility of the DOC. Stated differently, the trial court imposes the sentence, and the DOC administers the sentence. As a consequence, the DOC maintains the responsibility to deny or restore credit time. Id. at 982-83 (internal citations omitted). In Members and Samuels, our court noted that the General Assembly has established that offender grievances arising out of administrative acts that affect an offender are to be resolved through a departmental grievance procedure. 1 See id. at 983; 1 Indiana Code section 11-11-1-2 provides: The commissioner shall implement a departmental procedure in which a committed person may submit grievances arising out of the administrative acts of the department that affect that person. Although the procedure should encourage flexibility and informality in the resolution of grievances, it must be consistent with the following minimum requirements: (1) A committed person shall be informed of the grievance procedure as part of his orientation. (2) The department must periodically communicate to a committed person the rules and policies affecting him. (3) The department shall keep the person reasonably informed as to the status and ultimate disposition of his grievance. 4 Samuels, 849 N.E.2d at 692. Glover is claiming that the Department of Correction erroneously denied his request for educational credit time. Therefore, his grievance is first with the Department of Correction, and he must exhaust all of his administrative remedies with the Department of Correction before resorting to the judicial system. See Members, 851 N.E.2d at 983; Samuels, 849 N.E.2d at 692. From the record before us, it is apparent that Glover has failed to exhaust his available remedies within the Department of Correction. As a result, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Glover s petition for educational credit time, and therefore, the judgment must be set aside and this appeal dismissed. Appeal dismissed. KIRSCH, C. J., and SHARPNACK, J., concur. (4) The department may not undertake any act or practice that would discipline a person for, or otherwise discourage or limit him from, utilizing the grievance procedure. Ind. Code § 11-11-1-2 (2004). 5

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.