Sacred Heart Medical Center v. Jean Knapp - includes an Order
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
SACRED HEART MEDICAL CENTER,
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No.
30468-0-III
Respondent,
v.
JEAN KNAPP,
Appellant.
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
AMENDING OPINION
THE COURT has considered appellant’s motion for reconsideration, and respondent’s
answer to the motion, and is of the opinion the motion should be granted. Therefore,
IT IS ORDERED the motion for reconsideration of this court’s decision of November 20,
2012, is granted in part.
IT IS ORDERED the court’s opinion of November 20, 2012, is amended as follows:
On page 3 by deleting the block quote in its entirety and adding the following block quote
in its place:
(1) If, on appeal to the superior or appellate court from the decision and order of
the board, said decision and order is reversed or modified and additional relief is
granted to a worker or beneficiary, or in cases where a party other than the worker
or beneficiary is the appealing party and the worker’s or beneficiary’s right to relief
No. 30468-0-III
Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Knapp
is sustained, a reasonable fee for the services of the worker’s or beneficiary’s
attorney shall be fixed by the court.
On page 4 the third line from the bottom of the opinion, delete the following language
“There has been nothing that could be construed as an additional award here.” and add the
following in its place: “Nothing here could be construed as additional relief or a sustained right to
relief.”
DATED:
FOR THE COURT:
_____________________________________
KEVIN M. KORSMO
Chief Judge
No. 30468-0-III
Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Knapp
FILED
NOV 20, 2012
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
SACRED HEART MEDICAL CENTER,
Respondent,
v.
JEAN KNAPP,
Appellant.
No. 30468-0-III
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PUBLISHED OPINION
Sweeney, J. — RCW 51.52.130(1) requires an award of fees in an industrial
insurance claim if a “decision and order is reversed or modified and additional relief is
granted.” Here the court remanded for further consideration of whether vocational
services were in order. We conclude that this is not the grant of “additional relief”
contemplated by the statute and we affirm the court’s refusal to award fees.
FACTS
Jean Knapp injured her wrist while employed by Sacred Heart Medical Center as a
No. 30468-0-III
Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Knapp
certified nurse’s assistant. Ms. Knapp filed an application for benefits with the
Department of Labor and Industries (Department). The Department agreed and allowed
the claim.
The Department initially determined that Ms. Knapp was able to work following
treatment and did not need vocational services. Ms. Knapp filed a dispute of that
determination with the Department director who found vocational services were
necessary to assist her in returning to work. An independent physician later released Ms.
Knapp to resume work at Sacred Heart without restrictions. The Department closed the
claim.
Ms. Knapp appealed the closure to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals
(Board). The Board found that vocational rehabilitation plan development services were
required as ordered by the Department director. Sacred Heart appealed the decision of
the Board to Spokane County Superior Court.
The superior court found that the Department director is authorized to reconsider
whether vocational services are still required to restore an injured worker. The court
remanded the matter back to the Department to consider such additional information
before rendering any further vocational determinations. The court also ordered that all
parties were responsible for their own fees and costs because neither party had prevailed:
It seems to me that when you look at the relief granted here, I think
that it was more in the nature of—how can I put it—a technical correction
of a flaw that occurred in the Tribunal before it got to this Court. I don’t
No. 30468-0-III
Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Knapp
think I would characterize it as a situation where the worker here prevails
for purposes of the triggering of the attorney’s fees here.
Report of Proceedings at 8; Clerk’s Papers at 52.
Ms. Knapp appeals the denial of fees.
DISCUSSION
Whether a party is entitled to fees by the terms of a statute is a question of law that
we will review de novo. Ethridge v. Hwang, 105 Wn. App. 447, 460, 20 P.3d 958
(2001).
Ms. Knapp seeks attorney fees under RCW 51.52.130 and Brand v. Dep’t of Labor
& Indus., 139 Wn.2d 659, 989 P.2d 1111 (1999). Sacred Heart contends that Ms. Knapp
did not “prevail” because she did not obtain additional benefits or treatment, and that she
therefore is not entitled to fees. Sacred Heart contends that the director still must
consider whether the additional medical evidence supports a finding that vocational
services are not warranted and whether closure of the claim was proper.
The relevant portion of RCW 51.52.130 provides:
(1) If, on appeal to the superior or appellate court from the decision and
order of the board, said decision and order is reversed or modified and
additional relief is granted to a worker or beneficiary, or in cases where a
party other than the worker or beneficiary is the appealing party and the
worker’s or beneficiary’s right to relief is sustained, a reasonable fee for the
services of the worker’s or beneficiary’s attorney shall be fixed by the
court.
Here, the superior court’s holding was narrow; it only required that the
No. 30468-0-III
Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Knapp
Department director review the evidence of changed circumstances and make a final
determination on the need for vocational services. The holding recognized that the
director had the ultimate authority to close the claim. It is for the director to resolve
whether the claim has any remaining value. See RCW 51.32.095(9).
Ms. Knapp contends, however, that there is no requirement that a prevailing party
be recognized in order to trigger application of the statute; she urges that it is automatic
according to Brand. There the court stated, “[u]nder the statute, the worker’s degree of
overall recovery is inconsequential. This holding is consistent with the purposes behind
RCW 51.52.130. Awarding full attorney fees to workers who succeed on appeal before
the superior court or appellate court will ensure adequate representation for injured
workers.” Brand, 139 Wn.2d at 670. The court in Brand simply refused to segregate
successful claims from unsuccessful claims and apportion fees. It does not require an
automatic award of fees upon remand.
Nothing here could be construed as additional relief or a sustained right to relief.
Ms. Knapp did not succeed on appeal and is not yet entitled to fees under RCW
51.52.130.
We affirm the judgment of the superior court.
_______________________________
Sweeney, J.
WE CONCUR:
No. 30468-0-III
Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Knapp
________________________________
Korsmo, C.J.
_______________________________
Siddoway, J.
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